WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

RECEIVED
JUL 2 5 1996
THE KARRMAN L BARN
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN
PLATTEVILLE

Volume 48, Number 4 July 1996

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED BY THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD
John Waterbury, *Chair*
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Benjamin J. Cohen, Matthew Evangelista, Judith Goldstein, Stephan Haggard, Peter A. Hall, James R. Hines Jr., Miles Kahler, Jack Levy, James D. Morrow, Elizabeth Perry, Jonas Pontusson, Henry Shue, Vivienne Shue, Jack Snyder, Robert C. Tucker

Editors: Nancy Bermeo, Richard D. Challener, George W. Downs, Michael W. Doyle, Richard Falk, Aaron L. Friedberg (*Review Articles*), Robert G. Gilpin, Joanne Gowa, Jeffrey Herbst, Atul Kohli, John Waterbury

Associate Editors: Jeremy Adelman, Kent E. Calder, Harold A. Feiveson, Marc A. Levy, John B. Londregan, Kathleen R. McNamara, Pei Minxin, Gilbert Rozman, Anna Seleny, Paul E. Sigmund, Robert L. Tignor, Lynn T. White III, William C. Wohlforth
Executive Editor: Ilene P. Cohen; *Assistant Editor:* Susan Bindig
Secretary: Patricia D. Zimmer

The editors invite submission of articles (up to 10,000 words, including footnotes) bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in triplicate, together with an abstract. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Address: WORLD POLITICS, Bendheim Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within four months. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for transmitting readers' evaluations to authors of rejected manuscripts. Exceptions may be made if, in the opinion of the editors, such comments contain substantive suggestions. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publisher. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

Reprint permission: Permissions Department, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Phone: (410) 516-6987; FAX: (410) 516-6968; toll-free (800) 548-1784. Individuals: $25 per year; institutions: $56 per year. Single copies: individuals, $8.00; institutions, $15.00. For postage and handling in Canada and Mexico, add $3.80 per year; outside of North America, $9.00.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, NY 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Advertising: Journals Advertising Coordinator, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886–1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin Social Science Index,* and *Periodica Islamica;* it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature (IBZ), International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR),* and *Current Military and Political Literature.* Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science Abstracts,* and *Social Sciences Abstracts.*

Copyright © 1996 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 48, No. 4, July 1996. Periodicals postage paid at Balitmore, MD, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton Academic Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 48 • July 1996 • No. 4

CONTENTS

Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis	*Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu,* and *Melvin J. Hinich*	453
Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia	*Beverly Crawford*	482
Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China	*Andrew J. Nathan* and *Tianjian Shi*	522
Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined	*Gerald M. Easter*	551
Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary	*Patrick H. O'Neil*	579
Index to Volume 48		605
The Contributors		ii
Abstracts		iii

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CONTRIBUTORS

TSE-MIN LIN is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research interests focus on election study and voting behavior in both America and Taiwan.

YUN-HAN CHU is Professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University. He is the author of *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (1992).

MELVIN J. HINICH is the Mike Hogg Professor of Local Government in the Department of Government and Professor of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin. He is the coauthor (with James M. Enelow) of *The Spatial Theory of Voting* (1984), coeditor (with James M. Enelow) of *Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting* (1990), and coauthor (with Michael C. Munger) of *Ideology and the Theory of Political Choice* (1994).

BEVERLY CRAWFORD is Research Director at the Center for German and European Studies and Lecturer in the Political Economy of Industrial Societies at the University of California, Berkeley. Her most recent book is *Economic Vulnerability in International Relations: East-West Trade, Investment and Finance* (1993). She is completing a manuscript on the political economy of ethnic and sectarian conflict.

ANDREW J. NATHAN is Professor of Political Science at Columbia University and the author of *China's Crisis* (1990). He is working on *China's Place in the World*, with Steven I. Levine and Robert S. Ross (forthcoming).

TIANJIAN SHI is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University. He is the author of *Political Participation in Beijing: A Survey Study* (forthcoming).

GERALD M. EASTER is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at Miami University of Ohio and the author of *Reconstructing the State: The Informal Sources of Power in Postrevolutionary Soviet Russia* (forthcoming).

PATRICK O'NEIL is Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound. He is currently finishing a book on the collapse of socialism in Hungary and is the editor of *The Media and Global Democratization* (forthcoming).

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of $3.25 per article is paid directly to CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. 0043-88 71/94 $03.25

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ABSTRACTS

Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan

A spatial analysis

By TSE-MIN LIN, YUN-HAN CHU, and MELVIN J. HINICH

This paper presents a spatial analysis of political competition in Taiwan in an effort to explore the role of conflict displacement in the process of democratic transition. In recent elections, a new cleavage on socioeconomic justice has emerged as a salient political issue in Taiwan, cross-cutting the traditional cleavage on national identity. The authors first trace the historical trajectory of regime transition in order to provide a structural explanation of such a displacement of conflicts. Using data from the 1992 General Survey on Social Changes designed primarily by the authors for the Institute of Ethnology of Academia Sinica, they then present the results of a spatial analysis. The empirical findings confirm that socioeconomic justice together with national identity are the defining dimensions of the latent ideological space in which political competition takes place. The authors argue that, because of the availability of the new issue, political elites in Taiwan are undertaking a partisan realignment in both electoral and legislative politics, a process the authors consider conducive to both the transition to democracy and the consolidation of the new regime.

Explaining Defection from International Cooperation

Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia

By BEVERLY CRAWFORD

In 1991 Germany extended unilateral diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in direct contravention of the preferences of its EC partners. In the context of Germany's postwar history of multilateralism in foreign policy, this was an unprecedented decision. As a case of defection from international cooperation, it requires explanation. This article explains how the German preference for recognition was formed and why Germany acted unilaterally when its partners had moved to adjust their policies to coordinate them with Germany's preferences. Defection from cooperation in this case is best explained as a two-level game: the source of Germany's preference for diplomatic recognition of these republics is traced to domestic political factors; its unilateral action is traced to regime weaknesses leading to negotiating failures in a changing post–cold war international environment.

Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics

Issues and alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China

By ANDREW J. NATHAN and TIANJIAN SHI

A 1990 national sample survey shows that the Chinese population was concerned with issues relating to reform, economic and social grievances, and democracy. Although neither political issues nor social cleavages were the same as in the West, the same dynamics affected the process of ideological alignment. Social position and cognitive sophistication help explain why members of the population hold liberal or conservative attitudes.

Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building

Soviet Russia reexamined

By GERALD M. EASTER

The article contends that personal networks may facilitate state-building efforts under postrevolutionary conditions. With the breakdown of formal political structures, personal networks provide an informal social structure along which information may be exchanged, resources may be allocated, and collaborative activities may be planned. To demonstrate this argument, the article returns to the case of Soviet Russia. Using newly available archival sources, the case study

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shows how informal personal networks intersected with formal political organizations to develop a capacity for territorial administration in the decade following the civil war. The article concludes by suggesting answers to larger questions concerning the success of Soviet state building, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet state, and the implications for comparative state-building theory.

Revolution From Within

Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary

By PATRICK H. O'NEIL

The Hungarian transition from socialism stands out from other examples of political change in the region, in that the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) suffered an erosion of political power generated largely from within the party itself. The study shows how the Communist Party, after its destruction in the revolution of 1956, sought to institutionalize its rule through a course of limited liberalization and the broad co-optation of the populace. This policy helped create a tacit social compact with society, particularly in co-opting younger intellectuals who identified with the goals of reform socialism. However, the party eventually marginalized this group, creating an internal party opposition that supported socialism but opposed the MSZMP. Consequently, when the limits of Hungarian reform socialism became evident in the mid-1980s, rank-and-file intellectuals within the party began to mobilize against the party hierarchy, seeking to transform the MSZMP into a democratic socialist party. These "reform circles," drawing their strength primarily from the countryside, spread to all parts of the party and helped undermine central party power and expand the political space for opposition groups to organize. Eventually, the reform circles were able to force an early party congress in which the MSZMP was transformed into a Western-style socialist party prior to open elections in 1990.

The case is significant in that it indicates that the forms of transition in Eastern Europe were not simply the specific outcome of elite interaction. Rather, they were shaped in large part by the patterns of socialist institutionalization found in each country. Therefore, studies of political transition can be enriched with an explicit focus on the institutional characteristics of each case, linking the forms of transitions and their posttransition legacies to the institutional matrix from which they emerged. In short, the study argues that the way in which an autocratic order perpetuates itself affects the manner in which that system declines and the shape of the new system that takes its place.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONFLICT DISPLACEMENT AND REGIME TRANSITION IN TAIWAN
A Spatial Analysis

By TSE-MIN LIN, YUN-HAN CHU, and MELVIN J. HINICH*

INTRODUCTION

THE process of democratization is typically characterized by the predominance of a conflict over the speed and scope of political opening and democratic reform. In the literature, the conceptual distinction between the four types of political actors that are commonly involved—hard-liners and reformers within the authoritarian bloc and moderates and radicals within the opposition[1]—presupposes the existence of an underlying ideological dimension that can be broadly conceived as a continuum from political liberalism to conservatism. By this formulation, the breakdown of an authoritarian regime necessarily entails a cleavage that divides both the organized elites and the electorate into two camps: the opponents of the authoritarian regime and its defenders. During the later stages of the transition, when the founding elections are convoked and the old regime pledges to surrender its power formally to a democratically elected civilian government, the conflict between opponents and defenders of the authoritarian regime could soon be displaced by other issues. Since issues constitute the agenda that foreshadows political outcomes, it is important to explore the role of conflict displacement in democratic transition.[2]

* An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2–5, 1993. Support for this project was provided by the Chiang Ching-Kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange. We thank Tong-yi Huang and Fujia Lu for research assistance and Henry Dietz, Jay Dow, Nathalie Frensley, Emerson Niou, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Wade Riddick for helpful comments and advice.

[1] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, "Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, pt. 4 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

[2] For how agendas influence political choices in various contexts, see William H. Riker, ed., *Agenda Formation* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

World Politics 48 (July 1996), 453–81

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How the displacement of conflicts actually proceeds is always historically and contextually specific, that is, contingent on the legacy of the authoritarian regime. In Eastern Europe and to some extent in Latin America as well, the demise of authoritarian regimes was accompanied by socioeconomic crises. As a consequence, the restructuring of the political system was entangled with fundamental changes in the structure of property rights.[3] In the cases of East Germany, the former Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, where the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime was inseparable from the legitimacy of the state's claim over the territorial structure of authority, the process of regime transition was inevitably engulfed by interethnic struggle.[4] Historical trajectories and structural constraints in general determine in part what new conflict dimension will emerge once the old one runs its course.

This article uses the conceptual framework of conflict displacement to examine posttransition party competition in Taiwan. The approach differs from the existing literature on democratic transition in that it emphasizes the linkage between the elite and the electorate through the politicization of social cleavages. Because it focuses on the strategic interaction among elite groups and the struggle over institution building, most of that literature[5] tends to overlook the importance of electoral politics in the posttransition process of democratic consolidation.[6] It is

[3] For an extensive comparison of political and economic reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe, see Przeworski (fn. 1).

[4] See Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, eds., *Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Democracy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).

[5] For instance, O'Donnell and Schmitter (fn. 1); Terry L. Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "Modes of Transition and Types of Democracy in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe" (Manuscript, Stanford University, 1990); Przeworski (fn. 1); John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992); Adam Przeworski et al., *Sustainable Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[6] For example, Karl and Schmitter (fn. 5) emphasize that transition to democracy typically requires a bargain of "fundamental pacts" among the contending organized elites and the resultant reinstitution, adoption, or drafting of a constitution. On different paths to democratic consolidation, Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley suggest that "settlements" and "convergence" are two principal forms in which elite disunity can be transformed into consensual unity. See Burton, Gunther, and Higley, "Introduction: Elites and Democratic Consolidation," in Higley and Gunther (fn. 5). More recently, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have proposed that the condition of democratic consolidation involves three dimensions: behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional. According to Linz and Stepan, a democratic regime is consolidated when, behaviorally, no significant political actors seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or encourage domestic or international violence to secede from the state; attitudinally, a strong majority of the public believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formula even in the face of severe political and economic crises; and constitutionally, all the actors in the polity become habituated to the resolution of conflict according to the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. See Linz and Stepan, "Towards Consolidated Democracies: Five Arenas and Three Sur-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our contention that the process of democratic transition cannot be fully explained without an understanding of the incentive mechanism that motivates contending elites to deviate from the conflictual course of interaction and adhere to democratic rules of the game. Specifically, we argue that elite consensus on the rules of democratic governance can be achieved if (1) new, crosscutting issues are available, (2) competing elite groups have differential advantages for mobilizing electoral support on different issues, and (3) coalitional realignment is possible in both electoral and legislative politics. These three conditions provide incentives for competing political forces to accept the values of democratic institutions and avoid confrontational strategies. The incentives reside in the possibility that different political groups can win public support in different issue areas; hence in the long run political outcomes are no longer zero-sum.[7]

In identifying the dimensions of the conflict system, we apply the spatial-analytic methodology to survey data collected four months prior to the 1992 Legislative Yuan election.[8] The 1992 election constituted a watershed that initiated the process of democratic consolidation in Taiwan. Not only did the election give birth to the first democratically elected national legislature in the history of Taiwan, but it also resulted in a significant shift in relative party strength within the legislative arena. More importantly, over the long term, it ushered in a critical change in the terms of partisan conflicts and the composition of party coalitions. A new conflict on socioeconomic justice with an emphasis on anticorruption measures is developing over the traditional cleavage on national identity. Because of the presence of a new issue, political elites in Taiwan are undertaking a partisan realignment in both electoral and legislative politics, a process we consider conducive to both the transition to democracy and the consolidation of the new regime.

In the following, we first trace the historical trajectory of regime transition in order to provide a structural explanation of the displacement of subethnic conflicts by socioeconomic ones. Next, using data from the General Survey on Social Changes designed primarily by the

mountable Obstacles" (Paper delivered at Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges, an international conference cosponsored by the Institute for National Policy Research and the National Endowment for Democracy, Taipei, August 27–30, 1995). In our view, all three formulations lack a theoretical foundation that can account for the "change of heart" on the part of the elites in making pacts, reaching settlements, and/or changing behavior.

[7] Giovanni Sartori, *The Theory of Democracy Revisited*, pt. 1 (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1987).

[8] James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich, *The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authors for the Institute of Ethnology of Academia Sinica, we present the results of a spatial analysis. We then evaluate the tremendous impact of the dimensional change on the coalitional behavior of the major political parties and factions in both electoral and legislative politics.

The Entanglement of Democratic Reform and National Identity

In Taiwan a number of prevailing structural conditions constrained the ability of the opposition to develop an alternative socioeconomic policy agenda in the early phase of the transition. Instead, the opposition had to rely mostly on democratic reform issues to build up its electoral support. At the same time, these prevailing conditions precipitated two concurrent developments—the politicization of subethnic cleavage and the emergence of a crisis in national identity—that compounded the conflict over democratic reform.

Unlike most Latin American and East European cases, political liberalization of the Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian regime was not triggered by any major socioeconomic crisis or external market shocks. Nor was it accompanied by popular demand for major socioeconomic reforms. Rather, the transition was triggered by a protracted process of diplomatic derecognition and facilitated by the cumulative effects of social and political mobilization brought about by rapid industrialization and strong economic growth.[9] On the eve of democratic opening, an export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy had already been in place for more than two decades. The societal support for the regime-sponsored development program was much more broadly based as compared with the secondary import-substitution strategies launched by many authoritarian regimes in Latin America during the same period.[10] The society was relatively devoid of the highly divisive conflict over the distribution of wealth that might have been exploited by the opposition and translated into a left versus right polarization. As a result, in the beginning of democratic transition the conflicts over the scope and speed of reform overshadowed the issue of socioeconomic justice.

[9] For an analysis of the enabling conditions and the triggering factors for the transition from authoritarianism in Taiwan, see Tun-jen Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan," *World Politics* 42 (July 1989); and Yun-han Chu, *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1992).

[10] See Stephan Haggard, *Pathway from the Periphery* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Gary Gereffi and Donald L. Wyman, eds., *Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The momentum for political reform was reinforced by a popular demand for a redistribution of power. The conflict over democratic reform became closely intertwined with the underlying subethnic cleavage because the power structure of the party-state had long been dominated by a mainlander elite under the old regime. Democratization that broadened political participation would have led to a transfer of political power from mainlanders to Taiwanese. Specifically, expanded elections and the enhanced importance of national representative bodies would have facilitated the ascent of an election-based elite, who were predominantly native members in the KMT power structure and would have strained the relationship between the local elite and the party's national leadership.

The evolution of conflict over democratic reform was further complicated by the fact that the subethnic cleavage is inseparable from the conflict over national identity. For several decades the old regime justified its legitimacy and control of political power by the mainlander elite on the basis of the so-called One-China Principle.[11] As a result, struggles over democratic reform and the distribution of political power were unavoidably entangled with issues of national identity and relations with the mainland. The conflict over national identity complicated the negotiation of a political pact between the reformers and the hardliners, as well as between the incumbent and the opposition, because the issues involved concepts of exclusive legitimacy and they yielded competing demands that could not easily be broken down into bargainable increments.[12] In the end the state became the arena in which competing forces strove for power to erect a new cultural hegemony and impose its own vision of nation building in the direction of either Taiwanization or Sinicization.[13] This clash was qualitatively different from the interethnic strife and secessionist struggles that eventually led to the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia because it involved a de jure revision of the territorial structure and not a de facto one. Nevertheless, the dangers of both political polarization and external intervention inherent in any process involving the revision of the territorial structure of state were still present.

[11] The One-China Principle maintains that there is only one China, Taiwan is a part of China, and the government of the Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the whole of China.

[12] See Donald L. Horowitz, "Democracy in Divided Societies," in Diamond and Plattner (fn. 4).

[13] As Eric J. Hobsbawn reminds us, in modern history it is the state that makes the nation, and not the nation that makes the state. See Hobsbawn, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 44.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the 1980s the expanding electoral avenues were employed by the opposition as an effective mechanism to create a growing popular demand for democratic legitimacy and Taiwanese identity. Since 1983 the Tangwai, which would become the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), had escalated its confrontation with the regime on the sensitive issue of Taiwan's future.[14] Many Tangwai/DPP leaders linked the goal of democratization directly to the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-determination. Because it cut across socioeconomic strata, this subethnic cleavage was an effective counterstrategy to the KMT's broad-based socioeconomic development program. It was also an issue that could unite Tangwai/DPP members holding different social and economic interests under a common umbrella.[15] As the political environment became even more open by the late 1980s, the radical wing within the DPP steadily pushed the party to harden its position on independence for Taiwan. By 1991 the party discarded the earlier version of its constitutional reform proposal, which had been intentionally vague on the question of sovereignty, and put forward a new draft constitution for the "Republic of Taiwan."

The conflict over democratic reform and national identity not only divided the opposition but, to an even greater extent, also created a schism within the KMT itself. After the mid-1980s, the KMT leadership began to feel political pressure from the opposition as electoral support for Tangwai candidates steadily grew. The mainlander strongman, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo, responded to the emerging crisis with a series of political reforms to prevent the crisis from deepening after his death. During the last few years of his life, Chiang single-handedly quelled dissenting voices within the old guard, removed some of the hard-liners from strategic positions, and appointed a reform-minded Taiwanese, Lee Teng-hui, as his successor.

The death of Chiang in January 1988 hastened the breakdown of one-party authoritarian rule. Lee decided to stay the course of reform—indeed even going further than Chiang has intended—because he was eager to step out from the shadow of his predecessor and to consolidate his own power base. However, the process of Lee's political accession was ripe for a power struggle. The struggle that ensued was as much

[14] The Tangwai, which literally means "outside the Party," is the code name for the opposition camp before the founding of the Democratic Progressive Party in 1986.

[15] Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu, "Electoral Competition and Political Democratization in Taiwan," in Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard, eds., *Political Change in Taiwan* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about the redistribution of power as about control of the direction of democratic reform and mainland policy.

The cohesion of the ruling party suffered from the ensuing formation of two competing power blocs, which was triggered by the new foreign policy initiated by Lee. In mid-1989 Lee startled many senior members of the KMT Central Standing Committee by sending a high-level delegation to the 1989 annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Beijing and by directing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to seek dual recognition. In the eyes of some KMT leaders, the first move amounted to a de facto recognition of the PRC regime, whereas the second move marked a clear departure from the long-standing One-China Principle. Factionalism crystallized after Lee nominated Lee Yuan-tsu as his running mate, over the objection of many senior KMT leaders. Rivals of the president fought back by threatening to put up a challenger in the (indirect) presidential election. Lee got out of this quandary by agreeing to nominate as premier the mainlander defense minister, Hau Pei-tsun, who enjoyed a strong power base in the military and security apparatus and was a strong defender of the One-China Principle.

Since then the coalition centered around President Lee has been called the "mainstream faction." The coalition of Lee's political rivals, who surrounded Premier Hau, became known as the "nonmainstream faction." The nonmainstream faction questioned Lee's commitment to Chinese nationalism and objected to his effort to seek accommodation with the opposition party. The mainstream faction, for its part, characterized the nonmainstream faction as a conservative group interested only in preserving its past prerogatives and identifying more closely with mainland China than with the twenty-one million people on the island.

Between 1990 and 1992 the two camps clashed over almost every major policy issue. First, the nonmainstream faction favored broader economic and cultural exchange across the Taiwan Strait, while Lee resisted lifting the ban on direct air and sea links with mainland China. Second, the nonmainstream faction considered the proponents of Taiwan independence to be secessionists and urged the government to take legal action against them. They also insisted that leaders of the Taiwan independence movement overseas should be barred from entering the country. Lee, however, pushed steadily for the eradication of the so-called black list and for removal of the legal bans on the promotion of Taiwan independence. Third, the nonmainstream faction opted for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

minimum change to the R.O.C. constitution because it had been adopted when the Nationalist government still exercised effective governance over most of China and thus represented the quintessential legal embodiment of the One-China Principle. Lee, instead, favored more extensive revision of the constitution and was eager to transform the political system from a parliamentary system to a presidential one. The locus of contention eventually centered on the electoral system for selecting the president: the nonmainstream faction preferred indirect election, akin to an electoral college system, whereas Lee favored popular election. Popular election was viewed by the nonmainstream faction as a pretext for further expansion of presidential power and potentially a vehicle for self-determination.

During the same period, Lee actively sought a dialogue with the DPP. The DPP obtained from the KMT mainstream faction satisfactory answers to their various political demands, including ending the Period of Mobilization and Combating Rebellion; abolishing Article 100 of the Criminal Code;[16] transferring the power to dissolve political parties from the Political Party Commission under the Executive Yuan to the Council of Grand Justices under the Judicial Yuan; making a commitment to hold direct popular elections for the presidency by 1996; holding steadfast against party-to-party talks between the CCP and the KMT; continuing the ban on direct air and sea links between Taiwan and mainland China; and making a concerted diplomatic effort to join the United Nations and its related agencies.

Essentially, the nonmainstream faction, locked as it was into a permanent minority position, was fighting a losing battle. Each time a conflict arose, the mainstream faction, led by President Lee, managed to enlist the support of native politicians, mustered public support, and even secured cooperation from the DPP on certain legislation. Furthermore, the accumulated animosity and distrust hardened the resolve of Lee and his allies to accelerate institutional reform, especially in a direction that would effectively undermine the power base of his rivals. Nevertheless, the logic of strategic alliance compelled the DPP to side with Lee at all crucial junctures of the power struggle between the mainstream and nonmainstream factions, as the goal of Taiwan inde-

[16] About mid-1991 the arrest of four college students on charges of sedition sparked a series of large-scale popular demonstrations. Student leaders and some leading intellectuals called for repealing the stringent article on treason and sedition, known as Article 100, of the Criminal Code. Lee capitalized on the event by instructing the Executive Yuan to set up a task force to review various proposals for revising it. This judicious move eventually led to a revamping of Article 100 a year later. The revision removed from the article all those ambiguities that had given the security and law-enforcement personnel wide leeway in charging people with serious crimes. See *China Times*, May 10, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pendence became the only consensual benchmark against which all strategies vis-à-vis the two factions could be evaluated. In this light, the nonmainstream faction, not the KMT overall, was regarded as the primary political opponent because it represented the major obstacle to the DPP's nation-building cause. The tacit grand coalition between the DPP and the mainstream faction culminated in their joint effort to oust Hau Pei-tsun around the end of 1992. During the campaign of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, the call for removing Hau from the post of premier was the top item on the DPP platform. Hau was also vigorously attacked by members of the Wisdom Club, a KMT parliamentary clique that was closely associated with the president. After the election, the transfer of executive power from the hands of mainlanders to the native elite was largely completed with the departure of Hau and the appointment of Lien Chan, a Taiwanese and an ally of Lee, as the new premier.

The Emergence of Socioeconomic Justice as a Political Issue

The downfall of Hau and the marginalization of the nonmainstream faction precipitated a drastic shift in the parameters of party competition and the coalitional behavior. First, the logic of electoral competition set the KMT mainstream faction and the DPP on a collision course, since their common political adversary, the KMT nonmainstream faction, had been forced out of the ring. Once both sides no longer felt threatened by the nonmainstream faction, Taiwanese solidarity lost its appeal. Second, the process of the displacement of conflicts set in. After the convocation of founding elections and a thorough Taiwanization of the KMT leadership, the appeal to democratic ideals and Taiwanese identity exhausted its electoral utility. Suddenly the DPP found out that it could put forth few new demands for democratic reform that could gain widespread popular support. Neither could it continue to characterize the KMT as an "émigré regime," since the ruling party was now in the firm grip of President Lee. Furthermore, while its formal position on the question of the future of Taiwan stood in stark contrast to the KMT's official stance on reunification, the DPP found that its mainland policy and foreign policy proposals were converging with those of the KMT mainstream faction. Even its once-powerful campaign for joining the UN quickly fizzled when President Lee decided to move on applying for UN membership and wrested control over foreign policy agenda setting from the DPP. The DPP became the victim of its own success.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, except for a few zealots, most DPP leaders conceded after the defeat in the 1991 National Assembly election that it was impossible for the DPP to build a winning electoral majority on the issue of national identity. DPP leaders perceived that the party might become captive of its own uncompromising position on national identity and lock itself into a position of permanent opposition. Waving the banner of Taiwan independence helped DPP candidates consolidate the support of the party's traditional followers but turned away the stability-minded business elite and the middle class. These developments compelled the DPP leadership to reexamine the political compass, adjust its political agenda, and refurbish its electoral strength with a set of new issues. This time around, the DPP rediscovered the potential of the socioeconomic justice issue, which it had ignored during its founding years.

Two parallel developments in the late 1980s and the 1990s helped sharpen DPP's competitive edge on the socioeconomic agenda. First, the restructuring of the economy since the mid-1980s had induced the concentration of business ownership and increased the entry barriers for micro and small enterprises. It also adversely affected income distribution. The Gini coefficient of household income distribution revealed a clear trend toward greater income disparity between the rich and the poor during the period. The ratio between the income of the top 20 percent of households and that of the bottom 20 percent was 4.10 in 1980, one of the world's lowest. By the end of 1992 the ratio rose substantially, to 4.98.[17] Moreover, during the go-go years between 1986 and 1990, the skyrocketing of the real estate market and of stock prices contributed to a serious maldistribution of wealth. The "money game" substantially increased the wealth of asset owners, while it impoverished lower- and lower-middle-income families. The majority of the disadvantaged groups, who were left out of the money-chasing game but had to bear the burden of the rising cost of living, acquired a strong sense of relative deprivation. The discontent was also very strong among members of the urban middle class under age forty. The National Wealth Survey, conducted for the first time by the government in 1991, disclosed a shocking polarization over the distribution of asset ownership. The value of the assets owned by the wealthiest 20 percent of households was worth 17.8 times that of the poorest 20 percent. These developments undermined the social support for the existing development program, which no longer delivered "growth with equity."

[17] Medhi Krongkaew, "Income Distribution in East Asian Developing Countries: An Update," *Asian Pacific Economic Literature* 8 (November 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Against this new social context, the DPP formally introduced its Welfare State platform during the campaign of the 1992 Legislative Yuan election. The platform promised an array of entitlement programs, including universal health insurance, subsidized housing, and government-guaranteed retirement income.

Second, the triumph of the native Taiwanese leadership in taking control of the KMT and the government was not without its cost. The institutional insulation between the party-state central leadership and the business sector began to wear thin. As the trend toward indigenization of the party-state power structure accelerated, the penetration of social forces into the state through personal connections resumed. More important, the power struggle compelled competing blocs within the party leadership to bring in new allies from outside. The mainstream faction vigorously reached out to the business community and local factions because it started from a weaker power base within the party-state.

As a result, corruption, which had long been a problem in local elections, now became a factor at the national level. This corruption involved local faction-orchestrated election financing and campaigning; it institutionalized vote buying, relentless pork-barreling, and outright bribes for replenishing campaign chests. KMT local party officials actually encouraged this structured corruption and even provided the legal shield for illegal vote-buying practices because this seemed to be a sure way to contain the electoral success of the opposition candidates.[18] Vying for the political support of local elites, the KMT national leadership had no choice but to tolerate these illegal practices by a vast majority of its own members. In addition, expanded elections and an increasingly important parliament provided the business elite with new opportunities for political investment and influence buying in the policy-making process. The emerging political clout of the business elite eroded the autonomy of the state bureaucracy. Consequently, the Legislative Yuan became a horse-trading arena for state officials, party officials, and lawmakers who acted as surrogates for special business interests. With elected politicians rising in the power structure of the KMT, the party gradually transformed itself from a coalition of mainlander state elite and collateral native politicians to one of socioeco-

[18] On the corruption in electoral politics, see Ming-tong Chen and Yun-han Chu, "Quyuduzhan Jingji, Difang Paixi yu Shengyiyuan Xuanju: Yixiang Shengyiyuan Houxuanren Beijing de Fenxi" (Regional oligopoly, local factions, and provincial assembly elections: An analysis of the socioeconomic background of candidates, 1950–1986), *National Science Council Proceedings-C: Social Sciences and Humanity* 3 (January 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomically conservative state elites, local factions, and big business. Increasingly, the KMT could not uphold its image as the embodiment of an all-class political alliance.[19]

These developments provided the DPP with a new window of opportunity. Through effective muckraking efforts in the Legislative Yuan, the DPP soon turned the collusion among the KMT leadership, big business, and corrupt local factions into a serious political liability for the mainstream faction. There were major scandals of corruption and shady financial deals involving many KMT politicians and government officials. These scandals lent credibility to the DPP's attack on "money politics" and made it increasingly difficult for the KMT leadership to avoid the issue of political corruption. Public concern over money politics finally precipitated an islandwide popular campaign against vote buying during the 1992 Legislative Yuan election.

These concerns not only enabled the DPP to define a new dimension of partisan cleavage within the electorate but also divided the KMT internally. Some second-generation mainlander politicians who enjoyed substantial popular support in metropolitan areas decided to pick a new fight with the mainstream faction. The first major contention between the KMT Young Turks and the mainstream faction erupted over the issue of land-tax reform. Tax reform was vigorously promoted by Wang Jian-chuan, the finance minister and an ally of Premier Hau. Wang, widely known for his distaste for money politics, adopted a measure to control land speculation and to levy taxes on windfall profits. The policy was very popular among both the young urban middle class and intellectuals who could not afford home ownership, especially in the greater Taipei metropolitan area. But the same measure irritated not only landowning big business and local factions but also farmers in the south, who hoped to profit from selling their land. Wang was publicly criticized by President Lee for promoting such a draconian measure and was later pressured to resign. The departure of Wang was immediately followed by the departure of another nonmainstream cabinet member, Jaw Shau-kang, the head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). He complained that his tough stance in support of environmental protection policies was undermined by influential businessmen close to the president. Both men later ran in the Legislative Yuan election without party endorsement and emerged as the top vote get-

[19] Yun-han Chu, "The Realignment of State-Business Relations in Taiwan's Regime Transition," in Andrew McIntyre, ed., *The Changing Government-Business Relations in the Pacific Rim Countries* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ters in their respective multimember districts. This development pointed to the possibility that both the DPP and the KMT nonmainstream faction could line up voters on a new issue dimension on which the incumbent KMT mainstream leadership enjoyed no initial advantage.

A Spatial Analysis of Party Competition

The essence of democracy, according to E. E. Schattschneider, dwells in the exploitation of social conflicts by political leaders and organizers in involving the public to participate in the decision-making process.[20] The public, however, is not just a passive actor to be mobilized in whatever way elites desire. On the contrary, its interests and orientations determine the parameters within which elites can act safely and effectively.[21] In particular, heterogeneous public interests and orientations provide contending elites with rational incentives to participate in elections because the chance of winning is increased when there are cross-cutting issues that can be exploited. In this sense, the displacement of conflicts plays an important role in regime transition not in terms of the strategic maneuver on the part of the organized elites but in its potential for contributing to the consolidation of democracy.

A full explanation of conflict displacement requires substantiating the micro foundation of the macrolevel contours of partisan competition in Taiwan described in the previous section. In this section, we present the results of a spatial analysis to examine the parameters of elite maneuver in terms of the ideological orientations of the electorate.[22] In spatial analysis, political competition takes place in a latent ideological space in which politicians (or political groups) are situated. On the one hand, the voters' preferences are a function of the proximity of the politicians' ideal points. And on the other hand, the politicians develop their positions in competition with others to win more electoral support. The objective of spatial analysis is to recover the dimensions of the ideological space, to construct maps of politicians' and voters' ideal points in the space, and to interpret the dimensions of the space. We provide a brief introduction to the methodology of spatial analysis in Appendix 1.

[20] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1975).

[21] Lowell Field, John Higley, and Michael G. Burton, "A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology," *Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales* 28, no. 88 (1990), 164.

[22] The only work we are aware of that uses the spatial-analytic framework to study electoral competition in Taiwan is Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Game Theoretic Analysis of the Republic of China's Emerging Electoral System," *International Political Science Review* 13, no. 1 (1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Measurement and Data

The data used in this study are part of the General Survey on Social Changes conducted by the Institute of Ethnology of Academia Sinica in July 1992, about midway between the National Assembly election of December 1991 and the Legislative Yuan election of December 1992.[23] The sampling frame of the survey followed a multistage area probability design. Through a series of steps, cities, counties, districts, townships/villages, and precincts were selected with probability proportionate to their population of adults between the ages of twenty and sixty-four. The valid unweighted sample size is 1,408.

A section of the survey questionnaire was designed by the authors of this article specifically for spatial analysis. The main item, used as a "thermometer" in this study, asked, "From the perspective of the development of the society as a whole, please evaluate the following political figures. For those who, if given the role of a key policy-maker for the country, would bring about the worst outcomes, please give a score of zero (0). On the other hand, for those who you think would bring about the best outcomes, please give a score of ten (10). Between the worst and the best, please give an appropriate score." Among the eighteen politicians listed under the question, eleven were included in this study on the basis of name recognition rate and relative importance in politics. Brief biographical data for the included politicians are given in Appendix 2.

In addition to the thermometer item, respondents were also asked to evaluate the same politicians for two aspects of personal qualities: *p'o-li* (daring and resolution; capability) and *ch'in-ho-li* (likability). The two scores were combined to yield a single valence score that is normalized to a scale of 0–10.

To prepare data for spatial analysis, a series of procedures was employed to filter out respondents who either made a less-than-serious effort in answering questions or produced missing values that are not allowed in the analysis.[24] First, respondents who were not able to recognize the names of any of the eleven selected politicians were excluded. Second, those who recognized names but failed to assign a

[23] The survey itself is part of a multiyear project funded by the National Science Council of the Republic of China and covers the period between 1989 and 1994. Our Taiwan-based coauthor, Yun-han Chu, is the codirector of the project and concurrently serves as the coordinator of the political science section.

[24] Missing values in the valence items are not a problem since, in the version of the Cahoon program (see Appendix 1) that we use, the mean valence scores, rather than the individual scores, are entered as part of the program input.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

legitimate score, even to a single politician, were also dropped. Third, respondents who passed the first two tests but did not see enough differences among the political figures were discarded; thus, those respondents whose scores across politicians had a zero or very small standard deviation were excluded. About 5 percent of the cases that were still in the running were eliminated by this last procedure.

For the purpose of comparing the Taipei area with the rest of Taiwan, two subsamples were created: the first included respondents from Taipei City and County, while the second included all other respondents. The filter procedures were applied to both subsamples, respectively. Each filtered subsample was then subjected to spatial analysis. For the Taipei subsample, 216 out of 325 respondents passed all three filter procedures. For the non-Taipei subsample, the number is 553 out of 1,083.

It is not surprising that Taipei, the political, economic, and cultural center, gives a higher rate of selection than the rest of Taiwan (approximately two-thirds versus one-half). The filter procedures effectively select respondents with a higher level of political sophistication. The Taipei respondents are also better educated and economically better off than the average respondent. Table 1 shows the income distribution and education level for a "population subsample" and its corresponding "filtered subsample," respectively, for Taipei and non-Taipei. Although some selection bias is inevitably introduced by excluding less sophisticated respondents, the selection rate is higher than those reported by Enelow and Hinich for the case of the United States in 1976 and 1980.[25] The rate for the Taipei subsample is especially remarkable.

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the thermometer scores for the two filtered subsamples. The ranking of the politicians is similar in both cases. President Lee was given the highest mean score, and the small standard deviation shows that support for him was relatively homogeneous. In contrast, his principal rival, then Premier Hau, was more controversial, as indicated by the large standard deviation. The three DPP members (Hsu, Huang, and Shih), as well as the (then) Democratic Socialist, Chu Kao-cheng, received the lowest averages, but their standard deviations are even greater than Hau's.

To implement the spatial-analytic methodology, a politician has to be chosen as the "pivot" whose thermometer scores are to be subtracted from those of the other politicians included in the analysis. The methodology is robust against the choice of the pivot. In this study, we

[25] Enelow and Hinich (fn. 8).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND EDUCATION FOR POPULATION SAMPLES AND FILTERED SAMPLES

	% of Population Sample		*% of Filtered Sample*	
	Taipei	*Non-Taipei*	*Taipei*	*Non-Taipei*
Income (per month)	(N=305)	(N=1,024)	(N=204)	(N=531)
Less than NT$10,000	29.8	33.2	26.0	21.3
NT$10,001–20,000	14.8	24.5	12.3	23.4
NT$20,001–30,000	11.5	16.3	12.3	18.6
NT$30,001–40,000	19.0	12.5	21.1	17.7
NT$40,001 (and above)	24.9	13.5	28.4	13.5
Education	(N=325)	(N=1,082)	(N=216)	(N=553)
Elementary (and below)	28.9	41.3	16.2	20.1
Junior high	9.2	17.1	11.1	19.3
Senior high	26.5	24.8	31.0	33.5
College (and above)	35.4	16.8	41.7	27.1

chose Lin Yang-kang, the head of the judicial branch of government at the time of the survey, because of his relatively centrist ideological position. Since the spatial methodology requires the pivot to be at the origin on the valence dimension, Lin's mean valence score was also subtracted from the mean valence scores of the other politicians. Not surprisingly, President Lee's score on the valence dimension is the best in both subsamples.

RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION

The dimensionality of the ideological space is determined by the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the thermometer scores across politicians. We found that the dimensionality is consistently two. For the Taipei subsample, the first two eigenvalues account for 66.0 percent and 14.9 percent, respectively, of the variance, while the third eigenvalue explains only 4.3 percent. For the non-Taipei subsample, the proportions are 58.6 percent, 17.1 percent, and 5.1 percent.

As explained in Appendix 1, the orientation of a spatial map can be more appropriately determined with the help of substantive prior knowledge. Since we expect the first dimension to be the traditional cleavage on national (Taiwanese versus Chinese) identity, we use subethnic origin (native Taiwanese versus mainlander) as an external criterion to delineate the first dimension. The orientation of the maps is determined by choosing the rotation angle that maximizes the correla-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THERMOMETER SCORES[a]

Politician	*Taipei (N=216)*	*Non-Taipei (N=553)*
Lin Yang-kang	7.55 (1.84)	7.46 (2.00)
Wu Pei-hsiung	7.19 (1.91)	7.14 (1.84)
Shih Ming-teh	3.34 (2.53)	3.52 (2.59)
Lee Teng-hui	8.30 (1.68)	8.78 (1.42)
Hsu Hsin-liang	3.85 (2.48)	4.07 (2.70)
Soong Chu-yu	6.76 (2.17)	6.89 (2.15)
Wang Jian-chuan	7.07 (2.23)	6.83 (2.33)
Jaw Shau-kang	7.31 (2.02)	7.50 (1.88)
Chu Kao-cheng	5.03 (2.39)	4.84 (2.57)
Huang Hsin-jie	4.50 (2.64)	4.70 (2.62)
Hau Pei-tsun	7.45 (2.24)	7.26 (2.43)

[a]Entries are mean scores; standard deviations are in parentheses.

tion between voters' positions on the horizontal axis and their subethnic origin. The recovered spatial maps of the politicians' positions are shown in Figures 1 and 2 for the Taipei and non-Taipei subsamples, respectively. The position of Lin, the pivot, is constrained to be at the origin of the coordinate system. The voters' ideal points can also be recovered, but they are not shown on these maps.

As expected, the first dimension (the horizontal axis) on both maps clearly exhibits the traditional cleavage on national identity. The three DPP members, Hsu, Huang, and Shih, are on the far left of the dimension. The three mainlanders who belong to the KMT nonmainstream faction, Hau, Wang, and Jaw, are consistently on the right end of the dimension, a reflection of their strong Chinese identity. Falling in between are President Lee and his close mainlander associate, Soong, as well as Lin, Wu, and Chu. Lin and Wu are Taiwanese politicians who were then considered part of the pan-nonmainstream coalition. Chu, a Taiwanese sympathetic to the Chinese identity, was chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party and had severed his ties with the DPP. It is noteworthy that a considerable gap exists between the DPP group of three and all the other politicians on this dimension.

On the second dimension (the vertical axis), the spatial distribution of the politicians is dramatically different, although the pattern is largely similar for Taipei and non-Taipei. President Lee is now conspicuously at one end of the dimension, while the other end is occupied by members of the DPP as well as by Wang, Jaw, and Chu. Such a pattern is consistent with the cleavage on issues concerning socioeconomic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 1
POSITIONS OF POLITICIANS: TAIPEI AREA

justice. As mentioned above, before the Legislative Yuan election in 1992, the DPP launched campaigns against money politics in order to capitalize on the financial scandals and corruption that had plagued the KMT administration. At the same time, Wang, then the finance minister, publicized antispeculation land-tax reform proposals, which soon led to his resignation from the cabinet. Jaw was also soon to resign as head of the EPA in protest against the interference of big business in the implementation of environmental protection policies. Chu wrote a public letter criticizing President Lee for his money politics, among other matters. Although these political dramas did not climax until

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 2
POSITIONS OF POLITICIANS: NON-TAIPEI

after we conducted our survey, the public's sentiments about socioeconomic justice had apparently been developing and were picked up by the survey. Note that Wang's position on the dimension is perceived as the most extreme by non-Taipei respondents, beyond even the DPP politicians.

Since the interpretation of the dimensions depends on the rotation of the maps, it is important to provide external checks for the validity of the interpretation. In Table 3 we demonstrate the convergent validity of the ideological dimensions. The 1992 General Survey on Social Changes asked the respondents to indicate their degree of satisfaction

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
CONVERGENT VALIDITY OF THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS[a]

	First Dimension		*Second Dimension*	
Policy Issues	*Taipei*	*Non-Taipei*	*Taipei*	*Non-Taipei*
National identity				
Unification with China	−.0934	−.0687	−.0856	−.0409
Taiwan independence	−.2317**	−.1052**	−.1319*	−.1661**
Reform & stability				
Democratic reform	−.1600**	−.0097	−.0929	−.0615
Political stability	−.0733	.0810	−.1394**	−.0869*
Socioeconomic justice				
Economic equality	−.0627	−.0249	−.2203**	−.0869*
Anticorruption	−.0811	−.0507	−.1239*	−.1855**
Workers' rights/benefits	−.0318	.0362	.0056	−.1513**
Environmental protection				
Environmental protection	−.0946	.0016	−.0191	−.0729*
Valid N in subsample	216	553	216	553

* p<=.05. ** p<=.01; one-tailed test.

[a] The entries are the correlations between (a) | respondent's score on a dimension - President Lee's position on the dimension | and (b) the respondent's degree of satisfaction with KMT's performance on a policy issue. The correlations are expected to be negative according to the spatial theory of voting, that is, the closer a respondent is to Lee's position on a dimension, the more satisfied the respondent should be on KMT's performance on a policy issue that is consistent with the ideological dimension. The highest correlation within each column is underlined.

with the performance of KMT on a range of issues that we classified into four categories: national identity, reform and stability, socioeconomic justice, and environmental protection. Considering President Lee as the standard-bearer of KMT, we calculate the distance between a voter's ideal point and Lee's perceived position along each of the two dimensions. We then calculate the correlation between the distance and the respondent's degree of satisfaction on each of the issues. Theoretically, if a dimension coincides with a category of issues, high correlations should be observed because spatial proximity would then (and only then) be an indicator of the degree of satisfaction. Table 3 shows such bivariate correlations for both subsamples. Because of measurement error in the ideal points, the correlations are all attenuated, but they clearly exhibit the expected pattern. Not surprisingly, the first dimension coincides with national identity. More significantly, the second dimension has the highest correlations with issues classified as socio-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic justice, rendering convergent validity for our interpretation of the dimension.

With the interpretation of the dimensions validated, it is possible to provide some explanation for the voters' ideological positions on the dimensions by relating them to relevant demographic variables. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of multiple regression analysis for the two dimensions, respectively. It is important to emphasize again that positions estimated by the spatial method are subject to substantial noise, and the consequences of measurement error have to be taken into account.[26]

For the first dimension, since the dependent variable (national identity) can involve large error, a small R^2 should be expected. The estimated regression coefficients should be consistent, however, since the independent variables, being demographic variables, can be reasonably assumed to be free from measurement error. Still, the standard errors of these estimates are likely to be large and hence statistical significance is more difficult to achieve. The results do show by construction that subethnic origin (native Taiwanese versus mainlander) is highly significant for both Taipei and non-Taipei areas. Sex is the only other independent variable with statistical significance in both subsamples, whereas education is significant only for the non-Taipei subsample. These results are consistent with what we know about political socialization in Taiwan. Women are more likely than men to have developed Chinese identity, so are those with higher education in comparison with those with lower education. That education is a less significant factor in Taipei is probably because the population there has a higher education level than its counterpart in non-Taipei. Living in the political, economic, and cultural center also exposes a less formally educated citizen to flows of information that serve the function of schooling. Age and social class do not exhibit statistical significance. Although insignificance could be due to inflated standard errors, there is no strong substantive reason to expect these variables to influence national identity after controlling for other variables.

For the second dimension, it is necessary to include national identity as an independent variable because of the apparent exogeneity of the first dimension. In this instance, however, not only the dependent variable but also one of the independent variables is measured with error. In

[26] For a discussion of the consequences of measurement error in multiple regression, see William D. Berry and Stanley Feldman, *Multiple Regression in Practice* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1985).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4
REGRESSION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Explanatory Variables	*Taipei*		*Non-Taipei*	
Intercept	−2.31	(−0.74)[a]	−2.47	(−1.33)
Sex[b]	−1.67	(−2.37)**	−1.61	(−3.93)**
Age[c]	−0.07	(−0.16)	0.28	(1.11)
Subethnic origin[d]	5.57	(7.37)**	3.66	(6.01)**
Education[e]	0.32	(0.87)	0.54	(2.52)**
Middle class & up[f]	1.25	(0.28)	−0.18	(−0.32)
Working class[g]	0.35	(0.28)	0.14	(0.24)
N	216		553	
Adjusted R^2	0.25		0.10	

** p<=.01, one-tailed test.

[a] Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; t-scores are in parentheses.

[b] 0=female; 1=male.

[c] To deflate the effect of high age, the square root of actual age is used.

[d] 0=Taiwanese (including Hakkas and Aborigine); 1=mainlander.

[e] 1=elementary school (and below); 2=junior high school; 3=senior high school; 4=college (and above).

[f] 0=working/lower/lower-middle classes; 1=upper/upper-middle/middle classes.

[g] 0=nonworking classes; 1=working class.

this case, it is known that (1) the coefficient associated with the noisy independent variable will be attenuated, and (2) the coefficients associated with the perfectly measured variables will be inconsistent if these variables are causally related to the independent variable measured with error.[27] Taking these consequences into account, we can conclude from Table 5 that, controlling for demographic variables, position on national identity has a large impact on position on the socioeconomic dimension. The effect is more than what is shown in the regressions because the ordinary least squares estimates are biased toward zero. In addition, we find that age is a statistically significant factor in the Taipei area, with young voters more inclined to support the cause of socioeconomic justice. This finding is especially interesting because young people were more likely to free themselves from the traditional cleavage and rally around a new cleavage that seemed relevant to their future. The Taipei area was also where Wang, Jaw, and DPP candidates received strong support, mostly from young voters, in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election. Also significant are the class variables: the working/lower-middle/lower classes in the Taipei area and the working class in the

[27] Kenneth A. Bollen, *Structural Equations with Latent Variables* (New York: John Wiley, 1989), 162–63.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5
REGRESSION OF SOCIOECONOMIC JUSTICE ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

Explanatory Variables	*Taipei*		*Non-Taipei*	
Intercept	−12.88	(−2.76)[a]**	3.41	(0.87)
National identity	−0.43	(−4.18)**	−0.13	(−1.50)#
Sex[b]	−1.41	(−1.31)	0.17	(0.19)
Age[c]	1.64	(2.67)**	0.00	(0.00)
Subethnic origin[d]	−0.19	(−0.15)	0.18	(0.14)
Education[e]	0.30	(0.54)	−0.85	(−1.87)*
Middle class & up[f]	3.53	(2.12)*	−0.90	(−0.74)
Working class[g]	3.19	(1.70)	−2.40	(−1.90)*
N	216		553	
Adjusted R^2	0.11		0.01	

* p<=.05; ** p<=.01; one-tailed test.
# p=.067; one-tailed test.
[a] Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; t-scores are in parentheses.
[b] 0=female; 1=male.
[c] To deflate the effect of high age, the square root of actual age is used.
[d] 0=Taiwanese (including Hakkas and Aborigine); 1=mainlander.
[e] 1=elementary school (and below); 2=junior high school; 3=senior high school; 4=college (and above).
[f] 0=working/lower/lower-middle classes; 1=upper/upper-middle/middle classes.
[g] 0=nonworking classes; 1=working class.

non-Taipei areas supported Wang and the DPP on matters of socioeconomic justice.[28]

TOWARD CONSOLIDATION: PARTISAN REALIGNMENT AFTER 1992

Our contention that a displacement of conflicts occurred in 1992 prior to the Legislative Yuan election is therefore substantiated at the individual level by spatial analysis and supplementary correlation and regression analyses. With the issue of democratic reform no longer at center stage, the traditional cleavage on subethnicity and/or national identity no longer stands as the single most important conflict dimension in Taiwanese politics. In a process critical to democratic transition, a new cleavage based on the issue of socioeconomic justice has emerged with significant salience in the electorate. The political elites exploited

[28] Note that we are able to make inferences about the effects of age and social class because neither is causally related to national identity. For those demographic variables known to have an impact on the first dimension, the corresponding coefficients are inconsistent, and no statistical inference can be made about their effects.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the new cleavage, and the electorate has responded. Opposing President Lee and the KMT mainstream faction on the matter are the DPP and the KMT nonmainstream faction with support from younger and socioeconomically disadvantaged voters. The new cleavage situation presents an opportunity for coalitional realignment in both electoral and legislative politics. By providing contending elites with differential edges on different dimensions, the situation turns out to be conducive to the consolidation of the new democratic regime. As the political game becomes positive-sum and the chance of winning increases, electoral and legislative maneuvers become routinized even for the most confrontational politicians in the opposition.

The result of the 1992 election created a mercurial coalitional situation in the Legislature. The DPP ended up winning fifty-three seats nationally, almost one-third of the total. Besides Jaw and Wang, several other nonmainstream candidates were also elected, putting the faction in a pivotal position that threatened to deprive the KMT mainstream faction of a safe majority. As a result, the KMT leadership needed help from the DPP for certain key legislative actions. This was exactly what happened when the nonmainstream faction threatened to boycott the confirmation of Lien, the former governor of Taiwan Province who was nominated by President Lee to replace Premier Hau. Since Lien would be the first Taiwanese to become the head of the executive branch, it would be politically suicidal for the DPP to side with the nonmainstream faction. By its strategic absence during the confirmation roll call (thus lowering the threshold of the required majority), the DPP essentially nullified the nonmainstream threat and helped remove the obstacles for Lee to accomplish his final round of power reshuffling.

The new coalitional politics takes a dramatic turn on issues more akin to antimoney politics. The KMT leadership suffered its first major legislative defeat when a sizable number of renegade KMT legislators joined the DPP to pass a stringent financial disclosure bill. On two other important bills—the construction of a $2.2 billion new Legislative Yuan complex and a multibillion bullet train railway system—maverick KMT members, once again in an expedient alliance with the DPP, staged a successful revolt against the party leadership. The two projects were voted down because it was widely believed that they involved land speculation and invited waste and corruption. It became clear that a gradual partisan realignment anchored in antimoney politics was occurring in the legislature.

More dramatic changes certify our contention about the possibility of a partisan realignment. On the eve of the KMT fourteenth Congress,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some leading figures of the KMT's nonmainstream faction, encouraged by the split of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan and the subsequent success of the splinter parties in the Diet election, decided to break away from the KMT and established the New Party. In surprising consistency with our analysis, the New Party avoided taking a strong position on the issue of reunification and instead stressed an anticorruption position and socioeconomic justice in its founding declaration.

The New Party has teamed up with the DPP in many major legislative maneuvers against the KMT majority. In particular, it joined the DPP in opposing the attempt to expand the power of the presidency, as in the case of the National Security Council bill; in rolling back KMT's organizational presence on college campuses, as in the case of the University Act; and in pressuring the KMT to keep its promise to hold direct elections for the provincial governor and mayors of the two municipalities on time, as in the case of local government reform bills. The two former foes in the battle of democratic reform found themselves strange bedfellows in the "post-Hau" reform politics. When it comes to the issue of national identity, however, the New Party came right back to the KMT mainstream camp, as in the case of the Plebiscite Act.[29]

Electorally, the performance of the New Party has been impressive, although its electoral strength is concentrated in the North, particularly in the greater Taipei metropolitan area. The seven founding members won 5.5 percent of the total vote in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election. In 1994 Jaw Shau-kang, who was nominated by the New Party for the Taipei mayoral election, gathered 30.2 percent of the vote in a three-way contest, losing to the DPP's candidate (43.7 percent) but winning over the KMT's incumbent (25.9 percent).

More significantly, many leading figures of the DPP have modified their antisystem posture. The newly elected mayor of Taipei, Chen Shui-bian, made good on his pledge to respect the constitutional order of the Republic of China upon his inauguration.[30] During a recent tour to the United States, the chairman of the DPP, Shih Ming-teh, publicly announced that "the DPP need not and will not declare independence once it comes to power, because Taiwan has already been independent [from the PRC] since 1949."[31] Shih's remarks were clearly motivated

[29] The New Party actually cast the decisive vote in this case to save the KMT from an embarrassing defeat. For the roll-call records of the aforementioned bills, see *Lifayuan Gongbao* (various issues, 1993–94).

[30] As a symbolic gesture, Mayor Chen attended the annual flag-raising ceremony at dawn on New Year's Day 1995.

[31] *China Times*, September 15 , 1995, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the perceived need to alleviate the popular worry about DPP's seemingly uncompromising stance on the issue of national identity. Meanwhile, the KMT nonmainstream faction and the New Party shifted their position on the issue of presidential elections. Both stopped challenging the legality of the popular election of the president. Instead, both are fielding their own candidates and running an all-out campaign to challenge Lee's reelection bid.

Concluding Remarks

Our analysis yields a number of significant findings. First, as perceived by the Taiwanese electorate, the major political forces are competing in a two-dimensional issue space. The existence of a socioeconomic justice dimension indicates that the traditionally predominant cleavage—national identity—is no longer the only defining cleavage in electoral politics as Taiwan moves into the phase of democratic consolidation. As far as the development of the party system is concerned, the emergence of the new cleavage holds great transformative potential, part of which has been realized.

Second, our analysis suggests that the KMT led by the mainstream faction is unlikely to retain electoral dominance despite its incumbency advantage and control over preponderant organizational resources. It becomes increasingly difficult for the KMT to cast itself as a catch-all party when its leaders are perceived as soft on corruption and money politics.

Third, the new cleavage cuts across the traditional subethnic demarcation as voters perceive prominent mainlander politicians as positioning themselves closer to the DPP than are members of the KMT mainstream faction. Such a crosscutting situation makes it possible for different political groups to form coalitions on different dimensions and proves to be conducive to a partisan realignment. While the KMT mainstream faction enjoys proximity to the DPP on the national identity dimension, the nonmainstream faction and the New Party can also cooperate with the DPP on issues related to socioeconomic justice.

These developments indicate that the regime transition has already entered the consolidation phase. The three conditions that provide incentives for competing elite groups to accept the values of democratic institutions and avoid confrontational strategies have already been met. They are (1) the existence of new, crosscutting issues; (2) the differential advantages of competing elite groups in mobilizing support on dif-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferent issues; and (3) the possibility of coalitional realignment in both electoral and legislative politics. In a nutshell, the 1992 Legislative Yuan election will go down in history not only as the founding election of Taiwan's transition to democracy but also as a critical election for the development of the party system. It simultaneously marks the end of the old conflict and the beginning of a new politics.

Appendix 1: The Theory and Methodology of Spatial Analysis

Enelow and Hinich presented an introduction to the theory and methodology of spatial analysis with empirical applications to American presidential politics.[32] The specific method they used, originally developed by Cahoon and Hinich, provides estimates of voters' and politicians' ideal points through statistical analysis of thermometer scores acquired in a sample survey of voters.[33] In addition to the policy-oriented dimensions, the method also allows for consideration of a nonpolicy valence dimension in the voter's evaluation of the politicians' personal qualities.

Formally, let π_j denote the coordinates of politician j on the ideological dimensions and let z_m denote the coordinates of respondent m on the same dimensions. And let V_j denote politician j's position on the valence dimension. Then,

$$P_{jm} = (\|\pi_j - z_m\|^2 + aV_j)^{1/2}$$

where "$\| \|$" represents the Euclidean distance is a measure that reflects both the distance between politician j's and voter m's ideal points in the predictive space and the standing of politician j on the valence dimension.[34] In order to be consistent with spatial distance, V_j is conventionally scaled such that the larger the score, the worse the politician's position on this dimension. The thermometer score, T_{jm}, that voter m gives to describe his feelings toward politician j is supposed to be based on proximity; hence

[32] Enelow and Hinich (fn. 8).

[33] Lawrence S. Cahoon, "Locating a Set of Points Using Range Information Only" (Ph.D. diss., Carnegie-Mellon University, 1975); Lawrence S. Cahoon and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Method for Locating Targets Using Range Only," *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, vol. IT-22 (March 1976).

[34] In this study, we use the squared Euclidean distance as a measure of proximity. The methodology of spatial analysis, however, can accommodate other types of distance.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

$$T_{jm} = c_{jm} - P_{jm}$$
$$= c_{jm} - (\|\pi_j - z_m\|^2 + aV_j)^{1/2},$$

where c_{jm} represents nonsystematic factors that are uncorrelated with P_{jm}. The Cahoon method uses factor analysis to derive estimates of π_j and z_m from empirical data observed for T_{jm} and V_j. The method is readily implementable in a Fortran program.[35]

One of the assumptions that facilitate the implementation of the Cahoon method is that the variance-covariance matrix of voters' ideal points is diagonal. Such an assumption has no empirical bearing and is made only for the purpose of mathematical expediency. The violation of the assumption is known to occasion considerable rotational distortion of the recovery of the candidates' positions.[36]

In our analysis, since we believe that the voters' ideal positions on the ideological dimensions are correlated, we have to correct for the rotational error that results from the Cahoon algorithm. We develop a strategy that utilizes our substantive knowledge about the first dimension—the traditional cleavage—of the ideological space. On the basis of such prior knowledge, we rerotate the spatial map derived from the Cahoon program by maximizing the correlation between the voters' positions on the first dimension and an external criterion that is theoretically predictive of such positions. In other words, we orient the first dimension of the ideological space according to theoretically relevant voter characteristics instead of relying on a mathematical artifact. This approach, we believe, is appropriate because we have a prior expectation about the nature of the first dimension. In addition, we also provide validity checks for the recovered second dimension.

Appendix 2: Biographical Data of the National Political Figures

—Chu Kao-cheng, a Taiwanese, member of the Legislative Yuan and founder and former chairman of the Democratic Socialist Party, which was later merged into the New Party

—Hau Pei-tsun, a mainlander, former four-star general and former premier, member of the KMT Central Standing Committee and the leader of the nonmainstream faction

[35] The program, originally developed by Lawrence S. Cahoon, is available upon request from Tse-min Lin, the primary author.

[36] Lawrence S. Cahoon, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Statistical Multidimensional Scaling Method Based on the Spatial Theory of Voting," in P. C. Wang, ed., *Graphical Representation of Multivariate Data* (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—Hsu Hsin-liang, a Taiwanese, former chairman of the DPP and leader of the DPP's Formosa faction

—Huang Hsin-jie, a Taiwanese, former chairman of the DPP, member of the Legislative Yuan, and a leading figure of the Formosa faction

—Jaw Shau-kang, a mainlander, former head of the EPA, member of the Legislative Yuan, the top vote getter in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election, a founding member of the New Party, and the New Party candidate for the 1994 Taipei mayoral election

—Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese, president of the Republic of China, chairman of the KMT, and the leader of the mainstream faction

—Lin Yang-kang, a Taiwanese, former deputy premier, member of the KMT Central Standing Committee, former head of the Judicial Yuan, and a candidate for the next presidency and rival to Lee Teng-hui

—Shih Ming-teh, a Taiwanese, former leader of the DPP caucus of the Legislative Yuan, chairman of the DPP, and leader of the Welfare State Alliance

—Soong Chu-yu (James Soong), a mainlander, former secretary general of the KMT, a close ally of Lee Teng-hui, and current governor of Taiwan

—Wang Jian-chuan, a mainlander, former minister of finance, member of the Legisltaive Yuan, and a founding member of the New Party

—Wu Pei-hsiung, a Taiwanese, secretary general of the Presidential Office, former minister of interior, and member of the KMT Central Standing Committee. He used to lean toward the nonmainstream faction but was just recently coopted by Lee Teng-hui.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EXPLAINING DEFECTION FROM INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia

By BEVERLY CRAWFORD*

ON December 23, 1991, the German government announced its unconditional unilateral diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in open disregard of an EC agreement to recognize the two states under EC conditionality requirements. The decision became a subject of widespread political controversy. It hastened the end of Yugoslavia and seemed an ominously defiant first step in the foreign policy of a newly united Germany. It was puzzling because German political elites supported multilateralism, and Germany had worked hard within the EC to deepen political union. The Yugoslav crisis provided an opportunity to strengthen regional cooperation in security and foreign policy and was the impetus for the first peace conference directed by the EC in Europe. Why did Germany break ranks with the EC at the risk of undermining both those efforts and the larger project of political cooperation?

At first glance it would seem that the controversy over Germany's decision to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia was unwarranted. The diplomatic recognition of states is commonly deemed a matter for the discretion of the recognizing state.[1] Indeed, the typical occasion for

* I would like to thank John Brady, John Leslie, James Martel, and Hans Peter Schmitz for their assistance with the research and writing of this paper. I would particularly like to acknowledge the assistance of Nick Biziouras, without whose help this project could not have been completed. I also thank Tom Banchoff, Richard Buxbaum, Dimitri Dimritov, Ernst B. Haas, Rumyana Kolarava, Thomas Rippe-Kappen, Michael Kreile, Andrei Markovits, Glenda Rosenthal, Steve Weber, and Lisa Wedeen for their comments and criticisms on earlier drafts. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and its director Bernd Scheitterlein, to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and to Norbert Schwaiger at the Council of the European Communities, for valuable assistance with interviews and for access to archival material. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Center for German and European Studies at the University of California. Finally, I wish to thank the EC and the German officials whom I interviewed for the project. For those who requested anonymity, I have cited only their institutional affiliations.

[1] See Jochen Frowein, "Recognition," *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1987).

World Politics 48 (July 1996), 482–521

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interstate conflict over recognition has been when it was delayed rather than when it was granted. A closer look, however, reveals that EC partners viewed Germany's decision as a crucial breech of consensual norms in international law, that is, as premature recognition, and as a unilateral act that undermined an important multilateral agreement. Germany's impending decision led France's Foreign Minister Roland Dumas to ask, "Where is the spirit of Maastricht?" and to warn Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher that "if you do that [recognize Slovenia and Croatia] you will set Europe back twenty years." *Le Monde* compared Germany's position on recognition with the Nazi's creation of an independent Croatia under German trusteeship during World War II.[2]

Indeed, the EC was embarking on a delicate venture to formulate and implement a common foreign policy. One of the initial policy agreements was to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia both through direct mediation to reach a peace settlement and through an agreement forged in the EC Council of Ministers that member states would not grant diplomatic recognition to Yugoslav republics wishing to secede.[3] Participants strongly believed that unilateral recognition would undermine the credibility of EC members' commitment to construct a common foreign policy.

For students of international politics, this is a case of defection from international cooperation. Given Germany's postwar history of multilateralism and an explicit commitment not to take unilateral action, it

[2] Indeed, there is some evidence that consensual norms on the recognition of states have evolved in international law. A comparison of national recognition policies suggests that most states agree that recognition should not occur in the midst of a revolution or civil war. In these cases, the act of diplomatic recognition would be considered premature and would constitute a form of intervention in the conflict. Most Western states agree that diplomatic recognition should be granted only when the government to be recognized has effective control of the country or territory in question and has a reasonable expection of permanent control. If, however, the government is not in control, the recognition is generally considered to be premature. On premature recognition, see Joseph Sweeney, Corney Oliver, and Noyes Leech, "International Legal Effects of National Recognition Policies: Sketches of National Policies," *The International Legal System: Cases and Materials* (New York: Foundation Press, 1981), 819–23; Hersch Lauterpacht, *Recognition in International Law* (1947; reprint, New York: Foundation Press, 1978). Roland Dumas used the legal term "premature" to describe Germany's recognition of Croatia; for his remarks and comments published in *Le Monde,* see Marc Fisher, "Yugoslav Violence Puts Focus on Germany," *Washington Post*, July 7, 1991, p. A21.

There is, however, no real consensus on this issue. Legal scholars remind us that France recognized the United States during the Revolutionary War. The United States encouraged politicians in the Venezuelan province of Panama to secede and declare independence; the U.S. then immediately extended recognition to Panama, bringing it under its armed protection. States have also used a new government's political orientation, attitude toward foreign investment, and degree of foreign involvement in government as criteria for diplomatic recognition. See Department of State, *Diplomatic Recognition: A Foreign Affairs Outline*, United States Department of State Bulletin 462, August 1977.

[3] See "Germany Considers a Misstep," *New York Times*, December 15, 1991, p. 18.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

requires explanation. Cooperation occurs "when actors adjust their behavior to the preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination."[4] When unilateral action lowers others' policy gains, leading them to perceive that they will be worse off than they would otherwise be, that action can be considered uncooperative.[5] Defection, as I define it, is distinguished from ongoing discord in multilateral negotiations in that it is a unilateral action taken after a multilateral agreement to act in concert is reached. EC members agreed to present a unified policy stance on this issue. They then renegotiated the policy to adjust to Germany's preferences. Germany then cheated on that agreement with its unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. This had a negative impact on the common policy the EC was so carefully constructing: it destroyed the peace process that they had initiated and orchestrated.[6]

A thorough account of the causes of a particular defection can shed light on the conditions for international cooperation and on the conditions that undermine it. Two preferences—for diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, as opposed to the EC preference to maintain Yugoslavia's integrity, and for the decision to move unilaterally—and the ordering of these preferences require explanation. Germany preferred multilateral recognition to unilateral recognition, but preferred unilateral recognition to a multilateral effort to save Yugoslavia. How was this preference ordering formed?[7]

The findings can be stated succinctly: the German preference for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia originated in the domestic political arena. The norm of self-determination and the effects of elite "bandwagoning" combined to shape this preference. It was formed neither by external forces—that is, by Germany's new geopolitical interests in a changing international environment—nor by the internal pressure of public opinion, interest groups, or the media. Rather, elites preferred to

[4] Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 51–52.

[5] See Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44 (April 1992).

[6] This is not to make the counterfactual argument that a united EC policy could have saved Yugoslavia. Debate on this issue continues. In December 1991 Lord Carrington, the EC's chief negotiator, appealed to Hans van der Broek, the Dutch foreign minister who held the EC Commission's rotating presidency, claiming that German recognition would destroy the peace conference at The Hague and common EC policy. He argued that it would prompt Serbia to leave the negotiations and cause Croatia and Slovenia to lose interest in the proceedings. David Binder, "U.N. Fights Bonn's Embrace of Croatia," *New York Times*, December 14, 1991, p. 3. On the interaction between the peace efforts and the warring parties, see Henry Wijnaendts, *Joegoslavische Kronick: Juli 1991–Augustus 1991* (The Yugoslav chronicle: July 1991–August 1991) (Amsterdam: Rap, 1995).

[7] I explain only Germany's preferences in this episode, not the sources of the initial EC policy from which Germany's preferences diverged.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

recognize these two states because a recognition policy was most consistent with Germany's entrenched foreign policy norms and the incentives structured by party politics. At no time, however, did elites call for unilateralism; they expected Foreign Minister Genscher to negotiate a joint EC policy of diplomatic recognition. The unilateral action was caused by a spiral of mistrust that emerged in international negotiations in the face of German domestic pressure for a policy of diplomatic recognition. Mistrust was nourished by conflicting international norms and underdeveloped institutions for European foreign policy cooperation.

I begin with a brief discussion of three theoretical approaches to cooperation—the structural-realist, the institutionalist, and the domestic-level approaches—from which hypotheses about foreign policy preferences and defection from cooperation can be deduced. I then trace the events leading to Germany's defection. Finally, I propose five hypotheses, drawn from both the theories and the empirical material, to explain German preferences. I roughly weigh their relative explanatory power and distinguish between explanations for the preference for recognition and explanations for unilateral action. I combine those hypotheses supported by the evidence to provide a full account of Germany's defection from cooperation.

Theoretical Considerations

The theoretical debate on international cooperation focuses on whether the source of states' preferences is international or internal. Both structural realism and regime theory argue that preferences are formed primarily by external forces. Alternatively, a number of studies have focused on the domestic forces that shape foreign policy preferences in general and preferences for cooperation or defection in particular. These approaches, however, share the assumption that the decision to cooperate or defect is rational, based on calculations of net gains from a particular policy choice. The theoretical debate is over whether internal or external gains are more important in those calculations.

Realism argues that international anarchy creates incentives for noncooperation among states, particularly in foreign and security policy. The state's national interest is defined as the maintenance of security and independence. Central decision makers calculate gains from cooperation or unilateral action by assessing the impact of a particular choice on those national interests. Stronger states are able to protect their interests through unilateral action. Weaker states are less able to protect their interests alone; the weaker they are, the higher their in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

centive to cooperate with others to do so.[8] The more powerful a state, the less it can be harmed if it defects from cooperation.

From this perspective, the structure of the international system is a central determinant of states' policy preferences and their propensity for international cooperation.[9] In the bipolar world of the cold war, the relative equality of power between the U.S. and the USSR and the disparity in capabilities between them and others meant that they had only to look to one another for threats to their security. Smaller states like Germany, anchored in alliances with the two superpowers, were protected from the rival alliance. Bipolarity increased West Germany's incentive to cooperate in the Western alliance because cooperation offered protection from a well-defined threat: asymmetries in power led to cooperation.[10] In multipolar systems, in contrast, power positions are fluid, and uncertainty about the source of threat is high. With multiple poles, states feel unprotected from one another and perceive fewer gains from cooperation, both because power is more evenly distributed and because they are unsure about their neighbors' power capabilities. They are likely, therefore, to rush to protect themselves, and they defect from cooperative efforts that do not protect their interests.

This approach suggests that as Germany expands its relative power in an international system moving toward multipolarity, it will increasingly calculate net gains from unilateral action.[11] The unilateral recognition of Croatia is cited as an example: a more powerful Germany was recreating its World War II alliance with an independent Croatia as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy in the Balkans. A smaller Yugoslavia with Croatia and Slovenia as allies could realize this geopolitical aim.[12]

The realist approach has important limitations for a general understanding of the sources of defection from cooperation. There is a growing body of empirical evidence to show that powerful states—even

[8] The classic text on this issue is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

[9] See Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus* 93 (Summer 1964); and John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990).

[10] For a discussion of the power asymmetries argument, see Milner (fn. 5).

[11] John Mearscheimer argues that a nonnuclear Germany is likely eventually to acquire nuclear weapons as a defense against a possible attack from the nuclear [former] Soviet Union. Mearsheimer (fn. 9), 36–39.

[12] See Pierre M. Gallois, "Vers une predominance allemande" (Toward a German predominance), *Le Monde* (Paris), July 16, 1993, p. 2. For a more scholarly account, see Eberhard Rondholz, "Deutsche Erblasten im jugoslawischen Buergerkrieg" (The burden of German history in the Yugoslav civil war), *Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik* 37 (July 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

under multipolarity—do not always calculate net gains from unilateral action.[13] And the more powerful they become, the greater the odds that actual policy preferences in concrete cases will be shaped by forces originating outside the anarchic international environment.[14]

The institutional approach addresses those limitations by focusing on the role of international regimes to explain the cooperation of powerful states, even under multipolarity. Three points are important. First, regimes provide the necessary transparency and information to relieve heightened fears that arise in a multipolar world. By mitigating the uncertainty of multipolarity, regimes reduce the fear that others will act unilaterally. All members are then more reluctant to rush to unilateral action themselves.[15] Second, regimes create the expectation that all participants will interact indefinitely, and a defection will be punished by another member's noncooperation in the future. The odds of defection decrease when states historically have derived benefits from cooperation and have agreed to cooperate into the indefinite future. When states value their future relationship and when a defection threatens that future, they are likely to see fewer benefits from unilateral action.[16] Regimes help cement expectations that a common future exists. Finally, regime members calculate reputational gains from cooperation; a defection counts as a reputational loss, and the prospect of loss increases the willingness to cooperate. Taken together, these arguments suggest that strong regimes both shape the substantive preferences of their members and encourage a preference for cooperation.

The institutional approach suggests that German commitment to the EC should have prevented the defection under investigation here. Indeed, because Genscher had led the effort to strengthen the European Political Cooperation (EPC), the regime governing EC foreign policy cooperation, the German decision was unexpected. Under his

[13] See Stanley Hoffman, "International Relations Theory and Post–Cold War Europe," *International Security* 15 (Fall 1990), and Robert Putnam and Nickolas Bayne, *Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[14] See John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," *International Organization* 46 (Summer 1992), and Andrew Moravcsik, "Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

[15] See Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security* 16 (Summer 1991).

[16] See Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation under Anarchy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); and Helen Milner (fn. 5), 474–75.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prodding, the EPC grew from a set of informal guidelines initiated in 1969 for intergovernmental cooperation to a more formal institution in the 1980s. His initiative led to the arrangements set forth in the Single European Act of 1986 giving the EPC its formal organizational structure. Throughout this period, members worked together to achieve foreign policy coordination,[17] and the Maastricht Treaty further strengthened the EPC.[18] In short, the regime created expectations about future EC foreign policy cooperation. Given Germany's role in these developments, its defection in this episode is puzzling.

Domestic-level approaches suggest partial explanations. They assume that foreign policy preferences and the decision to cooperate rest on a calculation of net domestic gains.[19] Two domestic approaches may shed light on this case: the first, a cultural approach, suggests that each state has a national tradition in foreign policy that is the core of what can be termed its foreign policy culture.[20] That culture defines a dominant worldview that constrains available choices. Particularly in times of uncertainty, actors rely on the worldview they have acquired over time.[21] Examples include a tradition of support for countries with similar political structures and value systems, a tradition of anticommunism, or a tradition of support for multilateralism. If these or other normative traditions are entrenched in a nation's foreign policy culture, decision makers formulate policies that accord with them, and those policies are likely to meet with domestic support while incongruent policies may not. In this way, domestic norms provide the basis for calculating gains from a particular policy choice. In this case, Germany's tradition of support for self-determination might provide a clue to its

[17] On the EPC as a regime, see Heinz-Juergen Axt, "Kooperation unter Konkurrenten: Das Regime als Theorie der aussenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der EG-Staaten" (Cooperation among competitors: Regime theory and cooperation on foreign policy among members of the European Community), *Zeitschrift fuer Politik* 40, (September 1993). On the evolution of the EPC and Genscher's key role, see Roy Pryce, ed., *The Dynamics of European Union* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1987); and Martin Holland, ed., *The Future of European Political Cooperation* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

[18] The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 provided the legal basis for the institutionalization of the EPC. The treaty calls for the Political Cooperation Secretariat to join the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers in a unified institutional structure—the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). See the "Maastricht Treaty of 1991," February 7, 1992, *Treaty on European Union*, Article J.4.1.

[19] Central decision makers under diverse domestic-regime types may experience domestic gains from unilateral action. For examples, see Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44 (April 1992).

[20] For a good discussion of the cultural approach, see Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration," *International Organization* 47 (Autumn 1993).

[21] Peter Katzenstein, "Coping with Terrorism: Norms and Internal Security in Germany and Japan," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

preference for recognition, but its unilateral act defied its foreign policy tradition of multilateralism.[22] The puzzle of unilateralism remains.

Pluralist theories provide a complementary domestic-level approach. They suggest that, in democracies, decision makers must be accountable to their publics; this requirement narrows their range of policy options. Politicians are reluctant to pursue unpopular policies because those policies will undermine their continuing effort to secure political support.[23] This approach does not tell us why democratic publics might prefer unilateralism or international cooperation; it simply suggests that, in democracies, public demands are included in preference calculations of central decision makers.

Both international and domestic theories generate partial hypotheses, but their gaps suggest that a full explanation for Germany's preferences for recognition and defection rests on the interaction of both domestic and international forces. A fruitful way to explore that interaction is to use the metaphor of a two-level game in which central decision makers strive to reconcile domestic and international imperatives simultaneously.[24] They must cut a deal in international negotiations that will be politically acceptable at home. International negotiating positions are shaped by domestic politics in negotiators' states, but central decision makers also try to sell potential international agreements to their constituencies. The outcome in terms of cooperation or defection is a function of whether internationally negotiated agreements gain the necessary approval at home. The higher the odds of that approval, the greater the odds of international cooperation. Although a high degree of domestic approval makes international agreements easier to achieve, a state's negotiators can cite the lack of domestic approval to pressure their international negotiating partners to change course and accept their preferences. If, however, a state's negotiators find little domestic approval for a particular international agreement and are unable

[22] For detailed studies of multilateralism as a German foreign policy norm, see Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1955–1982* (Security and detente: On the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1955–1982) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1983); and Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy after Unification," in Paul Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992).

[23] Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in 21 Countries* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 138–39; Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies: Public Opinion and Political Parties in the United States, Great Britain, West Germany, and France* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988), 118, 199.

[24] See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988). Putnam's propositions are further elaborated in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam (fn. 14).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to persuade their negotiating partners to move to their position, defection is a likely outcome.

As we shall see in this case, German negotiators, whose domestic elites did not approve of the EC's efforts to save Yugoslavia, persuaded their negotiating partners to come closer to their preferences. Germany, nonetheless, defected from cooperation. Although the two-level game approach provides insight into the mutual influence of domestic and international pressures on preference formation, it is also incomplete.

The Recognition Episode

In April 1990 the ultranationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won Croatia's first contested elections since 1945. Croatia's new HDZ president, Franjo Tudjman, refused minority rights to the Serb population six hundred thousand strong, and its first constitution violated the principles on minority rights of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).[25] Local Serbs demanded that Serb-dominated territory be taken out of Croatia. On June 25, 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Army (JNA) attempted to prevent their succession and fighting broke out.[26]

It was neither obvious nor necessary for EC members to respond jointly. At one extreme, the EC could have decided not to act in concert; it simply could have done nothing, and the UN was the likely body to mediate the conflict. Indeed, the EC had never acted independently to resolve a regional military conflict outside its borders. At the other extreme, the EC could take an active independent role in conflict resolution. The crisis presented the EPC with an opportunity to engage in an independent European conflict-resolution effort. A cooperative response was a logical extension of the general commitment to coordinate policy. It also provided an opportunity to strengthen the EPC in preparation for the signing of the upcoming Maastricht Treaty, which would carve out an institutionalized realm for European foreign and security policy cooperation.

Two substantive alternatives for a common policy presented themselves. The first was a joint effort to preserve Yugoslavia. The rationale was to maintain the territorial integrity of an established state and to preserve the international status quo in the aftermath of communism's

[25] See Dijana Plestina, "Politics, Economics, and War: Problems of Transition in Croatia," Working paper, no. 5.15 (Berkeley: CGES, 1993); and Robert Hayden, "Constitutional Nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav Republics," *Slavic Review* 51 (Winter 1992).

[26] See Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin Books, 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

collapse. Postcommunist states were actively participating in reshaping European political and security institutions, and their disintegration threatened to weaken and discredit those institutions. Particularly, since these states were moving toward democracy, self-determination via fragmentation would raise the specter of nationalist rivalries in Europe again, and EC officials referred to what they believed were consensual norms in international law against premature recognition of belligerents in a civil war. That recognition would constitute an unwarranted and unlawful intervention in the conflict.[27]

The alternative was an EC policy to speed the disintegration of Yugoslavia by jointly recognizing republics demanding independence and then to help negotiate a peace settlement. The supporting argument was found in the doctrine of national self-determination, which had three overlapping dimensions, each forged in a different set of historical conditions.

First, after World War I, Woodrow Wilson, deeply influenced by nineteenth-century liberalism, saw national self-determination in international relations as an essential corollary of democracy. People had a natural right to govern themselves in domestic politics, and nations had a natural right to govern themselves in international politics.[28] After World War II, the principle of the self-determination of peoples was codified in Article I of the United Nations Charter. As that principle was construed in state practice after 1946, there was a clear differentiation between colonial possessions and territorial subdivisions within an independent state. With the advent of decolonization in the 1960s, the international community applied the principle of self-determination to movements for independence from colonial rule and generally refrained from extending the right of self-determination to separatist movements that demanded territorial separation within a single state.[29] Indeed, such an interpretation would conflict with the principle of territorial integrity upon which UN membership was based.

The cold war added yet a third interpretation of the self-determination principle, targeted specifically at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Western democracies held that the right of self-determination

[27] Author's interviews with EC officials, Brussels, May 18–19, 1993. On the concept of premature recognition, see fn. 2. On the view that diplomatic recognition is constitutive of statehood, that is, confers international personality on an entity purporting to be a state, see "The Effect of Recognition on Statehood," in Louis Henkin et al., eds., *International Law: Cases and Materials* (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 1980).

[28] Inis L. Claude Jr., *Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization* (New York: Random House, 1970), 53.

[29] Richard Emerson, "Self-determination," *American Journal of International Law* 65 (Fall 1971), 465.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

embraced a right to internal democracy for all peoples, irrespective of the status of the territory. This interpretation was codified in Principle VIII of the Helsinki Accords of 1975. It read that "by virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right in full freedom, to determine . . . their internal and external political status . . . and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social, and cultural development."[30] The United States and Britain had long recognized the governments in exile of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia under this interpretation, and it was in line with the view that separatist movements demanding territorial separation within a single state had the right to self-determination.

Faced with the substantive choice between a premature recognition based on the principle of self-determination and the preservation of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, the EC chose to preserve Yugoslavia jointly. The argument that dominated the discussion was that the cold war was over, and postcommunist states were moving toward democracy. Fragmentation of those states would mean a loss of control by new democratizing governments. Further, within EC member states, a number of separatist movements had called upon the principle of self-determination to justify claims for varying degrees of autonomy. Catalonia had asserted its independence within the EC, and France and Belgium were facing similar problems with regions that had pressed for more independence from the central government. Governments did not want to send a positive message to local separatists by supporting separatism in Yugoslavia. Finally, the granting of collective autonomy to any minority group ran counter to the dominant liberal principle protecting individual rights enshrined in EC law.[31]

Faced with a procedural choice between a joint policy and separate national policies, EC members chose a common policy. They were eager to build an independent foreign policy and security capability in Europe after the cold war, and, believing that the status quo should be preserved, wanted to work together to achieve this end.[32]

[30] CSCE, *Final Act of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (hereafter cited as *Final Act of the CSCE*), Helsinki Accords (VIII), quoted in Edmund Jan Osmanczyck, ed., *Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements* (Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985), 333–54. The phrase "in full freedom" was intended to preclude coercion by a government with respect to a people's choice of internal regime or policies. This was made explicit by the sponsor, The Netherlands, and by other supporting governments and was intended to support specifically the right of self-determination for people living under communist regimes. See Antonio Cassesse, "The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination in Human Rights," in Thomas Buergenthal, ed., *Human Rights, International Law, and the Helsinki Accords* (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun, 1977).

[31] On the legal implications of granting collective rights, see Henkin et al. (fn. 27).

[32] Authors interviews with EC officials (fn. 27).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Following the substantive agreement to preserve the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and the procedural choice to formulate a common policy, the EC, in early 1991, promised association and possible membership to a united Yugoslavia, hoping that this would help the presidents of the six republics reach a peaceful agreement. On the day before Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, it offered Yugoslavia a five-year loan of 807 million ECU (European Currency Units). When fighting broke out, however, it insisted that Croatia and Slovenia suspend further steps toward independence, threatening to cut $1 billion in aid until peace was restored.[33] Taking active steps to mediate the military conflict, three EC foreign ministers negotiated the Brioni Accord with Serbia, which stipulated the withdrawal of all Yugoslav troops from Slovenia—effectively ending the war there. They also persuaded Slovenia and Croatia to agree to a three-month suspension of independence declarations if the JNA would withdraw.

Until the late spring of 1991, the German political elite supported the EC in this policy choice. The Christian Socialist Union (CSU) declared that Europe must not fall back into the particularism of small states, and its Christian Democratic Union (CDU) coalition partner declared that nationalism and separatism could not solve the crisis.[34] The Social Democratic Party (SPD) argued that Germany should support those Yugoslavs that were attempting to hold the country together.[35] German political elites also preferred a common EC policy to resolve the crisis. In May, the CDU/CSU called for a German initiative to offer the EC's good offices as a mediator and for the use of West European Union (WEU) troops in a peacekeeping mission to Yugoslavia.[36] On June 19, 1991, a unified declaration of all German political parties stated that Yugoslav unity should be maintained.[37]

But after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence, the political elite quickly changed course. On June 27, the CDU called for recognition of the two states, and on July 1, the SPD argued that Genscher should actively push this option within the EC.[38] By July 9, the Federal

[33] Wolfgang Krieger, "Toward a Gaullist Germany?" *World Policy Journal* 11 (Spring 1994), 30.

[34] For the CSU position, see *Deutsche Press Agentur* (DPA), May 19, 1991. For the CDU position, see Dr. Hans Stercken, "Jugoslawien und die Europaeische Gemeinschaft" (Yugoslavia and the European community), *Deutschland-Union-Dienst* 44 (November 20, 1990), 4.

[35] See *Parlamentarische Protokolle der deutschen Bundestag* (Protocol of the German parliament), 12/9, February 21, 1991, p. 405.

[36] See CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag (CDU/CSU coalition caucus in the German Parliament), press release, May 7, 1991.

[37] *Parlamentarische Protokolle* (fn. 35), 12/33, June 19, 1991, p. 2690.

[38] See the statement by Alfred Dregger, chair of the CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion, in *Deutschland Union Dienst* 45 (June 27, 1991); and Heinz-Juergen Axt "Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) adopted a policy of support for recognition, thus bringing all major political parties into agreement in little more than two weeks after Croatia and Slovenia had declared independence. "Recognition fever" spread throughout the political elite. Representatives of the sixteen German states requested EC recognition of the two republics if the Yugoslav army continued to attack, and the state government of Hesse offered them material aid.[39]

Meanwhile, the EC was trying to preserve Yugoslavia. On July 3, CSCE officials requested that the EC send an observer mission to Zagreb. The Soviet Union preferred that the CSCE take a backseat to the EC with regard to this crisis, fearing that CSCE involvement would serve as a precedent for interference in the Baltics.[40] EC foreign ministers took up the challenge and agreed to establish a monitor mission to help stabilize a cease-fire when it was negotiated.[41] The European Monitoring Mission (EMM)—an EC first—was born, suggesting that the crisis was indeed helping to forge new levels of EC policy coordination.

But Germany immediately urged the EPC to change course. In a July CSCE meeting, Genscher identified Serbian aggression as the cause of the conflict and urged the community to recognize both Croatia and Slovenia.[42] Other EC members countered that recognition would lead to more bloodshed, but they agreed to recognize Croatia jointly if the JNA continued to fight and to suspend aid to Yugoslavia until hostilities ceased.[43]

Not wanting to take these drastic steps and despite mounting obstacles, the EC continued to seek peace in a united Yugoslavia. When the JNA refused to leave Croatia, the EC hesitated to act on its threat of diplomatic recognition.[44] Trying to buy time, the EPC requested that the WEU provide military support to back up its mediation efforts, but the WEU refused, saying that it could not send troops outside the NATO

Mythen und Fakten zur Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands" (Did Genscher chop Yugoslavia in half? Myths and facts of a united Germany), *Europa Archiv* 48 (June 25, 1993).

[39] See "Slowenien stimmt dem Kompromiss von Brioni zu" (Compromise for Slovenia reached at Brioni), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 11, 1991, p. 2.

[40] "Drei Tage lang am Telefon" (Three days on the telephone), *Der Spiegel* 45 (July 8, 1991), 128.

[41] EPC, *Declaration on Yugoslavia*, 82nd Ministerial Meeting, The Hague, July 10, 1991.

[42] William Drozdiak, "Germany Criticizes European Policy on Yugoslavia," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1991, p. A16; "Genscher will einheitliche EG-Politik" (Genscher wants a unified European Community policy), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 6, 1991, p. 6.

[43] "EG-Aussenminister hoffen auf friedliche Loesung in Jugoslawien" (European foreign ministers hope for a peaceful solution in Yugoslavia), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 10, 1991, p. 5.

[44] Stephen Engelberg, "Yugoslav Premier Fears All-Out War," *New York Times*, July 29, 1991, p. A3; "Mehr beobachter nach Jugoslawien" (More observers go to Yugoslavia), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 30, 1991, p. 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

area. On August 6, a cease-fire agreement was reached in Croatia, but with no enforcement, it would be broken in less than two weeks. Another blow fell after the August 19 Soviet coup, when most republics of the USSR declared their independence. As EC members extended recognition to them, the rationale for not recognizing Croatia and Slovenia weakened.[45] Shortly thereafter, press reports hinted that Germany was considering unilateral recognition of the two states.[46]

Undaunted by its negotiating failures and by German recalcitrance, the EC sponsored another European first in September: a European peace conference at The Hague. Croatia and Slovenia, however, declared secession from Yugoslavia on the day the conference began, and on the second day, Macedonia voted for independence.[47] Then, for the first time, the EC asked the WEU to serve directly as its military arm. The WEU refused again. In the midst of the conference, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in a widely publicized visit to the United States, raised the possibility of German recognition of Croatia.[48] Despite the EC's failure to bring peace, however, Germany still took no unilateral action.[49]

By October the EPC began to embrace the German position. Serbia and Montenegro excluded the other republics from Yugoslavia's federal leadership, and EC officials admitted that neither of these republics could be regarded any longer as the legitimate successor to Yugoslavia.[50] On October 10, EC foreign ministers agreed to delay the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia for two months. By this, Genscher understood that, on December 10, Germany would have a green light from the EC to recognize the two states.[51]

But Genscher was uncertain about the level of actual support for recognition within the EC, and he began to build what he hoped was a winning coalition. In early December he announced that Italy, Austria,

[45] For war and negotiations, see Anne McElvoy, "Events Lead Genscher Astray," *Times* (London), September 7, 1991, p. 1.

[46] John Tagliabue, "Kohl Threatens Serbia Over Cease-fire Violations," *New York Times*, August 8, 1991, p. A8.

[47] See Paul Montgomery, "Yugoslavs Trade Accusations as Peace Meeting Opens at The Hague," *New York Times*, September 8, 1991, p. 9.

[48] Helmut Kohl, Tanner Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, September 13, 1991.

[49] The German weekly, *Der Spiegel*, reported that Kohl clearly recognized the danger of unilateral action. He stated that, despite mounting internal pressure, he would not recognize Croatia and Slovenia alone because it would have negative repercussions for the unity of Europe. See "Verheerende Folgen: Die selbstgewaehlte Rolle eines Friedenmaklers fuer Jugoslawien brachte die Gemeinschaft an den Rand einer Schweren Krise" (Devastating consequences: A peace-mediator's self-appointed role brings the EC to the point of severe crisis), *Der Spiegel* 45 (September 23, 1991).

[50] Krieger (fn. 33), 33.

[51] Author's interview with Genscher, Bonn, May 26, 1993.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and possibly Poland were ready to recognize Croatia and Slovenia.[52] A few days later, Sweden called for recognition but declared that it would remain in step with the EC.[53] Genscher's problem was that Germany's clear supporters looked embarrassingly like the World War II coalition that had backed fascist Croatia. Kohl countered that the prorecognition group had gone beyond what they called "the 1941 coalition" to include Belgium and Denmark. On December 8, he announced that Germany would recognize the two republics and that Sweden, Italy, Austria, and Hungary were likely to follow.[54]

This announcement was a miscalculation because it indicated to British and French officials that Germany was moving outside the EC policy framework. So on December 13, France and Britain upped the ante by moving outside the EC themselves. They introduced a UN Security Council resolution—aimed at Germany—warning that no country should disturb the political balance in Yugoslavia by taking unilateral action. The United States concurred; earlier it had issued an official statement that recognition should be part of only a larger peace settlement.[55] But the threat of a UN Security Council resolution against Germany served only to harden Genscher's position, and on December 15, he announced that Germany would recognize the two republics before Christmas. Hoping that this counterthreat would force agreement by the EC on the German position, Kohl said that he would wait until after a meeting of EC foreign ministers the next day before actually making the announcement.[56]

At first, Genscher's threat of defection appeared to pay off. The UN Security Council dropped its resolution against Germany,[57] and at the December 16 meeting of the EPC, only two issues were on the agenda: the timing of recognition and the conditionality requirements.[58] The meeting ended with Genscher's agreement that if a set of specific human rights conditions were fulfilled, EC recognition would take

[52] "Der Sonderbeauftragte der UN vermittelt Tudjman will Friedenstruppen nur bei Abzug der Armee" (UN special committee reports that Tudjman will allow UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia only when the JNA withdraws), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 3, 1991, p. 4.

[53] "Während Vance sondiert, schießt die Armee" (While Vance explores the options, the army keeps shooting), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 5, 1991, p. 6.

[54] Tom Heneghan, "Ignoring Critics, Bonn to Decide Support for Croatia, Slovenia," *Reuters*, December 16, 1991.

[55] Stephen Kinzer, "Germans Follow Own Line on Yugoslav Republics," *New York Times*, December 8, 1991, p. 18.

[56] John Tagliabue, "Germany Insists It Will Recognize Yugoslav Republics' Sovereignty," *New York Times*, December 15, 1991, p. 1.

[57] Paul Lewis, "U.N. Yields to Plans by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics," *New York Times*, December 16, 1991, p. 1.

[58] Author's interviews with EC officials (fn. 27).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

place on January 15, 1992. As conditions for recognition, the EC stipulated that minorities be granted autonomy with respect to local government, local law enforcement, the judiciary, and education.[59] To meet the January 15 deadline, petitions for recognition would have to be submitted by December 23 to the Arbitration Commission of the peace conference, which would then determine whether the conditions had been met.[60]

Genscher left the December 16 meeting questioning whether the conditionality requirements were fair, whether Croatia would be able to meet them, and whether they were enforceable.[61] Macedonia was also expected to submit an application, but the same conditions would not apply: recognition would be considered only if Macedonia changed its name and renounced claims on Greek territory.[62] Also, the agreement did not make clear what steps the EC would take if the conditions for recognition were not met.

Genscher's doubts led to a move that astonished everyone: on December 23, Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia before the arbitration commission met to assess the fulfillment of conditionality requirements. This preemptive move was triggered by Genscher's fear that the EC would refuse to extend recognition because its conditions had not been fulfilled. Indeed, on January 11, 1992, the arbitration commission declared that the Croatian constitution did not meet the required conditions.[63] But with Germany's preemption, the EC had little leverage if it adhered to its conditionality requirements. Thus, the arbitration commission simply requested that Tudjman give his personal assurance that language would be added to the Croatian constitution conforming to EC requirements. Tudjman complied,[64] and the EC granted recognition to Croatia and Slovenia on January 15, 1992. Acceptance of the conditions substituted for fulfillment of them, and the conditionality requirement was conveniently swept under the table.

In the following section, I present five hypotheses to explain these events, and I examine the evidence to support them. The realist hy-

[59] "Conference pour la Paix en Yougoslavie" (Conference for peace in Yugoslavia), *Avis* 5 (January 11, 1992).

[60] See "Beschluß der Außenminister" (The foreign minister's decision), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 18, 1991, p. 2.

[61] Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

[62] "Bonn wird Kroatien und Slowenien am 15, Januar anerkennen" (Germany will recognize Croatia and Slovenia on January 15), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 18, 1991, p. 2.

[63] "Conference pour la Paix en Yougoslavie" (fn. 59).

[64] Franjo Tudjman to H. E. Robert Badinter, letter, Zagreb, January 15, 1992.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pothesis places the causes of both Germany's preference for recognition and the preference to defect at the international level. The institutional hypothesis also suggests that the preference to cooperate or defect is formed by external factors but does not explain the preference for recognition. Two domestic-level hypotheses follow—one focused on societal pressures and the other on elite culture and politics—which suggest that the preference for recognition was formed in the domestic political arena. Neither of these domestic hypotheses, however, explains the decision to defect. The final two-level game hypothesis suggests how domestic and international forces interacted under the condition of conflicting international norms and underdeveloped international institutions to trigger Germany's unilateral move.

Explaining German Preferences

International Anarchy, Multipolarity, and German Power

The realist hypothesis is that as the structure of the international system changed to resemble multipolarity, German economic power, unification, and full sovereignty provided incentives for the preference for recognition and defection from international cooperation. Germany's position in Central Europe and its expanded economic interests in the East, the argument runs, could be better served by an independent Croatia and Slovenia; Germany was attempting a modern version of a divide-and-conquer strategy in the Balkans. When its allies did not support this preference, Germany saw that its interests could best be served by an independent foreign policy in the region.[65] The independent variable explaining both defection and the preference for diplomatic recognition is external—Germany's changing power position in an anarchic international system. The virtual neglect of Croatia's human rights violations and the initial coalition formed to support Germany's preferences certainly did not help refute these claims. Nonetheless, the evidence is too weak to support the realist hypothesis.

Both Germany's minimal economic interests in the region[66] and its policy toward the war in Bosnia since 1991 cast doubt on realist explanations. Throughout this episode, Germany adhered to EC decisions

[65] Many argued that the recognition decision signaled that Germany wished to revive its hegemony in the East and to coerce the EC to lend legitimacy to its hegemonic pretensions. See, for example, Misha Glenny, "Germany Fans the Flames of War," *New Statesman and Society* (December 20 and 27, 1991), 145; Daniel Singer, "Germany Muscles In," *The Nation* (February 3, 1992); Quentin Peel, "Damned If It Does—and If It Doesn't," *Financial Times*, January 18–19, 1992, p. 6.

[66] German trade with Croatia was less than .02 percent of trade with the East. See Axt (fn. 38), 353.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to an EC embargo that included Croatia.[67] During this same time period, Germany sustained its commitment to multilateralism in other issue areas. At virtually the same time that it unilaterally recognized Croatia, Germany was an important force in pushing Europe toward monetary union, helping to create enduring restrictions on its own economic independence.[68] At the height of this diplomatic crisis, Germany joined with France to create Europe's only internationally integrated military unit.[69] When the war in Bosnia escalated in 1994 and Croatia sent troops there, Germany pressured Tudjman to pull back.[70] Neither this instance of unilateral action nor the preference for recognition can be explained as part of a larger pattern of defection from cooperation. Although the expansion of German power explains Germany's ability to act unilaterally, it does not explain its willingness to do so. Germany's growing power in an environment of evolving multipolarity was at best a permissive condition for this unilateral move.

The Absence of Strong Multilateral Institutions

The institutional hypothesis also situates the cause of Germany's defection at the international level but does not purport to explain the preference for recognition. Assuming that regime membership and consensual multilateral norms increase the reputational costs of unilateral action, reduce uncertainty, and attenuate fears that others will defect—thus shaping preferences that favor cooperation—this hypothesis suggests that the absence of regime strength and the presence of conflicting norms led to Germany's unilateral action.

Regimes must be firmly in place to raise the odds of cooperation. To put them in place requires a clear set of decisions on how to cooperate.[71] Alarmingly, many of those decisions that would govern joint decisions in this case had not yet been made. The ambiguities of the post–cold war environment had left EC members in a state of uncertainty as to how they would jointly solve regional security crises. Recall that early in this crisis, the WEU discussed possible measures to back up the EC's mediation efforts, but lacking a clear mandate, it failed to act. Furthermore, it was during this period that public officials began to talk

[67] On November 8, the EC imposed economic sanctions on all of the Yugoslav republics, including Croatia. See "Chronology 1991: Western Europe and Canada," *Foreign Affairs* 70 (Spring 1992), 226.

[68] See Wayne Sandholtz, "Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht," *International Organization* 47 (Winter 1993).

[69] See Tyler Marshall, "Germany, France Shape a Model for Diplomacy," *Los Angeles Times*, November 19, 1991, p. 1.

[70] See Stan Markotich, *RFE/RL Daily Report*, February 7, 1994.

[71] Milner (fn. 5), 475.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about divisible peace in Europe. NATO's official policy statements paid lip service to Europe's geographic unity and interdependence but expressed reservations about intervention in postcommunist conflicts. The war in Yugoslavia was not expected to widen,[72] and when it became clear that core national interests of EC members were not threatened, its salience was reduced.

Thus, the Yugoslav crisis led to no new decisions on how to construct appropriate European security regimes. WEU impotence and a reduced sense of urgency for security cooperation weakened mediation efforts. Weakened mediation efforts were perceived as reduced gains from cooperation to preserve the integrity of Yugoslavia. Reduced gains from cooperation to save Yugoslavia strengthened the German resolve to press for diplomatic recognition of the breakaway republics.

The CSCE was also too weak to deter Germany's unilateral move. The Helsinki Final Act provided conflicting guidelines for action. While Principle 2 of Basket I provided for the inviolability of borders, Principle 8 upheld the right of self-determination.[73] Furthermore, the CSCE was prevented from playing a prominent role by the Soviet Union. The Soviets had balked at the idea of CSCE involvement, shifting responsibility to the EC.

The relevant regime in this case was the EPC, which had indeed grown in strength under German leadership. But when this episode unfolded, it required no binding commitment to its agreements, had no powers of enforcement, and had no military capability. Sanctions against defection did not exist. Germany had license to threaten unilateral action, increasing others' fears of its defection. France and Britain acted on those fears, attempting to sanction Germany for its preferences, in turn increasing Germany's fears that others would defect from a joint policy of recognition.

Germany's fears increased because international norms governing diplomatic recognition were weak. As Yugoslavia and the USSR fragmented and as new states claimed independence, other considerations—a state's political stability, whether it would change its name, its possession of nuclear weapons, and its military power—were often more important than human rights considerations in determining whether diplomatic recognition would be granted.[74] Indeed, Western

[72] See NATO Press Service, press communiques, M-1 (91) 42, June 6, 1991; M-2 (91) 60, August 21, 1991; and S-1 (91) 86, November 8, 1991.

[73] *Final Act of the CSCE*, quoted in Osmanczyck (fn. 30), 333–54.

[74] See Roland Rich, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union," *European Journal of International Law* 4 (Summer 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries recognized the four nuclear republics of the former the Soviet Union; U.S. officials declared they had received sufficient promises from them that they would democratize and would maintain strict control over nuclear weapons.[75] What the EC demanded of Croatia in return for recognition was more than a promise—it was full implementation of human rights practices. This principle of conditional recognition based on human rights considerations was only selectively targeted and enforced.

Given the conflicting norms governing international behavior in this case, given the weakness of the EPC in reducing uncertainty and its inability to impose sanctions for defection, and given Germany's persistent effort to cooperate in other issue areas and its effort to persuade the EPC to accept its position, Genscher believed that the reputational costs of defection would be low. As he would later state: "This [the war in Croatia] was not the issue upon which European foreign policy cooperation would be made or broken; our major achievement was providing the EPC with legal status at Maastricht."[76]

Like Germany's growing power under multipolarity, underdeveloped regimes and conflicting international norms provided permissive conditions for defection. The evidence does not suggest, however, a positive explanation for how the German preference for recognition was formed, nor does it directly explain Germany's unilateral move. The evidence supporting the institutional hypothesis suggests that incentives for defection increased because the costs of defection were low. It cannot tell us, however, why Kohl and Genscher believed that Germany would be better off with a unilateral decision to recognize Croatia than with the initial multilateral course of conflict mediation aimed at maintaining Yugoslavia's integrity.

If external forces do not fully account for German preferences, domestic-level factors may offer a better explanation. The impact of changes in the international environment are ambiguous, and the response is likely to vary among states depending upon how national elites interpret them. Those interpretations, in turn, may be highly dependent upon domestic forces. Below I explore two domestic-level hypotheses explaining German motivations in this case: societal pressures and elite-party politics.

[75] "Der Sowjetunion untergegangen—Rußland anerkannt" (The Soviet Union collapses—Russia is recognized), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 27, 1991, p. 1.

[76] Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Societal Pressures: Public Opinion, Interest Groups, and the Media

Pluralist theory suggests that in democracies, domestic forces narrow the range of foreign policy options available to central decision makers. One of the most popular hypotheses explaining this case is that overwhelming societal pressures, spurred on by relentless media coverage of the war and the large Croatian community in Germany, pushed politicians toward the decision to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia.[77] The evidence examined here, however, demonstrates that these pressures did not exist when elites formed the preference for recognition.

First, direct public opinion did not influence elite calculations leading to the early consensus on recognition. The first opinion survey on this issue taken in late July revealed that 34 percent of the respondents were against independence for Croatia and Slovenia. Thirty-eight percent, however, felt that independence would be the only guarantee of democracy in the region, while 27 percent had no opinion at all. Furthermore, the majority of respondents preferred conflict resolution through EC mediation efforts. Forty-one percent trusted the EC completely when it came to resolving the Yugoslav conflict; 51 percent simply trusted the EC; and only 3 percent expressed no trust in the EC whatsoever.[78] Only about one-third of respondents stated a preference for diplomatic recognition, and virtually all trusted the multilateral process of conflict resolution under way within the EC. Importantly, these views were expressed after political elites had stated a preference for diplomatic recognition and after Kohl and Genscher pressed for this option within the EPC. It was after political party elites had made their position clear, after Genscher's arguments for recognition within the EPC had become public, and after early mediation efforts had faltered, that public opinion favoring recognition began to grow.

[77] Most of the scholarly arguments stressing the role of domestic politics can be found in German sources. The most prominent examples are: Axt (fn. 38); Wolfgang Wagner, "Acht Lehren aus dem Fall Jugoslawien" (Eight lessons from the case of Yugoslavia), *Europa Archiv* 47 (January 25, 1992); Bruno Schoch, "Anerkennung als Ersatzhandlung: Ein kritischer Ruekblick auf die deutsche Jugoslawienpolitik" (Recognition as a substitute for action: A critical assessment of Germany's policy toward Yugoslavia), in Peter Schlotter, et al., eds., *Der Krieg in Bosnien und das hilflose Europa* (The war in Bosnia and a helpless Europe) (Frankfurt: Hessiche Stiftung Friedens-und Konflictkforsch, 1993); Alexander Muehlen, "Die deutsche Rolle bei der Anerkennung der jugoslawischen Sezessionsstaaten" (The German role in the recognition of the secessional states in Yugoslavia), *Liberal* 34 (Spring 1992); and Arthur Heinrich, "Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik: Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Breussel" (New German foreign policy: Attempts to maneuver between Zagreb and Brussels), *Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik* 36 (December 1992).

[78] Institut für angewandte Sozialforschung (INFAS) (Institute for Applied Social Research), Meinungsreport, DPA Nachricheenabteilung/Ref. II A5, July 30, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The role of political pressure on the part of Croatians living in Germany and on the part of Croatian officials themselves is a second form of pressure that could have shaped the preference for recognition. Germany's Croatian community was concentrated in Bavaria and apparently had ties to the CSU.[79] In 1990 it had begun to lobby the CSU to push for Germany's support of Croatia's interests. In late August 1990 Horst Teltschik, Kohl's closest foreign policy adviser, met—"without the knowledge of the Foreign Office"—an emissary of Franjo Tudjman, a contact that his CSU colleagues had been cultivating for over four years.[80] In February 1991 the Republic of Croatia opened a foreign office in Stuttgart as a gesture of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).[81] In May, several thousand Croatians demonstrated in Munich for German recognition of Croatian sovereignty.[82]

But despite these early lobbying efforts, until the end of June 1991, both the CDU and the CSU held to the position that the Yugoslav crisis should be resolved peacefully with Yugoslavia's integrity intact. Even when it became apparent that Croatia and Slovenia would declare independence from Yugoslavia, both the CDU and the CSU held to the position that they could not support nationalism and separatism. Moreover, the conservative parties were not the first to call for recognition. In February 1991 the Green/Buendnis 90 party had called for the self-determination of Croatia and Slovenia and a confederation of sovereign states as the solution to the crisis.[83] In short, the Croatian influence on the conservative parties does not adequately account for their change of position, nor does it account for the consensus on recognition on the part of other German party elites.

The third societal-level explanation for elite consensus focuses on the role of the media. The influential *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* [*FAZ*], relentlessly portrayed a Croatia committed to "European" values, while caricaturing the Serbs as being hardly European at all. After June 25, *FAZ* editorials argued that the people of Croatia and Slovenia had voted democratically to secede; it was the communist government of Serbia that responded with violence. After the revolutions of 1989 for self-determination and freedom from communist rule, one editorial asked, How could democratic peoples possibly continue to support central communist regimes?[84] As I argue below, these statements both origi-

[79] For a discussion of the role of the Croatian community, see Schoch (fn. 77).
[80] Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage* (Berlin: Seidler, 1990), 347–48.
[81] DPA (fn. 78), February 18, 1991.
[82] Ibid., May 5, 1991.
[83] *Parlamentarische Protokolle* (fn. 35), 408B.
[84] "Folter und Mord an Polizisten Zivilisten als lebende Schutzschilde " (Torture and murder of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nated in and validated the dominant conservative worldview. Although the *Frankfurter Rundschau* echoed the FAZ position, however, the other major newspapers did not. The *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* even warned against hasty recognition.[85] Although increasing media consensus on a preference for recognition grew throughout the summer, media pressure cannot account for the elite consensus reached in early July. It certainly cannot account for the switch in the SPD position.

In sum, the societal-pressures hypothesis fails to explain the change in party positions and the rapid elite consensus on recognition. If domestic-level explanations for the recognition preference are valid, they are of the top-down variety: popular consensus followed elite consensus.[86] The source of elite consensus requires explanation.

Foreign Policy Culture, Elite Bandwagoning Effects, and Party Fragmentation

The elite hypothesis that explains the recognition preference has three dimensions. The first is suggested by the cultural approach: the preference for recognition follows the dominant cold-war foreign policy tradition of support for self-determination formed in the context of German-German relations. Because this norm shaped German foreign policy, elites calculated high domestic gains from being the champions of self-determination in the Yugoslav conflict.

Indeed, support for a Wilsonian and cold-war interpretation of the self-determination principle was an important component of Germany's foreign policy culture; it was a central foreign policy norm.[87] To the extent that Germany had an independent foreign policy during the cold war, it was the pursuit of the German national interest in the right of self-determination for the people of the GDR to choose freely the government that would represent them. It followed the cold war and the Helsinki interpretations of self-determination noted above. Until the advent of *Ostpolitik*, the CDU-dominated FRG government based its

civilian police as living shields), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 5, 1991, p. 3; Other examples include, "Bonn handelt nicht vorzeitig" (Bonn does not negotiate in advance), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 16, 1991, p. 1; and Johann Georg Reissmueller, "Absurditaeten statt Politik" (Absurdities instead of politics), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 8, 1991, p. 1.

[85] Schoch (fn. 77), 41.

[86] On top-down versus bottom-up perspectives on public opinion in foreign policy formation, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," *World Politics* 43 (July 1991).

[87] On the role of norms and how they set standards for behavior, see Katzenstein (fn. 21), 3–4. On the particular German interpretation of the self-determination norm, see Haftendorn (fn. 22); and William E. Paterson, "Gulliver Unbound: The Changing Context of Foreign Policy," in Gordon Smith et al., eds., *Developments in German Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy on the view that self-determination as an aspiration of all Germans could only be secured by the Federal Republic. The SPD and the FDP had weakened this "sole right of representation" with policies of rapprochement and with the doctrine of "two states in one nation"; nonetheless, they never abandoned the principle itself or their particular interpretation of it. The Basic Treaty of 1972 establishing relations with the GDR did not accord it full recognition, and the treaty never referred to it as a foreign country. In the 1980s the Kohl government continued to keep the German question open by consistent reference to the necessity of self-determination for the East German people.[88]

With regard to the Yugoslav crisis, the rhetoric that emerged to justify the political elite's changing position on recognition suggests that politicians consciously linked the East German victory for self-determination with the aspirations of the Croatian and Slovenian people for independence from communist-dominated Yugoslavia. The CDU's general secretary argued that Germany could not apply another yardstick to Yugoslavia "when we achieved the unity and freedom of our country through the right of self-determination."[89] When the SPD switched to a preference for recognition, its spokesmen argued that Bonn and the EC had ignored the issue of self-determination too long and that this right was the basis of all international law—Germany must support recognition as the best policy to implement this principle.[90]

Why, in domestic German rhetoric, was the principle of self-determination focused only on Croatians and Slovenians and not on the Serb population in Croatia? One-third of all Serbs lived outside the territory of Serbia, and the Arbitration Commission found that those in Croatia were subject to human rights abuses. France and Britain were keenly aware of the vulnerability of Serbs living outside the Republic of Serbia; an important justification for their involvement in the creation of Yugoslavia as a state in 1918 had been the principle of self-determination, the right of all Serbs as well as Croats and Slovenes to live in a single state. Croatian elites agreed to join Yugoslavia rather than face the alternative of a "Greater Serbia," which would have left Croatia under Serb domination. In the present crisis, French and British officials relied on their own foreign policy traditions, believing that the realization of the self-determination principle could only be achieved through the preservation of Yugoslavia. Indeed, their domi-

[88] Paterson (fn. 87), 142–43.

[89] William Drozdiak, "Germany Criticizes European Community Policy on Yugoslavia," *Washington Post*, July 2, 1991, p. A16.

[90] "Drei Tage lang am Telefon" (fn. 40), 128–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nant interpretation of the self-determination principle drew on the experience of decolonization. From the perspective of French and British central decision makers, keeping Yugoslavia intact was preferable to a renewed effort to build a Greater Serbia. Germany had not been a party to the creation of either the first or the second Yugoslavia; there was no tradition in German foreign policy of acceptance for Serb self-determination.[91]

In addition, Germany's Christian Democrats quickly perceived the crisis in the old cold war framework. The portrayal by *FAZ* of Serbia as a communist power dominating a people who had voted democratically for independence resonated strongly with the past CDU/CSU rhetoric; indeed self-determination and anticommunism had been the two pillars of conservative foreign policy during the cold war. Communism's demise had thrown the party into confusion concerning its post–cold war ideological direction.[92] The Yugoslav crisis, however, appeared to conservatives to fit nicely into the postwar ideological framework of preserving the world of communist aggressors and democratic defenders.[93]

These factors, however, only partially explain the preference of opposition SPD political elites for diplomatic recognition. The SPD had taken a pragmatic stand on the self-determination principle during the cold war, particularly in relations with the GDR. Self-determination is a vague principle that can be pursued in many ways, as its arguments in the 1960s for Ostpolitik had suggested. EC policy embodied the desire to achieve self-determination for all parties through a negotiated peace process. French and British officials believed that minority Serbs would lose the right to self-determination in an independent Croatia. Many Croats and Slovenes had suggested a looser federation and a new constitution in early negotiations that would create a government acceptable to all. CSCE provisions supported existing borders, and the Yu-

[91] Tito's Yugoslavia had been an ally against Hitler, and Yugoslavia had played an important role in cold war rhetoric. For details on French and British policy in the Balkans, see Jacques Nere, *The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975). On French and British interpretations of the self-determination principle, see Alan C. Lamborn, *The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain, France, and Germany* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991); and Christopher J. Bartlett, *British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1989). The best source on British policy toward the Balkans is Hugh Setton-Watson, *Eastern Europe between the Wars* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); and the best source on early French policy is John F. V. Keiger, *France and the Origins of World War I* (London: Macmillan, 1983). The most important general source is Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans, Twentieth Century*, vol. 2 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983). On French and British policies in the postwar period, see Stevan K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia and its Problems: 1918–1988* (London: Hurst Publishers, 1989).

[92] Beverly Crawford and Jost Halfman, "Germany's Role in Europe's Security Future," in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley: International and Area Studies), 220–27.

[93] See, for example, Dregger (fn. 38).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goslav constitution stated that the frontiers of Yugoslavia could not be altered without the consent of all republics. If diplomatic recognition was not the only way to implement the principle of self-determination, why was the SPD so quick to agree with the policy preference put forth by the CDU/CSU?

The second dimension of the hypothesis offers an explanation. It suggests that elite bandwagoning effects led to the SPD's rapid switch to a preference for recognition. "Bandwagoning" means that if a major party loses an election to its opponent, the loser reassesses its strategy and moves its policy positions closer to those of the winner, hoping to win back the loyalty of lost supporters and keep those loyalties until the next election. The winner has a high incentive to continue its winning strategy and rhetoric in order to maintain support even if the next election is far off.

The CDU and the SPD pursued opposing strategies in the 1990 German elections. While the CDU had reminded East Germans of its steadfast adherence to self-determination for them throughout the cold war, the SPD was forced to live down its decades-long *Entspannungspolitik*, its policy of relaxing tensions between the two German states at the expense of the potential political desires of the East German people.[94] The CDU justified its proposal for the rapid incorporation of the former GDR into the Federal Republic by appealing to the old self-determination principle: rapid unification is what East Germans want, the CDU argued. The SPD concentrated its campaign on attacking the pragmatic problems of unification envisioned in the CDU platform. Indeed, the SPD did not mention self-determination in its campaign rhetoric. It had an ambivalent relationship with dissident groups and movements for self-determination in Eastern Europe and had rarely evidenced support for them. Although clearly favoring the collapse of the Stalinist East German regime, SPD elites were uncomfortable with the openly nationalistic sentiments that rapid unification evoked.[95] But it was precisely the CDU appeals to those principles rather than tedious discussion of practical problems that led to its overwhelming victory.[96]

[94] See Arthur Heinrich, "Neue deutsche Aussenpolitik: Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Breussel" (New German foreign policy: Attempts to maneuver between Zagreb and Brussels), *Blaetter fuer deutsche und internationale Politik* 36 (December 1992), pp. 1446–58.

[95] For the definitive study of the origin and expression of these sentiments, see Andrei S. Markovits and Philip S. Gorski, *The German Left: Red, Green, and Beyond* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[96] For details on these two campaign strategies, see Gregg O. Kvistad, "Challenges to the Party-State in Unified Germany," in Norbert Finszch, ed., *Comparative Reconstructions* (London: Berg, 1996); and Markovits and Gorski (fn. 95), 235.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the bandwagoning proposition holds, we would expect the SPD to have moved closer to the CDU position the next time a similar issue emerged, even if the next election were far off. When the CDU first linked the principle of self-determination to the recognition of Croatia, the SPD could have raised human rights concerns, but its party leaders saw no way to oppose the CDU position. Once burned because they had not promoted self-determination in their own rhetoric, SPD officials were wary of appearing to deviate from that principle and the policy of diplomatic recognition tied to it. They also feared accusations of SPD support for a communist regime against the wishes of the Croatian people.[97] Once the CDU came out in favor of diplomatic recognition, the SPD—not to be outflanked—switched its position as well. Bandwagoning effects seemed to be at work.

This explanation, however, is not fully satisfactory. Recall that the CDU was not the first to call for recognition; its initial preference had been to take its lead from Kohl and support the EC position. The first call came, in fact, from the Buendnis 90/Green party in February. The Buendnis 90 was dominated by dissidents from East Germany who had challenged the communist regime and, more than anyone else, vindicated the cold war interpretation of the self-determination principle. Although numerically small and insignificant in coalition politics, this party exercised considerable moral authority on this issue in the Yugoslav context. Recall that in the February Bundestag session, all other party leaders had expressed concern about the problems a breakup of Yugoslavia would cause. In the June 19 Bundestag session, however, the Greens' Gerhard Poppe stated gleefully that all the parties had now moved to the Green position.[98]

How important were the Greens in shaping the SPD position? The third dimension of this hypothesis provides an answer. It suggests that the Green position was crucial because of an important shift in the dynamics of party politics. In the FRG, public influence on central decision makers is mediated by political parties and constrained by the structure of the party system.[99] Proportional representation brings coalition governments to power, and the 5 percent clause (*Sperrklausel*) bars parties with less than 5 percent of the vote from representation. This system led to stable elite consensus building on major foreign policy issues. Between the 1950s and the early 1980s, a two-and-a-half

[97] Author's interviews with SPD officials, Bonn, May 26, 1993.
[98] *Parlamentarische Protokolle* (fn. 37), 2560, 2690.
[99] On the domestic influence on German foreign policy, see Thomas Risse-Kappen (fn. 86).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party system prevailed; that is, each of the two large parties (the SPD or the CDU/CSU) formed a coalition government with the small FDP or, together, a "grand coalition" and each party maintained strong links to a homogeneous society. Although it was possible for public opinion to influence party positions, and although parties did disagree on some major issues, especially Ostpolitik, this party structure prevented the major parties from attempting to distinguish themselves on foreign policy issues simply to attract votes from their opponents.

During the 1980s, however, a shift took place that changed those dynamics and made foreign policy issues into valued currency in the struggle for political support. Fragmentation threatened the two-and-a-half party system, as the large parties began to lose a significant share of their traditional voters to new, smaller ones. Politicians were thus tempted to exploit foreign policy issues to attract support.[100] Why would party fragmentation politicize foreign policy issues in this way? Recent studies of shifts in party structure suggest that if political parties begin to fragment, with larger catchall parties losing votes to smaller ones, the large parties attempt to recapture lost constituencies by incorporating the smaller parties' positions into their own platforms. Smaller parties can espouse a pure ideological rhetoric, often by creating sensational issues, since they only expect to capture a small fraction of the vote; larger parties respond by incorporating the radical positions in digestible form to retain their traditional voters. Left-right dichotomies are diluted, and class-based voting is replaced by issue-based voting.[101] What is important to our story is that small parties attempt to distinguish themselves with regard to as many issues as possible—including foreign policy issues—in order to set the policy agenda; larger parties are tempted to embrace the small parties' positions in some form to retain those constituencies that were attracted to their positions.

In the 1980s this did happen in the FRG. On the local and state level new parties emerged and overcame the Sperrklausel, and the Greens broke the barrier at the national level. The 1990 federal election pro-

[100] In the 1970s the SPD and CDU/CSU could collect 91.2 percent of the vote, but in 1987 their share had declined to 81.3 percent. In the 1990 elections, the share of the vote won by the SPD and CDU/CSU fell to 77.3 percent. See Wolfgang G. Gibowski and Max Kaase, "Auf dem Weg zum politischen Alltag" (On the way to everyday politics), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 11 (December 1991), 3.

[101] For these arguments, see Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Party," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Wiener, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Richard Rose, *Voters Begin to Choose* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1986); and Russell Dalton, Scott Flanagan, and Paul Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1984). On digestibility, see Ulf Mintzel, "Grossparteien im Parteienstaat der Bundesrepublik" (The large parties in the German party-state), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 39 (March 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duced three small parties in the Bundestag. The rise of small radical parties in the 1990s led to fears of even further fragmentation, as the larger parties scrambled to win back votes from disaffected constituencies. The CDU, for example, hesitated to give assurances about the Polish border in 1990 because conservative supporters threatened defection to the emerging right-wing parties. As a result of right-wing pressure and its fomentation of violence against foreigners, the positions of the large parties quickly converged on immigration policy, and the Greens goaded the SPD to take a more interventionist position in the war in Bosnia.[102] Given this important shift in party dynamics, the third prong of the elite hypothesis is that perceptions of party fragmentation intensify bandwagoning effects.

Fear of the effects of party fragmentation on political support certainly was a factor in preference formation by the SPD in this case. While the CDU/CSU were only threatened by the Republikaner, the new right-wing party, both the Republikaner and the Greens had siphoned off votes from the SPD.[103] Although the CDU saw no threat to its support base by the Greens and its position changed because recognition based on self-determination was more consistent with its postwar ideological position, the SPD was pressed by both the conservatives and the Greens. Its switch reflected that pressure.

We can explore this argument's strength with a counterfactual proposition: if the SPD had won the 1990 elections, uniting Germany along the lines of its own program, and if the Greens/Buendnis 90 had remained out of parliament, it is unlikely that the issue of self-determination would have been so highly politically charged. The SPD would not have had to live down its Entspannungspolitik. Although it is likely that a general consensus on self-determination as a guiding policy prin-

[102] A good general discussion of this phenomenon is Bernd Siegler, Oliver Tolmein, and Charlotte Wiedemann, *Der Pakt: Die Rechten und der Staat* (The pact: The right-wing and the state) (Goettingen: Verlag die Werkstaat, 1993). The best source on the convergence of immigration policy is Ursula Muench, *Aslpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Asylum policy in the Federal Republic of Germany) (Oplande: Leske und Budrich, 1993). On the Greens and the SPD with regard to Bosnia, see "'Sie kneifen, Herr General': Manfred Opel (SPD) und Conny Juergens (Gruene) ueber UNO-Interventioned afu dem Balkan" ('You're chickening out General': Manfred Opel (SPD) and Conny Juergens (Greens) discuss UN intervention in the Balkans), *Der Spiegel*, (February 1, 1993), 76.

[103] In Germany there is an emerging literature on this problem. See, for example, Mintzel (fn. 101), 3–14. Mintzel argues that the small parties often play a positive role in binding "dysfunctional forces" (fundamental opposition) to the political system, thus stabilizing the overall system by filling in niche positions. See also Peter Haungs and Eckhard Jesse, eds., *Parteien in der Krise? In- und auslaendische Perspektiven* (Political parties in crisis? Foreign and domestic perspectives) (Cologne: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987); Elmar Wiesendahl, "Der Marsch aus den Institutionen. Zur Organisationsschwaeche politischer Parteien in den achtziger Jahren" (Leaving the institutions: On the organizational weaknesses of political parties in the 1980s), *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 40 (May 1990), 3–14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ciple would have prevailed, there would have been more freedom for political debate on the practical problems of recognition and human rights protection. There would have been more political freedom to support the emerging European peace process. Given the importance of this norm, consensus on self-determination in some form is likely to have emerged, but it would have emerged more slowly. There also would have been more room for post–cold war interpretations of the principle. If consensus had been slower and the public discussion less politically charged, Kohl and Genscher would have felt less pressure in EPC negotiations, and a European compromise may have been reached.

The evidence strongly suggests that foreign policy culture and elite bandwagoning effects under the condition of perceived party fragmentation combined to create an early elite consensus. After July 1, all political elites who jumped on the bandwagon pressured Kohl and Genscher to push for EC recognition. Why did Kohl and Genscher cave in? Both had resisted similar pressures in the past.[104] Both the German public and political elites strongly supported multilateralism in foreign policy; there was never a domestic call for unilateral recognition. Both Kohl and Genscher believed that foreign policy cooperation by the EPC was in the national interest, and both had worked hard to achieve it. Kohl was at the height of his political popularity, having won the 1990 elections, and Genscher had served as foreign minister for over a decade. The domestic-elite hypothesis explains the German preference for recognition, but it does not explain why central decision makers defected from a multilateral agreement.

Recognition as a Two-Level Game

The two-level-game metaphor suggests an explanation focusing on the reciprocal impact of domestic politics and international negotiations. The hypothesis suggested by this approach has three dimensions. First, to the extent that the preference for recognition was formed consensually in the domestic arena, Kohl and Genscher found no domestic support for their cooperation with EPC preferences. German domestic forces narrowed the options over which its international negotiators could reach agreement. Despite the evidence presented here on early domestic-elite consensus on recognition, what is required is evidence of domestic pressure on Kohl and Genscher to change course and evidence that they could not sell to their domestic constituents the EC preference to preserve Yugoslavia.

[104] See Risse-Kappen (fn. 86), 506–7.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is important to note at the outset that the domestic consensus coincided with the beliefs and perceptions of both Kohl and Genscher. In late June, Genscher had traveled to Croatia. Although he admitted that Tudjman was "no ideal democrat," what he saw and heard convinced him that Serbia was the clear and undisputed aggressor in the conflict; he would later argue that the tragedy of the twentieth century was German aggression and the appeasement of that aggression by the international community. To dramatize the point, he insisted that he could not stand by and watch appeasement again.[105] While this statement was made much later and could easily have exaggerated early perceptions to justify subsequent behavior, Genscher was convinced that the Serbs were exercising a de facto veto over the peace process through their domination of the Yugoslav federal government. He firmly believed that recognition of the two republics was a prerequisite for any such peacekeeping efforts.[106] Finally, recall that in early July, Kohl was the first to speak of Serb aggression as the cause of the conflict, shifting the interpretation from that of a civil war to that of an international war.

Despite these beliefs, both Kohl and Genscher continued public support for the EPC position and held to embargoes on all of Yugoslavia, including Croatia, between July and December. In July, their preference for multilateral cooperation with the EC position outweighed their preference for recognition. Kohl, for example, argued that recognition of the two republics might create a precedent that would put pressure on Bonn to recognize the independence of numerous other peoples and ministates.[107]

There is strong evidence of domestic pressure on Kohl and Genscher to change the EC policy. In August, CDU/CSU spokesmen called on Genscher to change EC policy with a tougher position on recognition.[108] In September, after the EC had recognized the Baltic states, the SPD party leader publically argued that Croatia and Slovenia should be granted recognition by the same principles. By November, parliament had adopted the resolution on Serbian aggression. This elite pressure on Kohl and Genscher was complemented by a significant shift in public opinion. A November poll showed that two-thirds of all respondents

[105] Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

[106] Statements to this effect can be found in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, (fn. 44); "Bonn dringt auf Sanktionen gegen Serbien nach dem Scheitern des EG-Vermittlungsversuchs" (Bonn pressures for sanctions against Serbia after failure of EC mediation efforts), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, August 6, 1991, p. 1.

[107] "Drei Tage lang am Telefon" (fn. 40), 128.

[108] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (fn. 106, August 6, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supported recognition.[109] In the same month, parliament resolved that Serbia was the aggressor in the conflict.[110] SPD spokesmen criticized Genscher and Kohl for not pursuing a tougher policy on recognition within the EPC; they goaded Kohl by declaring that it was entirely up to him whether thinking in alliances or the idea of freedom prevailed in Europe.[111]

At no time did Kohl launch a domestic publicity campaign in support of the EPC position. On the contrary, he faced the first all-German CDU party convention in Dresden in December with a platform calling for a more forceful and independent foreign policy [112] He needed to show his foreign policy strength on this issue, and he did. The December 16 EPC meeting coincided with the party congress, and he was given a standing ovation when he described the EC's conditional decision to recognize the two republics as a resounding success for German foreign policy.[113] He clearly saw the outcome of the EPC meeting as a domestic political win for himself.

In short, while there was domestic support for a multilateral solution to the Yugoslav conflict, there was no support for the EC attempt to preserve Yugoslavia. If Kohl had continued to support the EC course, he would have suffered significant political criticism in his own party. The London *Times* even reported that Genscher told other EC ministers at Maastricht that Germany had pressing domestic reasons for its position and that others should make concessions because of domestic pressures.[114] Clearly the evidence supports the argument that mounting domestic pressure narrowed the policy options available in international negotiations.

The two-level-game approach suggests a second dimension of the hypothesis: without domestic approval for an international agreement to preserve Yugoslavia, Germany's negotiators tried to reach a new international agreement that would meet domestic approval. The evidence supports this claim. Pressured at home to achieve the goal of multilateral recognition, Genscher pursued three strategies to increase others' incentives to adjust their policies to German preferences.

[109] ZDF Politbarometer (German Television, Channel 2, Political opinion poll), Mannheimer Forschungsgruppe, November 8, 1991.

[110] Krieger (fn. 33), 32.

[111] John Tagliabue, "Bold New Germany: No Longer a Political 'Dwarf,'" *New York Times*, December 16, 1991, p. A12.

[112] Tyler Marshall, "Germany Makes Its Presence Felt," *Los Angeles Times*, December 20, 1991, p. A14.

[113] Robin Gedye, "Yugoslav Crisis: Ovation for Kohl over Recognition," *Daily Telegraph*, December 18, 1991, p. 8.

[114] Peter Riddell, "Following the German Star," *Times* (London), December 20, 1991.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First, Genscher tried persuasion. Recall that he argued at the July CSCE meeting that Serbia was the aggressor, and in the EPC he argued that self-determination for Croatia should be the guiding principle in Europe's response to the crisis. He reasoned with his partners that failure to recognize Croatia would signal to Serbia that its military attacks had been successful and reminded them that the EMM reported that the Serb-dominated JNA was primarily responsible for the bloodshed. Attempting to win sympathy for Germany's position, he argued that "if a war were to spill over the border, Germany . . . would be one of the countries first and worst affected in the West."[115]

Second, Genscher raised the stakes by threatening unilateral recognition if EPC members would not accept Germany's position. In August the press leaked German threats of possible unilateral recognition of the two republics if cease-fire violations continued. Those reports continued into December as domestic pressure in Germany for recognition mounted. Finally, there is circumstantial evidence that Genscher attempted quid pro quo bargaining, that is, concessions in those issue areas if EC partners would agree to a joint recognition policy. The *Economist* reported that John Major had given his word that, in return for German support of the British position on a number of issues at Maastricht, he would support the German position on Croatia.[116]

Each of these strategies was calculated for maximum domestic and international influence. Genscher reminded his EPC partners of German domestic pressure for recognition to signal that their options were narrowed and that they should move to the German position. Tough talk in the EPC showed German domestic audiences that Germany was standing firm on recognition.

Pursuit of these strategies brought the EC closer to Germany's position. By the fall of 1991, EPC press releases questioned whether Serbia and Montenegro could be legitimately regarded as Yugoslavia's successor state. On October 10, it decided to withhold recognition for two months, hoping for some successes at the peace conference. In November the EPC stepped up pressure on Serbia by imposing sanctions on Yugoslavia, and in December it lifted sanctions against Croatia. On December 16, the EPC agreed on conditional recognition.

If the EPC moved to the German position, why did Germany take unilateral action? We can rule out domestic pressure at this point. At no time did German political elites call for unilateral recognition; for-

[115] Gedye (fn. 113).
[116] "Wreckognition," *Economist*, January 18, 1992, p. 49.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eign policy multilateralism was a norm that was as entrenched in German political culture as self-determination. The German public supported general policy harmonization in the EC. In 1991, 66 percent of West Germans and 79 percent of East Germans saw German participation in the EC as a good thing; 43 percent of the West German populace and 54 percent of the East German populace even believed that EC political union should take priority over national independence![117] Public support for the EC was at a high point during the period under consideration here.

A third dimension of the hypothesis explains the actual defection: the unilateral move was caused by escalating fears of mutual betrayal leading to negotiation failures in a bargaining environment where Germany's options were narrowed by domestic pressure. Genscher understood that the EPC decision of October 10 to recognize Croatia and Slovenia within two months meant that EPC recognition was a foregone conclusion. But when December 10 passed and there was no firm consensus on recognition, Genscher felt betrayed, particularly when his partners tried to block his move in the UN Security Council.[118]

Nevertheless Genscher did not act unilaterally yet. Before the crucial December 16 meeting, he had attempted to build a winning coalition in favor of recognition but failed to do so. By that time he only had one winning card left in his hand. Knowing that France and Britain had since called off the UN Security Council resolution and betting on the belief that they would not undermine the cooperative effort achieved at Maastricht, Genscher pressured the EPC to accept multilateral recognition with further threats of defection and betrayal if they did not. In turn, he appeared to compromise on conditionality. The compromise was a bluff. Given the ambiguous nature of conditionality in the recognition of new states, he did not want to accept the specific conditionality requirements imposed by the EC in this case. Because his partners had betrayed him once by going to the UN Security Council, he feared they would block recognition by pointing to Croatia's unmet conditionality requirements. He thus chose to defect, leaving the EPC with the choice of following Germany or fomenting further embarrassing

[117] Opinion data on German participation in the EC comes from the Eurobarometer and is cited in Hans-Wolfgang Platzer and Walter Ruhland, *Welches Deutschland in Welchem Europa? Demoskopische Analysen, politische perspektiven, gesellschaftliche Kontroversen* (Which Germany and in which Europe? Demoscopic analyses, political perspectives and societal controversies) (Berlin: J. H. W. Dietz Verlag, 1994), 47–53. Poll data on the priority of political union is from Hans-Joachim Veen, "National Identity and Political Priorities in Eastern and Western Germany," (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 2–5, 1993).

[118] Author's interview with Genscher (fn. 51).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disputes over the issue in the wake of Maastricht euphoria. Genscher bet correctly; Europe ignored the conditionality requirements and followed Germany. For Genscher, this onetime defection did not diminish the larger gain for political cooperation that had been achieved at Maastricht.[119]

The three dimensions of the two-level hypothesis are supported by the evidence and can now be stated succinctly: (1) domestic pressure narrowed Germany's policy options in EPC negotiations; (2) narrowed options led Genscher to persuade, threaten, and bargain for multilateral recognition, and his efforts moved other EPC members closer to German preferences; and (3) escalating threats of defection on all sides led to Genscher's belief that his partners would not actually coordinate their policies with German preferences, at least in the time frame demanded by domestic considerations. Therefore he chose to act unilaterally. A counterfactual proposition clarifies the act of defection: had the EPC been institutionalized, sanctions stronger, and international norms clearer, the spiral of mistrust could have been avoided. The EPC would have moved to the German position, and Germany would not have defected. Multilateral recognition would have been the outcome.

In sum, Kohl and Genscher's ordering of policy preferences on this issue was formed in the interaction of the domestic and international games: multilateral recognition > unilateral recognition > multilateral negotiations to preserve Yugoslavia's integrity. The first preference was formed in the domestic arena and coincided with the beliefs of the central decision makers, but they did not trust that their partners would concur. For them, there was a threat of net domestic losses for continued pursuit of the last option. Unilateral recognition, the suboptimal strategy, was the only available choice.

Conclusion

This episode presented both an empirical and a theoretical puzzle. Germany was a major promoter of foreign policy cooperation in the European Union. Germany had a history of cooperation and had agreed to cooperate in the indefinite future; this iteration of cooperative behavior should have been a good predictor of cooperation in this case, because the value of continued cooperation should have outweighed the benefits of any one defection. Certainly the postwar Federal Republic of Germany fits the profile of a cooperative state in this sense.

[119] Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

So why the defection? Growing German power provided the permissive condition. But the defection could have been averted had sanctions been stronger, norms clearer, and information better. If sanctions are weak and if central decision makers calculate that the defection will not jeopardize the future relationship, the costs of defection decrease. Strong regimes should change these calculations, but in this case, regimes governing this issue area were underdeveloped. Genscher clearly discounted the impact of this defection on future EC foreign policy cooperation. The case highlights the importance of sanctions in game-theoretic explanations of international cooperation involving future interaction. But game-theoretic explanations of cooperation cannot account for defections that occur when a cooperative future is valued highly by the defector. Changes in international structure and Germany's increasing power position may account for the fact that it could value future cooperation but defect with impunity in a particular case.

The case also highlights the importance of consensual norms in international regimes for shaping preferences for cooperation. In this case, the norms were weak and conflicting. They therefore failed as a guide to preference formation. European officials debated the wisdom of recognizing Croatia as a sovereign state in 1991 and discussed the relationship of diplomatic recognition to the prospects of peace. At the same time, conflicting CSCE norms of self-determination, the inviolability of borders, and conditionality requirements for diplomatic recognition of states seeking independence provided confusing guidelines. Cooperation to grant diplomatic recognition to governments seeking territorial independence from an established state was new and untried; consensual norms on cooperative recognition were only just emerging. Domestic politics in Germany played a role in undermining international normative consensus on both self-determination and the conditions for diplomatic recognition. Domestic forces could define Germany's position in this case because international norms were in conflict and thus proved to be a weak basis for multilateral decisions.

Finally, regime theory suggests that cooperation increases when regimes improve information about the behavior of others, especially information about the likelihood of cheating. More information reduces uncertainty, and more certainty increases the likelihood of cooperation. In this case, the EPC met often, and all members were well-informed about one another's preferences and behavior. But this information actually increased the odds of Germany's defection. German threats of unilateral action led to counterthreats of sanctions, reducing Germany's trust that others would cooperate with a joint policy

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that conformed to its preferences. Indeed, it may be that more of some kinds of information can actually reduce the odds of cooperation! Further, it appears that few of the EC actors were well-informed about the situation on the ground in Yugoslavia or had a good grasp of the causes of the conflict there. More information of that kind might have led EC members to share a common understanding of the problem and a common view of its solution, leading to a more solid consensus. It may well be that a foreign policy epistemic community is needed if the European Union is to have a truly common foreign and security policy.[120]

If sanctions had been stronger, if norms had been more consensual, and if the right kind of information had guided negotiations, a preference for cooperation would have been formed by external institutional incentives and constraints. When external incentives and constraints are weak, however, a window of opportunity opens for the domestic formation of preferences and domestic opposition to cooperation. This case thus suggests two conditions under which domestic politics and a particular domestic foreign policy tradition might outweigh alternative traditions and external institutional pressures to shape foreign policy preferences.

First, domestic factors are likely to outweigh external factors in shaping preferences when the issue is not clearly one of national security. In this case, if the war had posed a military threat to NATO countries, that threat would have formed a preference for cooperation. Had the conflict in Yugoslavia threatened EC members militarily, both the gains from cooperation and the costs of defection would have increased. NATO policy on threats to its members were very clear; its policies on out-of-area conflicts were not. When the issue was downgraded to a foreign policy problem, the costs of not acting in concert decreased, and decision makers had the luxury of acting in accord with the preferences of domestic political elites.

Second, this episode suggests that domestic politics shape substantive preferences when a high level of uncertainty surrounds the issue. In this case, as we have seen, the international system had changed rapidly, and there were no clear international guidelines to shape cooperative policy preferences on diplomatic recognition of new states. When clear international guidelines are not present, domestic factors have more room to influence policy.

[120] On epistemic communities, see Peter Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and their Progress," in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., *Progress in Postwar International Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The case suggests that under conditions of international uncertainty, a unilateral preference is more likely to be formed in the domestic arena when foreign policy traditions or culture contradict the principles upon which weak international guidelines rest. As the story suggests, French and British foreign policy traditions were more consistent with the joint decision to preserve Yugoslavia. Their interpretations of the self-determination principle were shaped largely by the decolonization process, which emphasized the right of self-determination for movements of independence from colonial rule and deemphasized the right of self-determination for separatist movements demanding territorial separation within a single state. Given the congruence of international norms and domestic traditions, domestic politics mattered very little in the shaping of French and British preferences on this issue. Given Germany's postwar division, its foreign policy tradition on this issue was more strongly linked to Wilsonian principles of the right than to internal democracy and territorial separation.

Yet even in this case, the clash of Germany's foreign policy tradition with international agreements might have been avoided had there not been a change in the structure of the party system. That change increased the German incentive to pursue a preference for recognition in the face of EC opposition. Indeed, Germany's interpretation of self-determination could have been attenuated by the end of communism, but the prevailing cold war interpretation was politically charged by the bandwagoning effects of electoral politics under conditions of perceived party fragmentation. Indeed, in the future, the foreign policies of all of the Western democracies may be infected by party fragmentation as large parties lose support and small parties emerge, offering extremist positions that counter the more centrist positions hammered out in multilateral agreements. In this case, large parties will be tempted to adopt the extremist positions in order to capture lost constituencies. The resulting clash raises the odds that under conditions of high external uncertainty, preferences will be formed in the domestic rather than the international arena.

When we speculate on the future direction of German foreign policy, this prospect is especially troubling. Until the current period, external forces were prominent in shaping Germany's foreign policy preferences, precisely to prevent a move toward unilateralism that might arise from the instabilities of domestic politics. Indeed, in 1949 the Western powers tightened the shackles on German foreign policy choice when they saw the results of that year's election, in which the major parties received small percentages of the vote and a variety of nationalist parties

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

enjoyed high levels of support. As the cold war progressed, the major parties gained strength and the extremist parties were excluded from the political system; rising prosperity fueled domestic support for tight Western integration and provided an important foundation for a stable party structure. Although Germany is no longer shackled by the victors of World War II, its leaders continue to be sensitive to international constraints; they have accepted limits on German power and been active proponents of tighter European integration. In game-theoretic terms, Germany continues to cooperate and to attenuate the security dilemma by reducing its own appearance of threat, thus inducing others to cooperate.

On the whole, domestic support for this foreign policy stance continues because no political party has emerged with the political clout that could sway public opinion away from continued support for multilateralism. If, however, the SPD continues to weaken and party fragmentation is exacerbated, then political space will be opened for a party to emerge that might indeed oppose Germany's strong position on multilateralism. If this happens again, as it did in 1949, the Western powers will have fewer political resources to prevent German unilateralism. The unilateral recognition of Croatia certainly suggests that even a mild shift in party structure could have deleterious effects on multilateralism. If, however, the party system remains stable, this outcome is unlikely, and Germany will continue on its multilateral course.[121]

To the extent that this single case can generate more general hypotheses about the source of preference formation in foreign policy and particularly about preferences for cooperation and unilateral action, I would suggest the following propositions: The source of preferences is issue specific; in foreign economic policy, preferences are more readily formed by domestic interests and coalitions constructed in response to international pressures.[122] In foreign policy and diplomacy, however, international-level explanations are more appropriate as "first cut" explanations.[123] Because central decision makers exercise high levels of

[121] For a more detailed argument along these lines, see Wolfgang Krieger, "Germany's Place in the World," in John Brady, Beverly Crawford, and Sarah Wilson, eds., *The Post-War Transformation of Germany: Democracy, Prosperity, and Nationhood* (forthcoming).

[122] See, for example, Peter Katzenstein, *Small States and World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Helen Milner, *Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); and Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

[123] See Robert Keohane, "The World Political Economy and the Crisis of Embedded Liberalism," in John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 16.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

initiative and discretion in that they make the first move in shaping foreign policy—often in the absence of domestic debate—they are the initial responders to external pressures and challenges. These pressures and challenges emerge from international power relationships and from those that are structured by membership in international institutions. In the European Union, in issues where a choice between cooperation and defection is presented, institutions rather than the external distribution of power among states shape a stronger preference for cooperation than for unilateralism. When institutional norms are conflicting, sanctions weak, and information distorted, however, domestic factors will account for more of the variance in preference formation.

The importance of domestic factors in shaping unilateral preferences will be enhanced by three conditions: (1) when the substantive preferences of statesmen correspond to the preferences of domestic political elites and contradict the preferences of international partners; (2) when there are no internal divisions among domestic actors with regard to a preference for unilateralism; and (3) when the dynamics of the domestic political system change to permit the emergence of parties and movements that offer extreme preferences running counter to incentives for international cooperation. A state's foreign policy tradition will influence the substantive preferences of statesmen and foreign policy elites; the structure of the party system will affect the legitimacy of noncooperative preferences in domestic politics.

I have argued that although domestic politics matter to preference formation under these conditions, and that these conditions obtained in this case, neither international nor domestic factors alone can explain Germany's defection from international cooperation. I have developed a synthetic explanation suggesting that Germany's growing power, underdeveloped multilateral regimes, and conflicting international norms lowered the costs of unilateralism and provided the permissive conditions for defection. Foreign policy norms and elite politics both formed the preference that diverged from that of Germany's partners and reduced central decision-makers' domestic gains from cooperation with them. Conflicting preferences could have been reconciled in the negotiating process, but weak international norms and the absence of sanctions for defection permitted an escalating spiral of threats and counterthreats that reduced trust and increased Germany's incentive to defect.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LEFT AND RIGHT WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS

Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China

By ANDREW J. NATHAN and TIANJIAN SHI*

IN the 1980s, the first decade of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, Chinese society became wealthier and more complex, and state control of ideology weakened. As public attitudes diversified, new ideological alignments took shape. This essay explores the ideological landscape in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen pro-democracy demonstrations. It uses data from a 1990 national sample survey that interviewed 2,896 adults throughout the country, except for Tibet, to provide a statistically accurate picture of mass attitudes. The technical details of the survey are described in the appendix.

Chinese society in 1990 was split along ideological lines into two large, loose groups, each with distinctive sociological characteristics. One group had more liberal attitudes toward public issues, the other more conservative attitudes. In Western terms, both Chinese issue constituencies stood on the left, in the sense that both demanded big government and egalitarianism: the liberals wanted government to fight against special privilege and economic inequality, and the conservatives wanted government to take responsibility for citizens' welfare.

The difference between the groups centered on attitudes toward reform and its consequences. Chinese liberals, who were concerned with the effects of reform on the moral state of society and on good govern-

* The authors acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grant INT-88-14199, a grant from the United Daily News Cultural Foundation, and the assistance of the Opinion Research Center of China, Social and Economic Research Institute of Beijing, under the directors Chen Ziming and Wang Juntao. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the Conference on Left, Right, and Center: Party and Ideology after the Cold War, sponsored by the Symposium on Science, Reason, and Modern Democracy, at Michigan State University, April 21–24, 1994. That paper is to be published in different form in a book edited by Arthur M. Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman. For comments we are grateful to conference participants and to Michael R. Chambers, Margot E. Landman, Dong Li, Kenneth Lieberthal, James D. Seymour, Robert Y. Shapiro, Lawrence R. Sullivan, Kellee S. Tsai, and Lynn T. White III.

World Politics 48 (July 1996), 522–50

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment, thought the way out of China's difficulties was to push forward with economic and political reform. Chinese conservatives for their part worried more about the negative impact of reforms on their personal welfare and thought reform should be slowed or reversed.

We explore the extent to which the dynamics that divided the Chinese population resemble the dynamics of ideological polarization in the West. We choose the West as the case for comparison because that area has been the focus of most of the research and theory on mass ideology and its determinants. We find that in China, as in the West, class, as measured by education, income, and occupation, has a strong effect on issue priorities and democratic values. The urban-rural cleavage is also important, although for reasons that differ somewhat from those that operate in the West. In China one finds some influential social divisions that are not found in the West: that between party members and nonparty members and that between employees of state and nonstate units. Nonetheless, the ways in which these attributes affect the individual's ideological standpoint can be understood in terms of the same logic that explains the impact of sociological attributes on attitudes in the West.

In short, the Chinese ideological spectrum is distinctive in substance but universal in the dynamics that shape it. In light of the cultural and institutional differences between China and the West, that is, by the logic of a most-different-case comparison, this finding supports theories of mass ideology hitherto grounded chiefly in studies of the United States and Europe.

Ideological Polarization in the West

Two issues have dominated the ideological space of the West: the role of the state and the conflicting norms of equality and achievement in the distribution of goods. The left generally favors more government intervention in the economy and more egalitarian income distribution; the right typically stands for relative freedom of private enterprise from state intervention and toleration of higher levels of income inequality. But left and right have accumulated additional meanings as well. According to Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, the political cleavages embodied in European party systems crystallized the results of four major historical struggles: between center and periphery, church and state, town and country, and owners and workers.[1] Arend Lijphart sug-

[1] Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gests seven dimensions of ideology: socioeconomic, religious, cultural-ethnic, urban-rural, regime support, foreign policy, and postmaterialism.[2]

The polarity of left and right emerged from a synthesis of these different cleavages, taking different form in each country. Each country varied in whether issue preferences and party loyalties were dominated by class alignments, or by religious, regional, ethnic, or other ones, or by distinctive combinations of several.[3] There was no tight relationship among positions on all these issues. Yet people usually thought of themselves as liberal or conservative because they leaned one way or another on a series of value dilemmas that characterized their nation's political culture. In the postwar era there emerged a new cleavage dimension—called materialism-postmaterialism by Ronald Inglehart—that generated the "new politics" of the environment, women's issues, and the peace movement. Even though older parties and issues tended to be more closely aligned with the left-right scale than the parties and issues of the new politics, citizens still thought of the new issues roughly in terms of a left-right dimension.[4]

Different people may combine these value choices in different patterns.[5] Left-right self-placement may reflect a mix of abstract thinking about issues and favorable and unfavorable feelings toward groups and issues.[6] Yet, according to John Zaller, "[A]lthough there are numerous 'value dimensions' between which there is no obvious logical connection, many people nonetheless respond to different value dimensions *as if* they were organized by a common left-right dimension."[7] Thus, in the "political action" study of four European countries and the United States done in the early 1970s, respondents were able to locate themselves on the left-right dimension in numbers ranging from a high of

[2] Arend Lijphart, "Political Parties: Ideologies and Programs," in David Butler, Howard R. Penniman, and Austin Ranney, eds., *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1981).

[3] For example, see Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984); Arend Lijphart, "Religious vs. Linguistic vs. Class Voting," *American Political Science Review* 73 (June 1979); and Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven Nation Comparison* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

[4] Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 273–78.

[5] Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications," *American Political Science Review* 25 (November 1981); and Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, "The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State," *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (February 1992).

[6] Shawn Rosenberg, "The Structure of Political Thinking," *American Journal of Political Science* 32 (August 1988); and Paul M. Sniderman et al., *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[7] John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 26.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

92 percent of the respondents in Germany to a low of 68 percent of those in the U.S.[8]

Ideas of left and right remain broad and vague in the minds of most Western citizens. Depending on the country, only 11 percent to 30 percent of the political action respondents were able to say what the terms meant. "A sizable proportion . . . either could not give any meaning of the terms or else completely reversed their meaning."[9] In America, the country where mass attitudes have been most intensively studied, few citizens are able to relate their overall ideological self-identification to their opinions on particular issues.[10] Still, no matter how vaguely comprehended, many citizens use these general categories to help orient their ideas about politics.

Western respondents align along the liberal-conservative dimension chiefly in response to the combined operation of two forces, social position and cognitive sophistication. Members of different social groups have different economic and other interests, which partly determine their positions on the ideological spectrum. Attitudes on the left tend to be preferred by the working class, urban residents, young people, and members of minority ethnic and religious groups, because they are dissatisfied with their share of benefits in society and think they would be better off if the state intervened to redistribute resources. People who are more satisfied (or less dissatisfied) with the status quo tend to take a more conservative stance toward government activism, social change, and redistribution. In Western societies these groups usually include white-collar workers, suburbanites, middle-aged people, and members of dominant ethnic and religious groups.[11]

While cognitive sophistication is affected by many factors, including education, media exposure, political campaigns, and government propaganda efforts, it is usually measured by education.[12] Cognitive so-

[8] Hans D. Klingemann, "Measuring Ideological Conceptualizations," in Samuel H. Barnes et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), 229.

[9] Ibid., 230.

[10] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964). But see Christopher H. Achen, "Mass Political Attitudes and the Survey Response," *American Political Science Review* 69 (December 1975); and Inglehart (fn. 4), chap. 3.

[11] Robert Axelrod, "Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952–1968," *American Political Science Review* 66 (March 1972); Douglas A. Hibbs Jr., "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *American Political Science Review* 71 (December 1977); Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, rev. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 230–300; and Herbert McCloskey and Alida Brill, *Dimensions of Tolerance: What Americans Believe about Civil Liberties* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983), 370–414.

[12] Cognitive sophistication is also referred to as cognitive mobilization, cognitive ability, cognitive competence, and political sophistication, among other terms. Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phistication has mixed effects on left-right self-placement. Greater knowledge is associated with higher socioeconomic status, which makes people more conservative. But education also increases openness to change and thus helps to move people toward the liberal end of the spectrum. Education may have different effects on people's left-right positions on different issues in different countries: in the U.S., for example, liberal social values are promoted in schools and better-educated citizens tend to be more liberal than those who are less-educated.[13]

Whatever the ideological direction of its impact, however, greater cognitive capacity allows citizens to approach issues in a more abstract, generalized, and interrelated way.[14] Without necessarily making citizens less self-interested, political knowledge enables them to see how "'roundabout' routes . . . will better secure ultimate gratification."[15] As a result, educated and knowledgeable sections of Western publics are more likely than are less educated groups to think about political issues in terms of an explicit ideology or broad policy choices as distinct from immediate self-interest. While the ideological position of a less sophisticated constituency tends to be a direct reflection of its social position, that of a more cognitively sophisticated constituency reflects the combined influence of social interest and an abstract conception of the issues.

Left and Right in Communist China

Under Mao, the meaning of the liberal-conservative dimension was decreed from above. Mao accepted Stalin's scheme that history moved from primitive communism to feudalism to capitalism to communism and that whatever pushed things in that direction was "progressive" and hence leftist. Class became a question of one's stance toward historical change rather than a matter of objective economic interest. And class

Voting Behavior," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 4 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Ronald Inglehart, "Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity," *Comparative Politics* 3 (October 1970); Robert C. Luskin, "Measuring Political Sophistication," *American Journal of Political Science* 31 (November 1987); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 148–55; and Sniderman et al. (fn. 6).

[13] Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 315.

[14] Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (1960; reprint, New York: John Wiley, 1980), chaps. 9–10; Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Rosenberg (fn. 6); Sniderman et al. (fn. 6); and James A. Stimson, "Belief Systems: Constraint, Complexity, and the 1972 Election," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (August 1975).

[15] Campbell et al. (fn. 14), 204.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was a label formally assigned to each citizen by the party authorities, rather than a self-chosen identity.[16]

Mao labeled as "left" those who stood on the side of what he considered progress. Those who went too far in advance of history he designated ultraleft deviationists or adventurists. Those who failed to push historical progress at the appropriate speed were right deviationists guilty of class compromise. The position Mao occupied at any moment defined the magic place that constituted the authentic left between the ultraleft and the right.[17]

After 1949 Mao moved this point of reference steadily in a radical direction, speeding the pace of change toward an egalitarian, state-dominated society. In a series of mass campaigns the Communist Party targeted as enemies all those defined as occupying positions on the right—landlords, counterrevolutionaries, "bureaucrats," and "sectarians." In the mid-1950s Mao accelerated agricultural collectivization and launched the Great Leap Forward. He accused party colleagues who failed to keep up of "tottering along like a woman with bound feet."[18] An estimated three-quarters of a million people fell victim to charges of rightism. In the 1960s Mao carried out the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution to make sure the revolution continued uninterrupted.

With Mao so impatient for historical progress, hardly any space remained to the left of him on the spectrum. The rare exceptions were certain allegedly ultraleft organizations that arose during the Cultural Revolution, organizations like the Hunan Provincial Proletarian Association (*Shengwulian*), which called for virtual anarchy, or an alleged anti-Mao conspiracy called the "May 16th Group," which supposedly was prepared to challenge Mao's dominance.

China was like a ship whose passengers all rush to port. During the Cultural Revolution every organization proclaimed its progressiveness with names like "Red Guards" and "Revolutionary Rebels." Street names (Anti-Revisionism Street), markets (East Wind Market), and personal names ("Defend-the-East" Zhang) crowded the left side of the symbolic space. For a time the Beijing Red Guards even forced cars to drive on the left side of the street and to stop on green and go on

[16] Richard Curt Kraus, *Class Conflict in Chinese Socialism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).

[17] See, for example, Mao Zedong, "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party," in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, vol. 3 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965).

[18] [Mao Zedong], *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), 4:184.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

red.[19] In effect, the ideological spectrum collapsed, and ideology ceased to be a meaningful concept because all views came cloaked in nearly identical terminology. When Mao's chosen successor, Lin Biao, fell from power, the party announced that Lin, who had always been praised as the leftest of the left, was really "left in form but right in essence." In the bankrupt terminology of the day, this meant that Lin had pretended to be a good man but was not. Left and right had become devoid of substance.[20]

A multidimensional ideological landscape reemerged after Mao's death. The official debate over the speed and content of reform continued to orient itself to the presumed direction of the march of history and to speak partly in terms of left and right. But Deng Xiaoping's regime was no longer able to monopolize public debate. In addition, two unofficial ideological dimensions emerged, one focusing on mass grievances toward a variety of targets and the other on ideas of democracy. Attitudes to reform, attitudes of grievance, and attitudes toward democracy constituted the three dimensions of ideology in Deng's China.

The ideas of left and right were used in the official reform debate more in attack than defense. Each side claimed to be on the left in a good sense and accused the other of being in some sense conservative. Advocates of reform tried to deny critics access to the progressive and socialist side of the rhetorical spectrum by presenting reform as the self-perfecting mechanism of socialism. Deng claimed to be "building socialism with Chinese characteristics" and to be guiding reform with the "four basic principles" of socialism, proletarian dictatorship, Communist Party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Critics of reform labeled the reformists "bourgeois liberals" and accused them of fomenting "spiritual pollution," which by implication located them on the right.[21] Reform advocates labeled conservative values ultra-left or "left" in quotation marks.[22]

A second ideological dimension was discernible in the unofficial media and in the liberalized official press. We call it the grievance di-

[19] Jiaqi Yan and Gao Gao, *Wenhua dageming shinianshi* (History of the ten-year cultural revolution), rev. ed., 2 vols. (Taipei: Yuanliu chuban shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1990), 90–108.

[20] Ibid, 646–48; cf. William A. Joseph, *The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958–1981* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984).

[21] Ming Ruan, *Deng Xiaoping diguo* (The empire of Deng Xiaoping) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua chuban shiye youxian gongsi, 1992).

[22] As seen in the book title, Wen Lü (pseud.), *Zhongguo "zuo" huo* (China's "left" disasters) (Beijing: Chaohua chubanshe, 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mension, but it consisted of many elements: a mix of economic grievances, nostalgia for the past, moral condemnation of social and political corruption, opposition to change, traditionalism, and antiforeignism. Deng Xiaoping had allowed the weakening of party control over ideology and the rise of a partial civil society. Newspapers, magazines, and book publishers eluded tight oversight by the propaganda departments.[23] Public opinion polling appeared, providing leaders and to some extent the public itself with information about mass attitudes, even though polls conducted by Chinese organizations fell short of international methodological standards.[24] Unofficial and private channels of communication came into existence—open letters, underground publications, foreign and Hong Kong–based books and magazines that made their way into China, and a vast realm of private conversation and rumor.

Dissatisfaction focused on a seemingly contradictory mix of targets: the ruling clans, the party and state bureaucracies, nouveaux riches entrepreneurs, dissident intellectuals, and foreigners. Despite their suffering under Mao, many Chinese remembered that era as a time when they could leave their front doors and bicycles unlocked, when prices were stable, when everyone had a job, when officials were honest, and when China was not afraid of war with the West. The new phenomena of inflation, economic inequality, corruption, personal insecurity, and cosmopolitanism seemed part of a general decline of values. Ordinary people were liable to complain about the rise of a new Mercedes-riding class of "bureaucratic capitalists" and "compradores" (*maiban*, an old term for Chinese who served as agents for foreign firms). The bustle of downtown construction prompted complaints that officials were "selling out the country like Li Hongzhang," the nineteenth-century negotiator who ceded Chinese territories to Japan. Dissidents and foreigners were perceived as collaborating with, rather than opposing, corrupt bureaucrats and party ideologues, all undermining what was native and true to China.[25] People complained that even *guanxi*—personal connections, the cement of human relations in Chinese society—no longer carried its overtones of friendship and moral obligation but had become

[23] Perry Link, *Evening Chats in Beijing: Probing China's Predicament* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992); Ching-chang Hsiao and Mei-rong Yang, "'Don't Force Us to Lie': The Case of the *World Economic Herald*," in Chin-Chuan Lee, ed., *Voices of China: The Interplay of Politics and Journalism* (New York: Guilford Press, 1990); and Judy Polumbaum, "The Tribulations of China's Journalists after a Decade of Reform," in Chin-Chuan Lee.

[24] Dong Li, "Public Opinion Polls and Political Attitudes in China, 1979–89" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993), chap. 3.

[25] Cf. ibid., chap. 4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instead cynical instruments in a marketized but lawless system.[26] The popular mood was essentially "anti."

The third ideological dimension was shaped by a broad group of pro-democratic intellectuals. They ranged from Wei Jingsheng, the self-taught dissident, to Wang Meng, a Communist Party member and government-supported writer of fiction and essays who had once served as minister of culture. They included world-class scientists like Fang Lizhi and Xu Liangying and teachers in provincial party schools; academic philosophers and senior party thinkers; private-venture entrepreneurs and poets. Despite its diversity, this group agreed on a central point: that China had a historic obligation to learn from the tragedies of the past in order to prevent the reemergence of a Maoist-style dictatorship. Their prescriptions varied from immediate democratization (Wei Jingsheng) to an interlude of authoritarianism (the "new authoritarians"); from civil service reform to Western-style democratization; from "rule by law" to human rights. The core issue across this band of debate was "preventing another cultural revolution."[27]

Although Chinese ideas of democracy are shaped by the heritages of Confucius and Marx, they also bear an essential similarity to Western concepts. The parallel is partly due to the direct influence of Western ideas, but more importantly it stems from the universality of the problem of making government accountable.[28] The party tried to deal with the lessons of the past in its resolution on the Mao years: it acknowledged that Mao had made ideological errors but asserted that the party had now corrected them.[29] This failed to satisfy many Chinese intellectuals, however. By the late 1980s the influence of the liberal intellectuals had gone so far on the subject of democracy that some observers argued their ideas enjoyed a hegemony in unofficial discourse.[30] Pro-democratic ideas were also widespread among the general population.[31]

[26] Marlowe Hood, "Reflections on Civil Society, 'Black Society,' and Corruption in Contemporary China" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, March 25–27, 1994); Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, *Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).

[27] X. L. Ding, *The Decline of Communism in China: Legitimacy Crisis, 1977–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Link (fn. 23).

[28] Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1985).

[29] "On Questions of Party History: Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," *Beijing Review* 24, no. 27 (July 6, 1981), 10–39.

[30] Baogang He, "Three Models of Democracy: Intellectual and Moral Foundations of Liberal Democracy and Preconditions for Its Establishment in Contemporary China" (Ph.D. diss., Australian National University, 1993), 3, 257.

[31] Li (fn. 24), chap. 6.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Issue Priorities and Agendas

Our survey data enable us to analyze how attitudes toward these three issue dimensions were distributed among the population in 1990. They also help us probe beneath the surface similarity of Chinese ideological issues to liberal-conservative ideas in the West, to see whether the two sets of ideological dimensions reflect the operation of the same social and cognitive forces.[32] We draw our evidence about the reform and grievance dimensions from a question about citizens' concerns with public issues. Another question, on which we report below, included items relevant to the democracy dimension.

The public-issues question asked, "Nowadays, our government is facing many problems, and to solve these problems is not easy. For each of the following problems that I mention, please tell me on which problems you think the government has spent too much effort, on which problems it has spent the appropriate effort, and on which problems it has spent not enough effort." The results are displayed in Table 1.

The question was not designed to uncover issues of public concern that we did not already know about. Rather, it assesses the relative degree of priority the public places on a predetermined list of issues.[33] The first column displays the issues in the order in which the public ranked them as getting "not enough" government effort (this was not the order in which they were listed in the questionnaire).

Not surprisingly, the two top issues—inflation and corruption—were the same concerns that dominated the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations. The next four items—crime, bureaucratism, inequitable income distribution, and inadequate government investment in education—were also prominent among the complaints of the 1989 demonstrators.

[32] Because of our expectation that left-right concepts would not be meaningful to respondents, our 1990 survey did not include a measure of left-right self-placement. Our 1993 surveys in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong included not only the issue priority battery reported here, but also a Chinese-traditionalism battery; a left-right placement battery for self, CCP, father, and KMT; and a number of other relevant questions (speed of reform and of social change, liberalism, civil liberties, democracy). We plan to use these questions to compare the dimensionality of Chinese political issues across the three Chinese political systems.

[33] As with similar questions commonly used in surveys in the West (e.g., Nie, Verba, and Petrocik [fn. 12]; Page and Shapiro [fn. 13]), we asked about issues we knew were on the public's mind. A technique used by researchers at National Taiwan University is to derive the issues they ask about from the platforms of candidates in election campaigns; see, e.g., Fu Hu, "The Electoral Mechanism and Political Change in Taiwan," in Steve Tsang, ed., *In the Shadow of China: Political Developments in Taiwan since 1949* (London: Hurst, 1993), 154–59. This reduces the risk that issues will be arbitrarily left off the list. Because of the lack of competitive elections in China, that option was not available to us. It should also be noted that this item was not designed to be used as we use it here, to test hypotheses about ideological dimensions. Nonetheless, it proved usable in this way.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF ISSUES
(%)

Issue[a]	*Not Enough Attention*	*Just Right*	*Too Much Attention*	*No Interest*[b]
Inflation and complaints				
Price control	55.7	19.7	1.9	22.7
Oppose corruption	53.8	17.9	3.0	25.3
Oppose crime	47.1	28.6	3.0	21.4
Oppose bureaucratism	46.8	16.8	1.8	34.6
Economic welfare				
Income distribution	42.5	15.0	1.7	40.8
Education	42.1	35.6	3.8	18.5
Unemployment	37.8	20.6	1.5	40.0
Housing	34.2	29.0	3.0	33.8
Consumer protection	33.6	21.7	1.7	43.1
Environment protection	33.6	30.3	2.6	33.5
Subsidies	27.9	21.7	7.4	43.0
Population control	24.7	50.4	12.8	12.2
Reform				
Anti-bourgeois liberalization	21.2	25.2	5.2	48.4
Private enterprise	18.2	25.4	9.4	47.1
Economic reform	17.9	28.6	4.1	49.4
Political reform	17.6	26.6	2.8	52.9
Foreign policy				
Taiwan	17.0	32.5	4.0	46.5
Opening	12.6	34.4	5.5	47.4
Defense	9.8	33.4	3.2	53.6
Foreign aid	5.7	20.0	8.1	66.1
N=2,896				

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

[a]Issues were: price control; opposing bribery and corruption, and rectifying party work style; opposing crime; opposing bureaucratism; solving the problem of inequitable income distribution; raising the education level; solving the employment problem; solving the housing problem; protecting consumers' rights; protecting the environment; subsidizing the basic necessities; population control and family planning; opposing bourgeois liberalization; encouraging the development of individual or private enterprises; economic system reform; political system reform; reunifying with Taiwan; opening to the outside world; national defense; and foreign aid.

[b]No interest equals don't know plus no answer.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The rank of these six items at the top of the table is consistent with our sense that the public felt beleaguered by the collapse of public and official morality and the rise of self-seeking materialism. It turns out therefore that the concerns of the urban, student demonstrators were widespread across the national sample, which included urban and rural residents, young and old, educated and uneducated. Remarkably high percentages of respondents of all kinds said that the government was not doing enough to solve the same problems that had motivated the demonstrators in Beijing.[34]

The table goes on to reveal how much priority the public placed on greater government effort on other issues. From one-quarter to two-fifths of the respondents wanted the government to do more to solve problems of daily life, including those related to jobs, housing, shoddy goods, environmental pollution, subsidies, and population pressures. These represent a variety of demands that the government was expected to satisfy in the former socialist society. Now that the socialist system was giving way to a market-based system, a substantial portion of the public seemed to deplore the weakening of government effort in these areas of traditional state responsibility.

The next four items relate to reform. Fewer than one-fifth of the respondents indicated a positive attitude toward reform, by stating that the government should do more to promote economic and political reform. A slightly larger percentage expressed a negative view of reform through their concern that the government needed to do more to stop bourgeois liberalization, a term used by critics of reform to refer to its negative ideological and cultural effects.

Finally, foreign policy ranked at the bottom of the public's list of priorities, as it does in most countries. Among foreign policy issues, the heavily propagandized, nationalistic issue of Taiwan stood above the rest.

The public may assign a low priority to an issue for either of two reasons: because it does not have much interest in the issue[35] or because it

[34] Besides Beijing, there were demonstrations in at least thirty other cities, but few are known to have occurred outside cities.

[35] Low expressed interest, in turn, may reflect an issue's lack of perceived salience to the respondent or the respondent's lack of information about the issue, or both. The difference between these two causes is not germane to the analysis here. Alternatively, one might hypothesize that "don't know" answers are given when an issue is politically too sensitive or dangerous to talk about honestly. In another article, however, one of us has demonstrated that this is not the case. "Don't know" responses are correlated with measures of respondents' cognitive deficiency rather than with measures of their political vulnerability. Tianjian Shi, "Survey Research in China," in Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leoni Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro, eds., *Research in Micropolitics,* vol. 5, *New Directions in Political Psychology* (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1996).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

feels that the government is already handling the issue adequately. The second and fourth columns in Table 1 help clarify which of these two attitudes applies to each issue. "No interest" is the label we have assigned to the summed percentage of "don't know" and "no answer" responses. Lack of interest generally increases as one moves down the list of issues. It strongly marks the foreign policy domain and also characterizes public attitudes to reform and to certain economic welfare issues like subsidies and consumer protection. Thus, the fact that the public did not demand more government action in these areas does not represent a vote of confidence in policy. But for issues higher on the list, such as price control, corruption, bureaucratism, and income distribution, dissatisfaction seems to be a better explanation than low interest for the public demand for greater government effort. "Just right" responses, which show the proportion of the public that was satisfied with the government's handling of the issue, are generally lower than both "not enough effort" and "no interest" responses.

"Too much effort" plays a substantial role in the public pattern of response only toward population control. This was the issue on which the fewest respondents felt no interest, the issue on which the largest number of respondents thought the government was already doing enough, and also the issue on which the highest percentage thought the government was doing too much. The pattern suggests that many people were concerned about population pressure and approved the government's strong policy to limit population growth, yet many were unhappy with the impact of population control policies on their own lives.

The main message of the table is that Chinese citizens were dissatisfied or uninterested in the government's handling of most issues. Only in the area of foreign policy was there a satisfied plurality, and its size was small.

The rank ordering of public concern about the issues given in Table 1 is not a test of how the public perceived the links among them. A factor analysis, which we display in Table 2, provides such a test. This procedure sorts the issues into groups according to the frequency with which respondents who answer "not enough" with respect to a particular set of issues will also answer "not enough" with respect to another given issue. In other words, factor analysis identifies clusters of issues (we label them agendas) that are related to one another in the response patterns of our respondents.[36]

[36] Factor analysis is best used to confirm the existence of dimensions that were theorized in advance. Otherwise, the risk is that almost any factor structure can be given a forced interpretation. As noted earlier, we did not have a theory of issue dimensions in mind when we constructed the list of issue

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF ISSUE PRIORITY[a]

	Tiananmen Agenda	*Reform Agenda*	*Economic Welfare Agenda*	*Foreign Policy Agenda*
Oppose corruption	.78	.02	.00	−.02
Oppose crime	.75	−.05	.07	.02
Oppose bureaucratism	.65	.07	−.09	−.02
Price control	.59	−.05	−.13	−.03
Education	.35	−.01	−.22	.12
Antibourgeois liberalization	.32	.19	.05	.10
Political reform	−.03	.82	.00	.02
Economic reform	−.01	.81	.00	−.03
Private enterprise	.03	.30	−.18	.09
Opening to world	.07	.25	−.07	.21
Unemployment	.02	.04	−.66	.01
Housing	−.06	−.03	−.65	.04
Income distribution	.21	.05	−.50	−.01
Subsidies	.01	−.00	−.49	−.01
Environment	.10	.17	−.36	.07
Consumer protection	.23	.18	−.35	−.01
National defense	.04	−.04	.05	.79
Foreign aid	−.04	.01	.03	.51
Percentage of variance	32.5	8.6	6.6	5.8
Eigenvalue	5.9	1.5	1.2	1.1

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

[a] The factors are derived from a principal axis analysis of "not enough attention" responses to the issue priority question in oblique rotation. Population control and reunifying with Taiwan loaded weakly on factors 1 and 2, respectively, and a slightly clearer factor structure emerged when they were excluded. This is reported here and used in the correlations and regressions that follow.

Table 2 shows that the issues were associated in the public mind in much the way our analysis of three issue dimensions would lead us to expect.[37] Following the usual standard in interpreting factor analyses, we concentrate on items with loading scores above 0.5. Items that fall below this level are not closely linked to other sets of issues in the pub-

items. But since the individual items have the kinds of face relationships that are described in the text, we feel justified in proceeding to factor analysis. The validity of the factor analysis gains further credibility when the factor results prove to be meaningful with respect to other variables in the study, as in Table 3.

[37] There is no reason to expect all the items to cluster tightly around a given number of factors, since the list of items presented to respondents was not drawn up to test a theory of issue dimensions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lic mind. For example, "opening to the world" was of roughly equal (and as Table 1 suggests, relatively low) concern to everyone, regardless of respondents' patterns of concern with other sets of issues.

Corruption, crime, bureaucratism, and price control cohere in factor 1 to constitute what we can call the *Tiananmen Agenda*. They represent an interrelated set of issues that implies a critical view of regime performance. The second factor identifies a *Reform Agenda*, which includes economic and political components. People who wanted the government to pay more attention to economic reform also wanted it to pay more attention to political reform, and vice versa. Although the factor loadings of "encouraging private enterprise" and "opening to the world" are too low to justify a strong statement of their relationship to the factor, they also make sense as reform-related issues.

The third factor separates economic and quality-of-life issues as a distinct agenda, which we label *Economic Welfare*.[38] The fourth factor constitutes a *Foreign Policy Agenda*. As we saw in Table 1, only a small number of people assigned a high priority to this last set of issues. The factor analysis shows that there was no strong tendency to link foreign policy issues with any of the other three issue agendas.

These findings deepen our understanding of two of our three suggested ideological dimensions. The Tiananmen and Economic Welfare Agendas both reflect elements of what we called grievance. The Reform Agenda corresponds to our reform dimension. Foreign Policy emerges as a separate agenda that is not important enough to generate a major ideological cleavage in the population.

All the agendas call for government action, since that was the subject of this question. But the agendas differ in the type of government role they envision. The Tiananmen Agenda calls for government moral leadership as well as a degree of economic intervention to control inflation. The Reform Agenda calls for government leadership to change the system. The Foreign Policy Agenda calls for government attention to foreign policy issues.

The Economic Welfare Agenda alone calls for direct government intervention in the distribution of goods in order to solve the problems that individual citizens confront with jobs, housing, wages, and subsidies. This is the only one of the four agendas that seems on the face of it to resemble the classical Western left-right dimension. To say in

[38] The weak loading of "environment" and "consumer rights" on this factor may support Inglehart's suggestion that materialist and postmaterialist issues are distinct in the public mind. But a separate factor analysis of these six items alone produced loadings on only one factor, not two. Six items may be too few to reveal the materialist-postmaterialist cleavage.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Deng's China that the government should do more about jobs, housing, and income distribution was to say that it should create more jobs in the tens of thousands of enterprises that it owned, build state-owned housing to rent at subsidized rates, and raise the salaries it paid to tens of millions of officials, teachers, technicians, factory workers, and other state employees. It is in this sense that the Economic Welfare Agenda resembled the agenda of the Western "left." It was also "left" in the Chinese context—or "conservative" according to the label reversal common in postsocialist and reforming socialist countries—in the sense that it ran counter to the reform effort to reduce direct government participation in the economy and to create more autonomous enterprises operating under market conditions.

Issue Constituencies

Face comparisons of the left in the West and China take us only partway toward knowing whether they reflect similar or different ideological structures and mechanisms. Deeper insight can be gained by identifying which kinds of citizens are most concerned with which agendas. We cannot expect to find the same constituencies as in the West any more than we find the same issues, since neither China's issue space nor its sociological structure is a copy of the West's. The deeper question is whether the issue constituencies in China reflect patterns of social interest in interaction with cognitive sophistication that are intelligible in terms of the theories that explain ideological alignments in the Western case.

Table 3 presents correlations of selected respondent attributes with the tendency of respondents to give high priority to each issue agenda. Some of the attributes we look at are the same as those found in the West, such as sex, education, income, and age. Others, though different from the West, have a sociological logic similar to that of attributes studied elsewhere. For example, being a Party member is a measure of elite status. Membership in a state unit is an indicator of economic privilege and high social status. Urban household registration signals the right to live in the cities, where conditions are better and most residents have access to social services not available in the countryside.[39]

[39] Type of household registration is not a measure of actual place of residence. However, those registered in the cities tend to live in cities, while those registered in rural areas either live in rural areas or are in the cities temporarily, without access to the privileges accorded urban residents. Sulamith Heins Potter and Jack M. Potter, *China's Peasants: The Anthropology of a Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), chap. 15.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' ATTRIBUTES AND ISSUE AGENDAS*

	Tiananmen Agenda	*Reform Agenda*	*Economic Welfare Agenda*	*Foreign Policy Agenda*
Household registration[a]	.17	.20	−.33	.09
Sex[b]	.24	.20	.22	−.16
Age	−.18	−.17	−.17	.15
Education[c]	.38	.37	−.44	.26
Family income[d]	.15	.16	−.21	.12
Party member[e]	.16	.14	−.16	.12
Occupation[f]	.19	.25	−.25	.13
State unit[g]	.21	.23	−.32	.13

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

* All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

[a] Household registration: 1 if urban household registration, 0 if rural household registration.

[b] Sex: 1 if male, 0 if female.

[c] Education: by years of formal schooling.

[d] Family income: by yuan.

[e] Party member: 1 if member of Communist Party of China, 0 if not.

[f] Occupation: 1 if white collar, 0 if other.

[g] State Unit: 1 if respondent reported working at state organization or state-owned enterprise, 0 if working at collective or other kind of enterprises.

For each attribute, the size of the correlation coefficient is a measure of how strongly the attribute influences a respondent's tendency to be concerned with the items that make up each agenda. The stronger the correlation, the more intense the social cleavage around that issue agenda, that is, the more sharply persons who differ along the particular social dimension differ in the priority they assign to the issue agenda.

All the correlations are statistically significant, and several are strong. Education is the most powerful predictor of issue priorities. Type of work unit is the second strongest correlate. Household registration, sex, and the other variables also have moderate effects on the choice of issue concerns.

However, there is a tendency for many of these factors to reinforce one another. For example, a person with more education is more likely to be young, male, and have more income. A multiple regression analysis, shown in Table 4, distinguishes how each attribute functions separately. The standardized regression coefficients (betas) measure the relative strength of each variable in affecting respondents' choice of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 4
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS' ATTRIBUTES ON ISSUE AGENDAS

	Tiananmen Agenda		*Reform Agenda*		*Economic Welfare Agenda*		*Foreign Policy Agenda*	
	Co-efficient	Beta	Co-efficient	Beta	Co-efficient	Beta	Co-efficient	Beta
Household registration[a]	07	.03	.12	.06**	−.35	−.18***	−.03	−.01
Sex[b]	.28	.15***	.20	.11***	−.16	−.07***	.15	.09***
Age	−.00	−.06***	−.00	−.08***	.01	.13***	−.00	−.09***
Education[c]	.06	.25***	.05	.20***	−.05	−.24***	.03	.15**
Family income[d]	.00	.03	.00	.04**	−.00	−.03*	.00	.05**
Party member[e]	.21	.07***	.17	.05***	−.18	−.06***	.21	.07***
Occupation[f]	.07	.02	.29	.10***	−.11	−.04**	.07	.26
State unit[g]	.11	.05**	.11	.05**	−.13	−.07***	.07	.03
Constant	−.45		−.41		.60		−.11	
R Squared		.17		.17		.24		.08
N=2,727								

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

* =significant at .1 level; **=significant at .05 level; ***=significant at .01 level.

[a] Household registration: 1 if urban household registration, 0 if rural household registration.

[b] Sex: 1 if male, 0 if female.

[c] Education: by years of formal schooling.

[d] Family income: by yuan.

[e] Party member: 1 if member of Communist Party of China, 0 if not.

[f] Occupation: 1 if white collar, 0 if other.

[g] State unit: 1 if respondent reported working at state organization or state-owned enterprise, 0 if working at collective or other kind of enterprises.

issue agendas. Education is the attribute that most strongly influences the choice of issue agenda, and it does so consistently across all four agendas. This suggests that differences in cognitive sophistication play a major role in determining the ideological alignments of Chinese citizens, even after taking account of the privileged social position of many educated citizens.

The next three most influential variables reflect the importance of social interest. Different variables more strongly affect different agendas. Sex is the second strongest factor affecting adherence to both the Tiananmen and Reform Agendas; men are more concerned with these sets of issues than are women. Household registration and age are the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second and third strongest factors influencing adherence to the Economic Welfare Agenda; rural residents and older people place relatively high priority on this agenda.

When the four variables mentioned so far are controlled, the effects of the remaining variables are nearly all statistically significant. Some of them are quite strong, in particular, the tendency (1) of party members to be more concerned about all four agendas, (2) of persons in more prestigious occupations to be strongly concerned with the Reform Agenda, and (3) of employees of state units to be concerned with the Economic Welfare Agenda.

The most important feature of Tables 3 and 4 is the sign of the coefficients. A positive sign indicates that those concerned with the given agenda tend to measure one way on that attribute; a negative sign indicates that they measure the other. Thus, a positive sign on household registration indicates urban registration, a negative sign rural; a positive sign on sex indicates male, a negative sign female; a positive sign on age indicates an older group, a negative sign a younger group; and so on. For each variable in both tables (except for age and sex in Table 3 and the statistically insignificant relationship between foreign policy and household registration in Table 4),[40] the sign for the Economic Welfare Agenda is the opposite of that for the other three agendas. This means that with respect to the four agendas, the Chinese public divides into two constituencies with opposite characteristics.

One of the constituencies is relatively more urban, male, young, and well educated; it has above-average family incomes, contains more Party members than the other constituency, tends to work in white-collar occupations and to be employed in state units. This group is disproportionately concerned with the Tiananmen Agenda and the Reform Agenda. It wants more government leadership in attacking the problems of corruption, crime, bureaucratism, and inflation, and it favors more attention to economic and political reform. This constituency is critical of government performance yet supportive of reform. In the Chinese context, it is relatively liberal. (It is also interested in the Foreign Policy Agenda. But we know from Table 1 that interest in the Foreign Policy Agenda is not strong, and Table 3 shows that this agenda divides the two constituencies more weakly than the other two. We therefore drop it from the rest of the analysis.)

[40] And except for the statistically insignificant relationship between foreign policy and household registration in Table 4, Table 4 is a better guide than Table 3 to the impact of age and sex on selection of agendas, because it shows their effects when other variables are controlled.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second constituency has relatively more members with the opposite characteristics: rural, female, older, less educated, with lower incomes, without party membership, and working in nonstate units. This group is most concerned with the Economic Welfare Agenda. It is uneasy about the impact of reform on jobs, housing, incomes, and subsidies, and it does not support accelerated reform. In the Chinese context, it is relatively conservative.

The attributes that divide the two constituencies are partly the same as and partly different from those that divide left and right in the West. But more importantly, the divisions make sense in terms of the same theory that explains ideological alignments in the West.

First, socioeconomic interest explains why the constituency for the Tiananmen and Reform Agendas consists of the relative winners from reform, while backers of the Economic Welfare Agenda are those who have been most vulnerable to the costs of reform.[41] Although inflation, corruption, and the decline of government services have affected everyone (as Table 1 shows), they hit hardest those of lower social and economic status, who perceive themselves as more in need of the kind of government protection characteristic of the old system and who are less equipped to take advantage of the market economy that is emerging under the reforms.

Reform dissolved the rural commune system and left village residents to fend for themselves in the market, while urban residents continue to have access to social benefits denied rural residents. Women lost some of the protection they had enjoyed under the old system, in which the government supported relative equality of the sexes; they are now openly discriminated against, especially in the growing private and collective enterprise sector. Older people have seen their guarantees of lifetime employment threatened and their pensions eroded; many lack the energy and skills to take advantage of the new opportunities that reform offers.

Persons with lower educational levels lack the training and connections to get ahead in the new order. Those with lower incomes lack the capital to get started in business. Party members have the connections to get ahead, and some can use their positions to benefit from the corruption that reform has generated. Members of state units, with their privileged employment status, have less need to worry about jobs, sub-

[41] For similar arguments about the former USSR, see Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 86 (December 1992); and Arthur H. Miller, Vicki L. Hesli, and William M. Reisinger, "Reassessing Mass Support for Political and Economic Change in the Former USSR," in *American Political Science Review* 88 (June 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sidies, housing, and the like. The fact that those without privileged access to state benefits show greater concern with the Economic Welfare Agenda reflects the fact that reform has subjected them to risk and deprivation. In short, those social groups who have been relative gainers in the reform process are more concerned with the general public agendas of Tiananmen and Reform. Those who have been relative losers because of the reform process have been more concerned with the personal damage they have suffered.

As sometimes happens in the West, cognitive sophistication reinforces the operation of economic interest by making those who are likely to be liberal even more likely to be liberal. While both constituencies are critical of the present state of affairs, the better educated tend to look at the problems generated by reform in a way that goes beyond immediate personal interest and to see them in terms of broad public issues. They are more likely to understand how indirect measures like further reform can over the long run solve immediate problems like housing, jobs, income distribution, and satisfaction of consumer needs more effectively than can state intervention aimed directly at these issues. The better educated—more advantaged by reform and so more liberal—are also more willing to trade material benefits for ideological values and to trade immediate benefits for long-term benefits.

In short, there were two distinct issue constituencies in the Chinese mass public in 1990. Although they were not replicas of the classic Western left-right constituencies, they resembled them in certain ways. To the extent that they differed from Western constituencies, they did so in ways that can be explained by the same logic of interest and cognition that explains ideological alignments in the West.

Democratic Values

We turn finally to our third ideological dimension, attitudes toward democracy. Does the pattern of cleavage over democratic values fall along the same ideological spectrum just identified or crosscut it? Our data permit us to answer this question by looking at democratic attitudes and also at two related sets of attitudes, social liberalism and procedural liberalism.[42]

[42] These sets of questions touch on what Flanagan calls the "authoritarian-liberal" dimension. Our questions are not the same as his because we designed the questionnaire to collect information on public attitudes to certain specific issues of concern to us. Our 1993 questionnaire includes a "traditionalism" battery that incorporates some of Flanagan's items and others analogous to his. Scott Flanagan, "Value Change in Industrial Societies," *American Political Science Review* 81 (December 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Using an agree-disagree format, we posed six statements about attitudes toward democracy.[43] The pattern of responses is displayed in Table 5. We also asked six questions about attitudes toward women (social liberalism) and two about criminal procedure (procedural liberalism), some of them in agree-disagree format.[44] The pattern of responses is shown in Tables 6 and 7.

The responses to these questions contain several points of interest. On democracy, the public's responses would be unexpected in the West but make sense in China. Democracy is understood by most Chinese not as a system of competition and participation, but as a term for the good polity, one that is fair, egalitarian, stable, and honest. What legitimizes government is not pluralism and participation but moral rectitude and administrative performance.[45] The majorities who want "more democracy" want government that is more honest and responsive. They would like top city officials to be elected instead of appointed, because current mayors are often viewed as remote and corrupt. But at the same time substantial minorities fear that too much pluralism will give rise to ideological and social disorder. And only a tiny number are willing to dispense with CCP leadership.[46]

[43] The statements were

—If there are too many political parties in a country, it will lead to political chaos.
—If people's ideas are not united, there will be chaos in society.
—Broadening the scope of democracy in our country now would affect stability.
—It is now very necessary to broaden the scope of democracy in our country.
—The realization of democracy in our country depends upon the leadership of the party.
—Some people believe heads of cities (counties) should be elected by the people, others believe they should be appointed by the higher authorities. What do you think?

[44] The questions were

—Do you care if you do not have a son?
—A couple has been married many years, but their feelings all along were incompatible, and the wife has fallen in love with another man. Some people think that under this type of situation, it should be permitted for the couple to divorce; some people think it should not be permitted for them to divorce. What is your opinion?
—If your unmarried son wanted to marry a divorced woman, would you approve?
—If your immediate supervisor were a woman, would you feel annoyed?
—The educational level of a wife should not be higher than her husband's.
—The salary of a wife should not be more than her husband's.
—Ruthless criminals should be punished immediately, without having to follow complicated legal procedures.
—When trying a major case, the judge should solicit the opinions of the local government.

[45] Nathan (fn. 28); this interpretation gains support from the fact that the same constituency supports pro-democratic attitudes and the Tiananmen Agenda, as we are about to show.

[46] We acknowledge the possibility that respondents were afraid to withhold agreement from this proposition, since CCP leadership is one of Deng Xiaoping's "four basic principles," which every Chinese citizen is supposed to support. This analysis should not be taken to imply that Chinese political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 5
OPINIONS ON DEMOCRACY
(%)

Issues	*Pro-democracy*	*Antidemocracy*	*Don't Know*
More democracy will lead to chaos (disagree)	37.7	22.4	39.9
Multiple parties will cause political chaos (disagree)	29.5	35.7	34.7
Different thinking will lead to chaos (disagree)	32.2	43.0	24.8
Heads of cities should be elected (agree)	67.8	21.6	10.6
China needs more democracy now (agree)	54.8	6.0	39.3
China's democracy depends on CCP's leadership (disagree)	1.7	76.1	22.2
N=2,896			

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

TABLE 6
SOCIAL ATTITUDES
(%)

Issues	*Liberal*	*Conservative*	*Don't Know*
Would you allow son to marry a divorced woman (yes)	46.0	38.5	15.6
Do you mind if supervisor is a woman (no)	81.2	5.3	13.5
Wife's educational level should be lower than husband's (no)	70.3	17.4	12.3
Wife's income should be lower than husband's (no)	75.0	15.5	9.5
Do you care if you do not have a son (no)	63.8	27.1	9.1
Should couple be able to divorce (yes)	55.0	33.8	11.2
N=2,896			

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

TABLE 7
ATTITUDES TOWARD DUE PROCESS
(%)

Issues	*Pro–Due Process*	*Ignore Due Process*	*Don't Know*
Punish without legal procedure	43.2	40.7	16.1
Judge should solicit opinions of local government	22.6	57.3	20.1
N=2,896			

SOURCE: China survey (1990)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Social attitudes show a consensus for liberal values that is surprisingly strong in light of the poor social and economic status of Chinese women.[47] Most people say they are willing to have a female supervisor and to allow their son to marry a divorced woman. Few say that they think a wife's income or education should be lower than her husband's. Since the Chinese population is still largely rural and has relatively low average educational levels, we suspect they have expressed politically correct responses rather than deeply rooted beliefs.[48]

By contrast, procedural liberalism is relatively weak. Faced with what they see as a crime wave, Chinese are not immune from the tendency found in mass publics elsewhere to be less liberal when they think about the rights of suspected criminals than when they think about other issues.[49] This fits with Chinese attitudes of intolerance toward proponents of unpopular political attitudes, which we have discussed elsewhere.[50] In short, liberalism in China is no more consistent a belief system than it is in the West.

In order to discover which sections of the public hold democratic and liberal values, we scaled respondents according to the number of democratic or liberal answers they gave for each set of issues[51] and then correlated the strength of pro-democratic attitudes with the same respondent attributes used in Table 3. The results are displayed in Table 8.

Table 8 displays the same pattern of correlations as the Tiananmen and Reform Agendas in Table 3. All three kinds of democratic/liberal attitudes are powerfully affected by education. Urbanites, males, and younger people tend to be more liberal on all three dimensions. Income, party membership, occupation, and unemployment in a state unit also contribute. The cleavage patterns on political democracy and

culture is inhospitable to democratization; cf. Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, "Cultural Requisites for Democracy in China: Findings from a Survey," *Daedalus* 122 (Spring 1993); and Andrew J. Nathan, "Is Chinese Culture Distinctive?" *Journal of Asian Studies* 52 (November 1993).

[47] For example, Elisabeth J. Croll, *Changing Identities of Chinese Women: Rhetoric, Experience, and Self-Perception in the Twentieth Century* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1995); Xiaoxian Gao, "China's Modernization and Changes in the Social Status of Rural Women," trans. S. Katherine Campbell, in Christina K. Gilmartin et al., eds., *Engendering China: Women, Culture, and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Margery Wolf, *Revolution Postponed: Women in Contemporary China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1985).

[48] We asked more questions about gender attitudes in our 1993 survey, which will enable us to test this hypothesis.

[49] McCloskey and Brill (fn. 11), chap. 4; James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22 (May 1960).

[50] Nathan and Shi (fn. 46).

[51] Factor analysis confirmed that the three sets of questions concern three different issue-areas, each of which emerged as a distinct factor. Thus, scaling is an appropriate technique here. The democracy and social liberalism scales ran from 1 to 6, and procedural liberalism from 1 to 2.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 8
CORRELATION BETWEEN RESPONDENTS' ATTRIBUTES AND DEGREE OF DEMOCRATISM

	Political	*Social*	*Procedural*
Household registration[a]	.25	.23	.23
Sex[b]	.28	.16	.18
Age	−.28	−.17	−.10
Education[c]	.49	.39	.34
Family Income[d]	.21	.15	.17
Party member[e]	.14	.13	.16
Occupation[f]	.25	.19	.21
State unit[g]	.29	.22	.23
N=2,896			

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

* All correlations are significant at the .001 level.

[a] Household registration: 1 if urban household registration, 0 if rural household registration.

[b] Sex: 1 if male, 0 if female.

[c] Education: by years of formal schooling

[d] Family income: by yuan.

[e] Party member: 1 if member of Communist Party of China, 0 if not.

[f] Occupation: 1 if white collar, 0 if other.

[g] State unit: 1 if respondent reported working at state organization or state-owned enterprise, 0 if working at collective or other kind of enterprise.

social and procedural liberalism are thus isomorphic with those on the reform issue dimension: the same kinds of people tend to array themselves in the same way along both dimensions. A pro-reform, pro-democratic constituency of the relatively privileged finds its complement in a relatively disadvantaged constituency that wants a return to state responsibility for economic welfare and withholds support from democratic values.

The multiple regression presented in Table 9 shows that all the variables have distinguishable effects but that education is by far the strongest, with sex, age, household registration, and party membership following. As in the United States, cognitive sophistication appears to play an even more important role in the choice of democratic/liberal attitudes than it does in the choice of issue agendas, with social interests having correspondingly less influence.[52] Respondents who are better educated, male, younger, more urban, and members of the party tend to be at once more knowledgeable about politics, better trained in official norms, and more tolerant and less authoritarian in their values.

[52] McCloskey and Brill (fn. 11); and Page and Shapiro (fn. 13).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 9
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS' ATTRIBUTES AND DEGREE OF DEMOCRATISM

	Political		*Social*		*Procedural*	
	Co-efficient	Beta	Co-efficient	Beta	Co-efficient	Beta
Household registration[a]	.31	.09***	.34	.10***	.14	.09***
Sex[b]	.58	.19***	.24	.07***	.14	.10***
Age	−.02	−.15***	−.01	−.05**	.00	−.02
Education[c]	.10	.27***	.11	.29***	.04	.23***
Family income[d]	.00	.05**	.00	.01	.00	.04**
Party member[e]	.19	.04**	.26	.05**	.15	.06***
Occupation[f]	.22	.05**	.09	.01	.09	.04*
State unit[g]	.27	.07***	.09	.02	.07*	.04*
Constant	1.41		2.9		.15	
R Squared	.29		.17		.15	
N=2,896						

SOURCE: China survey (1990).

* =significant at .1 level; **=significant at .05 level; ***=significant at .01 level.

[a] Household registration: 1 if urban household registration, 0 if rural household registration.

[b] Sex: 1 if male, 0 if female.

[c] Education: by years of formal schooling.

[d] Family income: by yuan.

[e] Party member: 1 if member of Communist Party of China, 0 if not.

[f] Occupation: 1 if white collar, 0 if other.

[g] State unit: 1 if respondent reported working at state organization or state-owned enterprise, 0 if working at collective or other kind of enterprise.

Even though most members of this group are relatively privileged under the current political system, they probably expect Chinese-style democracy to open the system to even greater influence by people like themselves.

CONCLUSION: AN EMERGING CLEAVAGE STRUCTURE

Both constituencies we have identified were nostalgic for some aspects of the Maoist past, but the first group wished for the era of honest government and stable prices, the second for the time when government provided jobs, housing, and incomes. Liberals tended to blame the government for corruption and inflation; were eager to see more progress on reform; and held relatively tolerant, pro-democratic political, social, and procedural attitudes. Conservatives were dissatisfied with the shrinking role of government in solving citizens' individual economic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and social problems; did not place a high priority on reform; and held relatively nondemocratic and nonliberal attitudes.

Socioeconomic interest and cognitive sophistication explain how citizens aligned themselves on the issues that confronted them. The predictor variables do not work exactly as they do in the West. The impact of education on issue priorities and values is so powerful that it should be understood as not just a surrogate variable for class and cognitive sophistication, as in the West, but as additionally marking a status and role gap between the mass of people and the educated minority that the Chinese call "intellectuals." People in this category, conventionally including anyone who went to college, consider themselves collectively responsible for the fate of the nation. Their sense of a special role probably shapes their response to questions about issues facing the nation.

The urban-rural gap is also especially important in China, defining a wider range of differences than it does in the West. Mao's regime created a castelike division between rural and urban residents to make possible the accumulation of capital from the rural sector for industrial development. Rural residents remain radically disadvantaged today. The role of work-unit type and party membership also reflect distinctive Chinese institutional dynamics—the tradition of lifetime employment in state units with cradle-to-grave benefits, and the small size and total political dominance of the Chinese Communist Party. But however distinctive they are, the impact of all the predictor variables can be deciphered with social-interest and cognitive logics that are as valid in China as in the West.

We found no parallel for Lipset and Rokkan's center-periphery cleavage when we coded respondents on a coastal-inland dimension. Since regional identities are important in China, this deserves further research; different coding might produce stronger results. Nor are religious cleavages important in shaping the distribution of political attitudes across the population as a whole. Although religious issues animate political movements in Tibet, Mongolia, and Xinjiang, and there are sizable Catholic and Protestant communities at odds with the state, 92 percent of our respondents described themselves as not religious.

The attitudinal and sociological structure of the Chinese mass public today provides the context within which future political change will take place. As in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and as in Russia and Eastern Europe in the twentieth, so in China in the twenty-first, the social cleavages of the past are likely to shape the political system of the future. The cleavages we have described are statistical tendencies rather than structured groups. As China moves to-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ward more openness, the issue agendas are likely to become contested issues and the issue constituencies are likely to become interest groups. When and if a multiparty system forms, the constituencies may form party coalitions. With appropriate adjustments, the issue agendas may become their platforms. Deng Xiaoping's reform may thus have bequeathed to China not only a soft transition to the market but also the beginnings of relatively clear, institutionalized, interest-based cleavages that can either shape a post-Deng authoritarian-corporatist structure or undergird a democratic party system if one should emerge.

Appendix

This analysis is based on a survey conducted in December 1990, in cooperation with the Social Survey Research Center of People's University of China (SSRC). The sample was designed to be representative of the adult population over eighteen years old residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibet Autonomous Region.[53] A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed to select the sample.

Since the political structure in the rural areas is different from that in urban areas, political culture and behavior in the countryside were expected to be different from those in cities and towns. In order to obtain separate estimates for rural and urban areas, we divided the whole population into two domains: the rural domain and the urban domain. Because only about 20 percent of the population hold urban household registrations, they were oversampled, and rural residents were undersampled. Poststratification weighting technique was used to correct for household registration, age, and sex, while preserving the original sample N. This created a valid national sample consistent with the 1990 census 10 percent sample.[54]

The primary sampling units (PSUs) employed were *xian* (counties) for the rural domain and *shi* (cities) for the urban domain. Before selection, counties were stratified by region and geographical characteristics and cities by region and size. The secondary sampling units (SSUs)

[53] We decided to exclude Tibet from this study for a number of reasons. Transportation there is difficult since there is no railroad and the highway system is not well developed. Many Tibetans do not speak Chinese. And it is difficult to find qualified interviewers to work there.

[54] Guowuyuan renkou pucha bangongshi (State Council, Population Census Office), *Zhongguo 1990 nian renkou pucha 10% chouyang ziliao* (Ten percent sample data of China's 1990 census), elecronic data edition, ed. Guojia tongjiju renkou tongjisi (Beijing: State Statistical Bureau Office of Population Statistics, 1990).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were *xiang* (townships) in rural areas and *qu* (districts) or *jiedao* (streets) in urban areas. The third stage of selection was villages in the rural domain and *juweihui* (residents' committees) in the urban domain. For both domains, households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

In the selection of PSUs, national population data for 1986 acquired from the Ministry of Public Security were used as the database to construct the sampling frame.[55] The number of family households for each county or city was taken as the measure of size (MOS) in the PPS selection process.

For the subsequent stages of sampling, population data were obtained from local public security bureaus or governments. At the village and residents' committee levels, lists of *hukou* (household registrations) were obtained from police stations. In places without household registration, lists were obtained by field count.

The project interviewed 3,200 people, and 2,896 questionnaires were collected, which represents a response rate of 90.5 percent.

The survey instrument was constructed in the United States and pretested in Beijing in December 1988. After thorough analysis of the pretest, we revised the questionnaire. College students of sociology and statistics were employed as field interviewers. Before the fieldwork, project members went to China to train the interviewers in field interviewing techniques.

[55] Ministry of Public Security of the PRC, ed., *Quanguo fenxianshi renkou tongji ziliao, 1986* (Population statistics by city and county of the People's Republic of China, 1986) (Beijing: Ditu chubanshe, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PERSONAL NETWORKS AND POSTREVOLUTIONARY STATE BUILDING

Soviet Russia Reexamined

By GERALD M. EASTER

WHY do some state-building efforts succeed and others fail? This question may seem to be a throwback for comparative politics, but in fact recent world events have refocused attention on precisely this issue. The collapse of communism across the nations and regions of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has precipitated a resurgence of state-building activity unmatched in intensity and scope since the breakup of the colonial empires a half century ago.

This study contributes to the recent efforts of comparativists to extend the explanatory reach of state-building theory by redirecting attention to microlevel forces. Specifically, the study contends that personal networks provide an informal social structure, which under postrevolutionary conditions may facilitate successful state building. To test the utility of this contention, the study revisits a case once considered among the most successful state-building experiences of the twentieth century: postrevolutionary Soviet Russia.

The reexamination of this case is especially interesting at this time for several reasons. First, Soviet Russia was a paradigmatic case for some of the more influential comparative theories of state building, yet recent empirical findings have challenged the premises of the once conventional view. Second, the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet state has invited a reconsideration of the underlying sources of support in a strong state. And finally, with the opening of previously closed archives in Russia, scholars now have access to a store of previously untapped empirical data on the state-building process.

World Politics 48 (July 1996), 551–78

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I. State Building, Personal Networks, and Soviet Russia: Theoretical Issues

Comparative Politics and State Building

A decade and a half ago political comparativists refocused their research efforts on the state. The advocates of "bringing the state back in" were reacting to a perceived neglect of the causal role of state institutional structures in shaping political outcomes.[1] To many comparativists, the "statists" appeared to be staking out their claim by exaggerating and polemicizing their differences with the "behavioralists."[2] Moreover, the emphasis on a state-society dichotomy became an easy target for critics. Bob Jessop, for example, dismissed the state-society dichotomy as a "common-place distinction" with "superficial" and "misleading appeal."[3]

Despite such criticisms, comparative research on the state thrived in the 1980s.[4] The efforts soon produced more nuanced conceptualizations of the state as a causal agent and greater sensitivity to the interactions between state and society. Michael Mann's influential article distinguishing a state's "despotic," or decision-making, powers from its "infrastructural," or implementation, powers brought some needed clarity to the discussion.[5] From this distinction emerged a focus on state capacities, or capabilities, which offered more concrete subject matter for analysis. Capacities referred to functions of the early modern state concerning territorial administration, military-coercive power, and revenue extraction, as well as the later developed socioeconomic functions.[6]

Studies of state building increasingly sought to determine the extent to which central, or strategic, state actors were able to develop enduring institutional forms through which these capacities could be realized.[7]

[1] See, for example, Stephen Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); and Eric Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

[2] Gabriel Almond, *A Discipline Divided: Schools and Sects in Political Science* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1989), chap. 8.

[3] Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Their Place* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 2.

[4] For an excellent overview of this literature, see Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[5] Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," in John Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[6] The classic definition is found in Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Interpretive Outline of Sociology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 2:901–5.

[7] Among the many good examples of this work, see Charles Tilly, ed., *Formation of the National*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scholars tended to gauge state capacity in "high-low" terms: states that developed a high capacity to perform these activities independent of societal influences were labeled "strong" states, whereas states that maintained a low capacity to perform these activities were labeled "weak" states.[8] It was commonly found that most states exhibited high capacities in some areas and low capacities in other areas.[9]

To explain state-building outcomes, the literature tended to stress macrolevel causes, with the structure of the international environment frequently cited as a main determinant of state-building processes. Accordingly, the more hostile the international environment appeared to centrally located state actors, the greater the likelihood that measures would be undertaken to construct a strong state, or at least a state with well-developed coercive and extractive capacities.[10] Likewise, it was argued that strong states were more likely to emerge in societies where macrolevel social and economic structures acted as obstacles to industrial development.[11] But it was exactly on the issue of causes and outcomes that the state-building literature spawned a new set of questions and criticisms, even among those sympathetic to the approach. Barbara Geddes aptly noted that "the short-coming of these macro-level explanations is that they describe virtually all developing countries"[12]

States of Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Vivienne Shue, *The Reaches of the State: Sketches of the Chinese Politic* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988); John Brewer, *Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Lisa Anderson, *The State and Social Transformation in Libya and Tunisia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986); Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Stephen Skorownek, *Building a New American State: Expansion of National Administrative Capacities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); and Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in England and France* (Oxford: Oxford University, 1986).

[8] Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Societal Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 4–7. A good critique of the way in which comparativists have attempted to measure state capacity is Robert Jackman, *Power without Force: The Political Capacity of Nation-States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), chap. 3. Robert Putnam has recently developed a more sophisticated comparative measurement of institutional performance, which includes comprehensiveness, internal consistency, reliability, and correspondence to objectives. See Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 3.

[9] R. Kent Weaver and Bert Rockman, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993); G. John Ikenberry, *Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of the American Government* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

[10] Skocpol (fn. 1), 19–33; and John Hall and G. John Ikenberry, *The State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

[11] Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation," in Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (fn. 4); and Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[12] Geddes, "Building State Autonomy in Brazil, 1931–1964," *Comparative Politics* 22 (January 1990), 217.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparativists are now exploring new areas in an effort to extend the explanatory reach of state-building theory. This search has led to a reconceptualization of the state as a microlevel unit of analysis. Toward this end, Margaret Levi called for "bringing people back into the state," specifically, revenue-hungry rulers.[13] Geddes, meanwhile, proposed a conceptualization of the state as a collection of politically self-interested individuals.[14] According to this approach, all state actors confront the "politician's dilemma," in which policy choices are constrained by patterns of power acquisition.

Wary of the tendency for reification in the "state as rational actor" approach, Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue have pushed the literature in another direction. They argued for a "state in society" approach so as "to disaggregate" the state as a unit of analysis and to resituate its component parts in concrete social settings.[15] This approach conceptualizes the state as a four-tiered structure consisting of central leadership, central administration, regional administration, and field offices. Each tier provides its own set of arenas within which power struggles are waged among various state and nonstate actors. Ultimately, the overall "patterns of domination" in the state-societal relationship are shaped by the outcomes of these power struggles in the different arenas. This paper follows in a similar direction.

State Building and Soviet Russia

The Russian Revolution was notable for the relative ease with which Vladimir Lenin and his small party of radical socialists, the Bolsheviks, came to power in October 1917. The process of consolidating power in new institutional forms, however, was conflictual and prolonged. Soviet state capacities were developed incrementally over a period of two decades. Why the Soviet Russian state developed along the lines it did remains a disputed question in Western scholarship. A different question, however, is why Bolshevik state-building efforts were successful, given the formidable array of obstacles confronting the postrevolutionary regime. Even Lenin at first doubted that a Bolshevik state would prevail in Russia.

For more than two decades there was virtual consensus among West-

[13] Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

[14] Geddes, *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).

[15] Migdal, Kohli, and Shue, eds., *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), introduction, chap. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern scholars on the question of the success of Soviet state building. They stressed strong leadership, coercion, and, especially, formal organization.[16] According to this view, by the early 1920s the Communist Party provided the state center with a tightly organized and centralized structure for administering Soviet Russia's vast periphery. On top of this apparatus sat the party's general secretary, Iosif Stalin, whose hands were in firm control of the organizational levers of power. "The tentacles of the Secretariat," it was said, "reached into the smallest territorial units throughout Russia."[17]

This depiction by area specialists of the means by which a strong state was constructed in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia was incorporated into the comparative theoretical literature on state building. Indeed, two of the most influential studies in comparative politics over the past thirty years borrowed directly from the Soviet studies literature to support the argument that formal organizational structure was necessary for successful state building.

Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* preceded the "return to the state" in comparative politics by a decade, but his focus on "political order" is, in fact, a study of the dilemmas encountered by new states seeking to develop their capacities to rule. Huntington held up the Soviet case as a model of effective political institution building for other modernizing countries; he stressed, in particular, the role of formal organization. "The relative success of communist states in providing political order," he wrote, "in large part derives from the priority they have given to the conscious act of political organization."[18] Theda Skocpol's *States and Social Revolutions* likewise presented Soviet state building as a success. While Skocpol pointed to macrolevel international and socioeconomic structures to explain the emergence of a strong state in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia, she also adopted the conventional area studies argument that formal organization was the means to that end. She noted that the Communist Party "consisted of hierarchically ordered cadres subject to appointment and

[16] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955); Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); Robert Daniels, "The Secretariat and the Local Organizations in the Russian Communist Party, 1921–1923," *American Slavonic and East European Review* 6 (March 1957); and Robert Service, *Bolshevik Party in Revolution: A Study in Organizational Change, 1917–1923* (London: Macmillan, 1979). A notable exception, which pointed out the shortcomings in the organizational structure of the center, was Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[17] Adam Ulam, *Stalin: The Man and His Era* (New York: Viking, 1973), 258, 259.

[18] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 1, 137, 336–41, quote at 400. Huntington followed theses remarks by directly quoting from Schapiro's study.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

explicit discipline by the top Party leadership, thus allowing much more effective central coordination than the tsar could achieve."[19]

Comparative state-building theory, however, has not kept pace with new findings in Soviet area studies. Empirical investigations of the past ten years have revealed anything but a tightly organized and centrally coordinated party structure outside Moscow for well over a decade after the revolution.[20] In a comprehensive study of local politics during the 1920s, Roger Pethyridge expressed what is now the prevailing view among area specialists concerning the new state's formal organizational structures in the periphery: "Chaos reigned. Orders arrived from higher authorities in a raw form . . . (t)hey were not often understood and so ignored."[21]

But if functioning centralized organizations were the exception and not the norm in the Soviet periphery, then a major question is left unanswered for both area specialists and comparative theorists: how did this "infrastructurally" weak state just over a civil war manage to carry out a comprehensive campaign for radical economic reform by decade's end? For all the mass economic dislocation and social resistance incurred by the campaign, not only did the regime survive, but it was also able to build the foundations and framework for its command-administrative economic system.

Among area specialists, this question provoked a debate between adherents of the conventional view, who stressed organizational forces from above, and a new generation of "revisionists," who stressed social forces from below.[22] While the revisionist arguments exposed the explanatory limits of the once conventional view of Soviet state building, their emphasis on forces from below did not become the basis for a new consensus. Commenting on this theoretical impasse in the field, Mark Von Hagen observed that "the boundaries between state and society are not so neatly fixed. This is true everywhere, but it is perhaps especially clear in the Soviet Union." He urged scholars instead to examine "a large middle ground of social groups and political formations" that directly shaped Soviet state-building processes.[23]

[19] Skocpol (fn. 1), 162, 215, quote at 226.

[20] J. Arch Getty, *Origin of the Great Purges* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Roger Pethyridge, *One Step Backwards, Two Steps Forward* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Graeme Gill, *Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); James Hughes, *Stalin, Siberia, and the Crisis of the New Economic Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

[21] Pethyridge (fn. 20), 294.

[22] The classic treatment is Sheila FitzPatrick, *Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

[23] See Von Hagen's review article in *Slavic Review* 48 (Winter 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the earlier assumptions about formal organizational structure were in error, then what factor does explain the success of Soviet state-building efforts? In proposing an answer, this study follows Von Hagen and argues that informal personal networks played a significantly larger role in Soviet Russia's state-building process than has previously been recognized. The infrastructural weaknesses of the postrevolutionary state were eventually overcome by the *intersection* of informal social structures and formal political organizations. Certainly, scholars of communist political systems have long been aware of the workings of personal networks within established political and economic institutional settings.[24] By contrast, the role of personal networks in the process of institution building has gone largely unnoticed.[25]

State Building and Personal Networks

State-building efforts often occur in contexts marked by the breakdown of long-established and widely accepted political roles. Under such conditions, personalistic relations can provide the basis for new institutional forms. Comparativists, for example, have readily noted cases in which charismatic authority and patrimonialism have shaped institution-building processes.[26] Less attention, however, has been devoted to personal networks.[27] In this study, the term *personal network* is similar to Warner and Lunt's definition of a clique, that is, a nonkinship, in-

[24] Fainsod (fn. 16), 236, 237; C. M. Hann, *Tazlar: A Village in Hungary* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); John Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); T. H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw, *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); Jerry Hough, *Soviet Prefects: Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Andrew Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Jean Oi, *State and Peasant in Contemporary China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[25] A notable exception was Gill (fn. 20), 44, 128, 129, 217. But Gill ultimately concluded that informal relations undermined the process of institution building in the new state.

[26] For charismatic authority, see Weber (fn. 6), 2:1111–23; for patrimonialism, see Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," *World Politics* 20 (January 1968).

[27] A personal network is distinguishable from charismatic relations in that it is not a leader-follower relationship, and it is distinguishable from patrimonialism in that it is not based on mutual obligation. A personal network does not by definition exhibit structural inequality in the connecting "ties," as it would in these other two types. In this case, personal networks originated with peerlike ties of camaraderie, based on shared experiences in the illegal underground and in the civil war. As network ties became enmeshed with the formal organizational structures of the new state, some network ties began to exhibit more of a hierarchical structure.

David Knoke has distinguished between "influence" networks, in which information is exchanged among relatively equal members, and "domination" networks, in which scarce goods are controlled in unequal relationships. See Knoke, *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 11–16. Personal networks in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia exhibited elements of both types of networks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

formal association, within which exists group feeling and intimacy, as well as group norms of behavior.[28] Network analysis is the attempt to uncover the microlevel social ties that exist within a macrolevel social or institutional complex. According to Barry Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, "network analysis is neither a method nor a metaphor, but a fundamental intellectual tool for the study of social structures."[29]

Network analysis has grown over the past three decades in Western social science. First elaborated in the 1950s and 1960s by British anthropologists investigating the sociological and psychological effects of urban in-migration, its findings challenged existing theories of "mass society."[30] In the 1970s and 1980s network analysis gained prominence among American sociologists who used new quantitative techniques to reveal the underlying social relationships that accounted for the otherwise seemingly "hidden hand" of economic markets.[31] By contrast, American political science has moved more slowly to employ network analysis.[32]

The power elite approach popularized in the 1950s by C. Wright Mills and Floyd Hunter is considered by some to be a forerunner of network analysis of policy-making.[33] In the 1970s network studies of community power structures demonstrated that local actors informally connected by overlapping organizational and social memberships are decidedly more successful in influencing policy outcomes than are "nonconnected" local actors.[34] More recently, network analysis has been

[28] W. Lloyd Warner and P. S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941); see also John Scott, *Social Network Analysis* (London: Sage Publications, 1991), 16–26.

[29] Barry Wellman and S. D. Berkowitz, "Introduction: Studying Social Structures," in Wellman and Berkowitz, eds., *Social Structures: A Network Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 4.

[30] The pioneers of this approach were J. A. Barnes, "Class and Committees in a Norwegian Fishing Parish," *Human Relations* 7, no. 1 (1954); and Elizabeth Both, *Family and Social Network* (London: Tavistock, 1957). Some of the best-known works are represented in J. Clyde Mitchell, ed., *Social Networks in Urban Situations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1969).

[31] The work of Harrison White has been at the forefront of this effort; see White, "Where Do Markets Come From?" *American Journal of Sociology* 87 (November 1981); Ron S. Burt, *Corporate Profits and Cooptation: Networks of Market Constraints and Directorate Ties in the American Economy* (New York: Academic Books, 1983); and Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (May 1973).

[32] Knoke (fn. 27) is a notable exception.

[33] Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956); and Hunter, *Community Power Structure* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

[34] Robert Perucci and Marc Pilisuk, "Leaders and Ruling Elites: The Interorganizational Bases of Community Power," *American Sociological Review* 35 (December 1970); Edward Laumann and Franz Pappi, *Networks of Collective Action: A Perspective on Community Influence Systems* (New York: Academic Press, 1976); and Joseph Galaskiewicz, *Exchange Networks and Community Politics* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979). Their conclusions contrasted sharply with the images of power projected by pluralists. The classic example of a pluralist approach to community politics is Robert Dahl,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

employed to uncover the informal ties that cut across the realms of state and society to shape national policy-making processes. These studies conclude that national policy networks emerge from either bureaucratic or class interests and operate primarily to advance those interests.[35] While these policy-oriented studies focus on networks in established institutional settings, it is less common to find network analysis employed to study processes of institution building.

There are at least two reasons why network analysis has not made greater inroads in political science research. At a theoretical level, the assumptions of network analysis conflict with the conceptual premises of the more dominant pluralist, statist, and rational choice approaches. Moreover, at an empirical level, informal networks can be found beneath the flow charts of all formal organizations.[36] Because this makes for difficulty in discerning systematically which informal ties are more important and how their influence is manifested, there is a tendency to look past the role of personal network ties when trying to explain political outcomes.

This study attempts to uncover informal network ties and specify their modes of influence and thereby provide a new perspective on the state-building process in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia. Its working hypothesis argues that the structure of personal network ties affects a state's capacity for territorial administration. Two structural features are particularly significant in this regard: the reach of network ties and the location of core network members.[37] First, are network ties limited in reach, largely concentrated in a host region, or do they extend across the physical and institutional boundaries of the host region? Second, are core network members confined to a host region or have they relocated to the state center or another strategic position outside the host region? If the structure of network ties indicates a cross-regional reach and core network members have relocated to the center, then a state's capacity for territorial administration is enhanced. By contrast, if the

Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). See the critique of pluralism in G. William Domhoff, *Who Really Rules: New Haven and Community Power Re-Examined* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978).

[35] See the excellent case studies of health and energy policy formation in the Carter administration by Edward Laumann and David Knoke, *The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); and Michael Useem, *The Inner Circle* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[36] One of the early organizational theorists to make this observation was Chester Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937).

[37] A core network member is an individual with a high degree of "centrality" in the network. Centrality is simply a measure of the number of direct network ties of an individual member. Scott (fn. 28), 86.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

structure of network ties indicates a limited reach and core network members remain located within a host region, then a state's capacity for territorial administration is diminished. The assumption is that personal network ties provide an informal mechanism by which information and resources are exchanged, or perhaps withheld, which in turn directly affects a state's implementation powers in its periphery.

II. Personal Networks and Territorial Admininstration in Soviet Russia: The Transcaucasian Regional Network

Intersection of Informal and Formal Structures in the Postrevolutionary State: An Overview

Personal networks among the Bolsheviks originated as a survival strategy in the prerevolutionary underground and were later strengthened through a combination of circumstantial and instrumental factors in the postrevolutionary period. To begin, under Russia's old regime the Bolshevik Party was an illegal political organization and therefore had to conduct most of its activities through regional underground committees. As underground life was marked by the constant threat of police infiltration, most underground workers endured multiple arrests, which often entailed exile to remote Siberian settlements.[38] Survival dictated the observance of certain codes of behavior. Trust and reputation were essential attributes for underground workers, an aspect of underground existence that fostered an environment conducive to the formation of personal networks.[39]

Underground ties provided a social base for more elaborate personal networks during the civil war and became especially important in the Bolsheviks' effort to consolidate territorial holdings along the major battlefronts. In the wake of the Red Army's territorial advance, martial law was imposed by military-revolutionary committees headed by political commissars recruited from the prerevolutionary underground. Underground ties were employed by political commissars to establish a political foundation in the periphery, to provide rear-line support for the Red Army, and, on occasion, to engage in front-line fighting.

[38] See Ralph Elwood, *Russian Social-Democrats in the Underground* (Assen, Holland: Van Gorcum, 1974).

[39] Trust here refers to a system in which an intermediary acts to assure one actor of the performance reliability of another actor. For different systems of trust, see James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), chap. 8. For the importance of trust in the internal workings of illegal groups, see Diego Gambeta, ed., *Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, early patterns of provincial administration shaped personal networks.[40] The new state lacked the organizational resources to administer the periphery from the center. A survey of forty local party organs, conducted in October 1920, found that no two had the same internal organizational structure.[41] For over a decade, the informal social structures of personal networks substituted for a formal organizational structure in regional administration. Regional party leaders were empowered to appoint personnel, to manage finances, and to allocate goods. Personal network ties were thus strengthened as they became a means of access to scarce and valued resources. The center did not impose a formal functional division of labor on the internal structure of the regional party organs until the early 1930s.[42]

Toward the end of the civil war, members of regional personal networks began to move into political-administrative work. They did not, however, find employment in the local soviets, which at this time served as the center's preferred administrative organ for territorial administration.[43] In 1919 only one local soviet chairman, Valerian Kuibyshev in Samara, had ever belonged to the prerevolutionary underground. Network members found work instead in local party committees. Over the course of the 1920s, personal networks became embedded in the territorial party apparatus. As an indication of this process, between 1922 and 1924 the number of local party committee secretaries who had previously worked in the prerevolutionary underground rose from 52 percent to 71 percent.[44] By 1927 the number had increased to 78 percent.[45] By decade's end the party apparatus had emerged as the main institutional link between the center and the rural periphery.[46]

It was, however, not simply the movement of personal networks into local political organs that facilitated the extension of central administrative capacities to the periphery. Indeed, in the early 1920s informal

[40] See T. H. Rigby, "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin," *Soviet Studies* 38 (July 1986).

[41] *Izvestiia TsK RKP(b)*, no. 24 (1920).

[42] L. Maleiko, "Iz istorii razvitiia apparata partiinykh organov" (From the history of the development of the party apparat), *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (February 1976), 113–15.

[43] The center's efforts to work through the soviet structure was described by Iakov Sverdlov, who among the early Bolshevik state builders was considered "the organizational genius" of the revolution. See Sverdlov, *Izbrannye stat'i i rechi* (Collection of articles and speeches) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1939), 92.

[44] *Izvestiia TsK RKP(b)*, no. 3 (March 1922), 20; and *Trinadtsatyi s'ezd RKP(b): stenograficheskii otchet* (Thirteenth congress of RCP[b]: Stenographic report) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1963), 118.

[45] *Pianadtsatyi s'ezd VKP(b): stenograficheskii otchet* (Fifteenth congress of ACP [b]: Stenographic report) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1961), 1:115.

[46] Center-regional institutional relations evolved somewhat differently in industrial regions, where economic administrators emerged as powerful players in local politics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

network ties often acted to constrain the center's attempts to administer particular regions. In these regions the structure of network ties indicated limited reach and core members were located in the region. Efforts to uproot these regionally concentrated networks provoked protracted power struggles.[47] The new state's capacity for territorial administration was gradually enhanced as the structure of regional network ties changed during the 1920s. By the end of the decade, the structure indicated more extensive cross-regional reach and the relocation of core members to the center.

This process occurred in two successive stages at the regional and central levels. First, in the early 1920s new regional bureaus (*oblastnyi biuro*) were created to bridge the administrative gap between the center and the more distant regions. The regional bureaus consolidated large peripheral areas into single administrative-territorial units.[48] Regional bureaus were first formed in 1920 for the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Siberia, the Urals, and the Far East. They served as a model for a more comprehensive administrative-territorial reform implemented in the second half of the decade.[49] The first leaders of the regional bureaus were chosen from among the proven veterans of the prerevolutionary underground, who employed network ties to carry out the tasks of political consolidation.[50]

The second stage involved the promotion of regional leaders to the center. An examination of the individuals occupying the central leadership posts from the civil war period through the mid-1930s indicates the upward movement of regional network members.[51] Thus, between 1919 and 1925 of the twenty-six individuals who held central leadership positions, only five had been regional leaders. Between 1927 and 1934, however, fourteen of the twenty-three individuals occupying central leadership positions had been regional leaders.

[47] Anastas Mikoian, *V nachale dvadtsatykh* (In the beginning of the 1920s) (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), chap. 2.

[48] *Izvestiia TsK RKP(b)*, no. 33 (October 1921), 22.

[49] I. G. Aleksandrov, "Ekonomicheskoe raionirovanie rossii," in G. Krzhizhanovskii, ed., *Voprosy ekonomicheskogo raionirovaniia sssr: sbornik materialov i statei, 1917–1929 gg.* (Questions of the economic regionalization of the USSR: Handbook of materials and articles, 1917–1929) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1957).

[50] N. Petukhova, "Sozdanie oblastnykh biuro TsK RKP(b) i nekotorye storonye ikh deiatel'nosti, 1920–1922" (Creation of the regional bureaus of the CC RCP [b] and several aspects of their activities, 1920–1922), *Voprosy istorii KPSS* (April 1965).

[51] The central leadership refers to full and candidate members of the politburo, the main policy-making organ, and the secretariat, the organizational head of the territorial party apparatus. Regional leaders refers to individuals who worked for at least two years in a particular region during the civil war (1918–21) and/or the postwar political consolidation (1920–23).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As core network members moved to the center in the mid- to late 1920s, they named fellow network members to their regional leadership posts. In turn, these newly appointed regional leaders assumed responsibility for overseeing the lower levels of the administrative apparatus. Rather than severing network ties, then, this process of upward promotion took on a vertical dimension within the formal administrative structures of the state. Table 1 lists the first party secretaries, in 1929 and in 1934, of the major administrative-territorial regions beyond the central industrial region. Figure 1 then presents a matrix indicating the informal ties, which linked the 1929 and the 1934 regional leadership groups to the central leadership.[52]

This period saw an increase in the reach of informal network ties across formal territorial administrative lines. When informal network ties are taken into account, the image of constant change among the regional leadership at this time should be modified. The leadership changes in Table 1, for example, reveal that turnover was far more common in the non-Russian regions than in the Russian regions. But even in the non-Russian regions continuity existed in the informal connec-

[52] A network tie is determined by two criteria: (1) evidence of a working relationship (two or more years) in at least one of three milieus (prerevolutionary underground, civil war, postwar consolidation); and/or (2) evidence of friendship or family relationship. Below are the source materials used to determine the informal ties of the regional leadership listed in Figure 1. They include personal correspondence, memoirs, and biographies; RTsKhIDNI refers to the Russian Center for the Preservation and Investigation of Documents of Recent History.

—A. Andreev: RTsKhIDNI, f. 73, op. 1, d. 1–9; *Vospominaniia, pis'ma* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1985).
—L. Beria: RTsKhIDNI, f. 80, op. 24, d. 166, ll. 1, 2.
—R. Eikhe: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 2215, ll. 1–6; *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 7 (1965), 92–97.
—I. Gamarnik: *Vospominaniia druzei i soratnikov* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978).
—N. Gikalo: RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 15, d. 34, ll. 1–5; RTsKhIDNI, f. 80,op. 8, d. 25, ll. 3–9.
—F. Goloshchekin: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 484, ll. 1–12.
—A. Ikramov: RTsKhIDNI, f. 79, op. 1, d. 708, ll. 1–7; *Pravda*, April 9, 1964.
—L. Kartvelishvili: RTsKhIDNI, f. 80, op. 29, l. 1; f. 124, op. 1, d. 835, ll. 16–17.
—M. Khataevich: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 2043, ll. 2–6; *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 6 (1963), 98–101.
—S. Kosior: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 951, l. 1; *Vospominaniia, ocherki,stat'i* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1989).
—A. Kostanian: *Kommunist* (Erevan), July 28, 1967.
—A. Krinitskii: *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 12 (1964).
—L. Mirzoian: RTsKhIDNI, f. 80, op. 7, d. 3, l. 1; *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 1 (1965), 101–4.
—M. Orakhelashvili: RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 28, ll. 1–4; *Mamiia Orakhelashvili* (Tbilisi: Izdatel'stvo sabchota sakartvelo, 1986).
—I. Rumiantsev: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 1662, ll. 3–5.
—B. Semenov: *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 12 (1989), 110.
—B. Sheboldaev: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 2138, ll. 1, 2.
—V. Shubrikov: *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 12 (1989), p. 112.
—I. Vareikis: RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, 302, ll. 1–5; D. Lappo, *Iuozac Vareikis* (Voronezh: Tsentral'no-chernozemone izdatel'stvo, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
LEADERSHIP IN RURAL RUSSIAN AND NON-RUSSIAN REGIONS
(1929, 1934)

	First Party Secretary	
Region	*1929*	*1934*
1. Western	Rumiantsev	Rumiantsev
2. Central Black Earth	Vareikis	Vareikis
3. Lower Volga	Sheboldaev	Krinitskii
4. Middle Volga	Khataevich	Shubrikov
5. Urals	Kabakov	Kabakov
6. Siberia	Eikhe	Eikhe
7. Far East	na	Kartvelishvili
8. Ukraine	Kosior	Kosior
9. Belorussia	Gamarnik	Gikalo
10. Crimea	Kostanian	Semenov
11. North Caucasus	Andreev	Sheboldaev
12. Trans Caucasus	Orakhelashvili	Beria
13. Kazakhstan	Goloshchekin	Mirzoian
14. Uzbekistan	Ikramov	Ikramov

tions to the center. Nikolai Gikalo in Belorussia and Lev Mirzoian in Kazakhstan were both members of the Transcaucasian network and had personal ties with Orjonikidze and Kirov.[53] Meanwhile, other regional leaders were simply transferred horizontally, which did not sever their informal network ties to central actors. Mendel Khataevich (who does not appear on the 1934 list) moved from the Middle Volga to the Dnepropetrovsk province in Ukraine; and Boris Sheboldaev moved from the Lower Volga to the neighboring North Caucasus region.

This section sketched an overview of the intersection of informal network ties and formal organizational structures in the decade following the civil war. Notably, during these years the new state developed sufficient capacity for territorial administration to implement a program of radical economic reform. The next section focuses more specifically on how one set of informal network ties was employed in this process.

TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REGIONAL NETWORK

This section presents the findings of an investigation of the Transcaucasian regional network based mainly on archival sources previously

[53] *Voprosy istorii KPSS*, no. 1 (1965), 101–4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

	Andreev	Chubar	Kaganovich	Kalinin	Kirov	Kosior	Kuibyshev	Mikoian	Molotov	Orjonikidze	Petrovskii	Postyshev[b]	Rudzutak	Rykov[a]	Stalin	Syrtsov[a]	Voroshilov
Andreev[a]	X	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	X	0	0	0	0	0
Beria[b]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	X	0	X	0
Eikhe	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Gamarnik[a]	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	X	0	0	0	0	0
Gikalo[b]	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	X	0	X	0
Goloshchekin[a]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	X	0	0	0	0
Ikramov	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Kabakov	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kartvelishvili[b]	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	X	1	X	1
Khataevich[a]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	X	0	0	0	0	0
Kosior	0	1	1	0	0	X	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1
Kostanian[a]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	X	0	0	0	0	0
Krinitskii[b]	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X	0	X	0
Mirzoian[b]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	X	0	X	0
Orakhelashvili[a]	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	X	0	0	1	1	1
Rumiantsev	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Semenov[c]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	X	0
Sheboldaev	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
Shubrikov[c]	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vareikis	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Totals	2	3	7	1	10	4	7	7	3	10	3	3	5	0	2	2	4

FIGURE 1
NETWORK TIES BETWEEN CENTRAL LEADERSHIP
AND REGIONAL LEADERSHIP[d]
(1929, 1934)

[a]Held position in 1929 only.
[b]Held position in 1934 only.
[c]Held position in 1934 only; incomplete information on early career.
[d]Based on criteria set out in fn. 52: 0 = no tie, 1 = a tie, X = not applicable.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unavailable to Western scholars.[54] The study uses personal correspondence, biographical data, and official personnel files to piece together the informal ties of the Transcaucasian regional network and to discern the ways in which these ties were employed to enhance the state's capacity for territorial administration.

The Transcaucasian network was drawn from the participants in several underground party committees in the region. In this period the Bolshevik Party was not well established in the Transcaucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, North Caucasus), the exception being Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan and center of the oil industry.[55] According to Anastas Mikoian, a veteran of the Baku committee, "underground conditions" required "secrecy, reliability and dedication of the people."[56] Following the revolution, the Transcaucasus became a battleground of old regime loyalists, nationalists, Mensheviks, and foreign interventionists. Indeed, at first the Bolsheviks in the region were cut off from the parent party in Russia and forced back into an underground existence. The Transcaucasian network was most strongly shaped by civil war experiences as new members enlisted, personal ties were strengthened, and patterns of hierarchical relationships were defined.

At this time formal organizational structures simply did not exist for the Transcaucasian Bolsheviks. Only when the Red Army eventually made its way into the region did the Bolsheviks reemerge from the underground to join the military campaigns. The Bolshevik underground network provided the personnel and structure for the military-revolutionary committees that were formed to consolidate the army's territorial gains.

Sergo Orjonikidze and Sergei Kirov emerged as leaders of the Transcaucasian military-revolutionary committees.[57] Personal correspondence and telegrams found in the archival fonds of Orjonikidze and Kirov demonstrate how network ties served to establish a foundation for the Soviet state in the region. As regional leader, Orjonikidze quickly developed a system of information gathering built on preexisting network ties. He relied almost exclusively on network ties (Kirov,

[54] The archival sources are from the former Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, which has been renamed the Russian Center for the Preservation and Investigation of Documents of Recent History (RTsKhIDNI).

[55] Ronald Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988); and idem, *The Baku Commune*, 1917–1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972).

[56] Anastas Mikoyan, *The Path of Struggle* (Madison, Wis.: Sphinx Press, 1988), 450.

[57] For Ordzhonikidze's official appointments, see RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 1, d. 15, l. 1; f. 85, op. 1, d. 18, l. 1; for Kirov's official appointments, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 80, op. 3, d. 34, l. 1; f. 80, op. 4, d. 47, l. 1; f. 80, op. 5, d. 24, l. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kvirikeli, and Gikalo) to track the progress of territorial consolidation in the mountainous and ethnically fractious North Caucasus.[58] In the campaign to incorporate independent Georgia by force into the new Soviet state, Orjonikidze relied on network ties to coordinate the military and political aspects of the takeover and, later, to staff the formal positions of power in Soviet Georgia.[59] Similarly, in early 1920 Kirov and Mikoian relied exclusively on personal network ties to open supply and communication lines between the North Caucasus and the advancing forces of the Red Army.[60] In June 1919, when Kirov had to report to Lenin and Stalin on the progress of establishing Soviet power in Armenia, he based his assessment almost exclusively on a letter he had recently received from Mikoian.[61]

In 1920 the new state center established a "regional bureau" for the Transcaucasus, which for the next decade would be the main institutional link between the Transcaucasus and the state center. The creation of this bureau marked the intersection of informal and formal structures in the Transcaucasus, as a nascent formal organization for territorial administration was built upon the preexisting informal ties of the Transcaucasian network. Members of the network dominated the formal positions of power in the regional bureau. Thus, Orjonikidze and Kirov were appointed to the top leadership; and in 1921 a separate regional bureau was formed for the North Caucasus region, headed by Anastas Mikoian, another core member of the Transcaucasian network. Much as they had done in the underground and in the military campaigns of the civil war, these leaders employed their informal network ties to perform the task of territorial administration.

As informal network ties fused with formal state structures, core network members gained access to financial resources and valued goods. Regional party leaders and their staffs were besieged with requests for financial assistance, food, housing, employment, and education. These scarce resources were distributed as rewards that reinforced network ties. Orjonikidze's office, for example, was able to secure admittance to a higher technical school in Moscow for the son of Gegechkora, a for-

[58] For Kirov, see RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 4, d. 44, ll. 1–4; d. 94, ll. 2–4; op. 5, d. 13, ll. 1–4; d. 20, l. 1; d. 25, l. 1.; op. 85, op. 11, d. 8, ll. 1–7. For Kvirikeli, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 13, ll. 3–18; d. 14, ll. 1–3; d. 19, ll. 1, 2; d. 34, ll. 2–7. For Gikalo, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 11, d. 28, ll. 1–4; d. 34, ll. 1–5; d. 59, ll. 1, 2.

[59] For the coordination of military and political tasks, see RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 15, d. 57, l. 1; d. 61, l. 1; d. 71, ll. 1, 2; d. 103, l. 1. For the placement of network members in positions of power, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 85, op. 15, d. 182, ll. 4–9; d. 243, l. 1; d. 246, ll. 1–5.

[60] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 22, d. 11, ll. 3–7; 15, ll. 1–10.

[61] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 3, d. 20, ll. 1–8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mer colleague in the Georgian underground.[62] And there is the case of Kirov's private letter to Orjonikidze, describing the overwhelming demand for financial support coming from local party organizations. Given the limited resources available for distribution, Kirov chose to dispense funds to Gikalo, to whom he had personal ties, leaving other local organizations, at least on this occasion, to go without.[63]

In the second half of the 1920s core members of the Transcaucasian network began to move out of the region to the state center or to other regions. In 1926 Orjonikidze, Kirov, and Mikoian were promoted to the party's central executive organ, the politburo, as candidate members. In addition, they moved into new formal positions with access to vast organizational resources: Orjonikidze to the central control apparatus, Kirov to the Leningrad party organization, and Mikoian to the commissariat of internal and external trade.

In turn, network members with whom they shared strong ties were promoted to the leadership posts they had vacated within the region. Orjonikidze's replacement as head of the Transcaucasian party organization was Mamia Orakhelashvili, with whom he had formed an informal tie in the civil war and during their early political-administrative work together.[64] He was described in *Pravda* as Orjonikidze's "close friend" and "wartime counselor."[65] Orakhelashvili also had personal ties to Kirov, with whom he had worked closely in the North Caucasus during the consolidation of Soviet power.[66] In addition, Amaiak Nazaretian, with whom Orjonikidze and Kirov shared a personal tie, was also named to the regional party leadership.[67] In Azerbaijan, Levon Mirzoian and Nikolai Gikalo, who had personal ties to Kirov, were promoted to leadership positions.[68] In this way, as informal ties were stretched from the region to the center, the Transcaucasian network developed a vertical dimension.

By the late 1920s and early 1930s the Transcaucasian network reached across the regional and formal organizational structures of the postrevolutionary state. The regional leaders at this time who were also members of the Transcaucasian network included Boris Sheboldaev in

[62] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 24, d. 261, l. 1.
[63] RTsKhIDNI, (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 3, d. 15, ll. 1, 4; f. 80, op. 4, d. 7, ll. 3–7.
[64] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 11, d. 28, ll. 1–4; f. 85, op. 15, d. 246, ll. 2–5.
[65] *Pravda*, June 10, 1963.
[66] G. K. Dolunts, *Kirov v revoliutsii* (Kirov in the revolution) (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1967), 65.
[67] For evidence of Nazaretian's close ties with Orjonikidze, see RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 11, d. 85, ll. 2–5; for Nazaretian's ties with Kirov, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 80, op. 4, d. 117, l. 1.
[68] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80. op. 7, d. 3, l. 1; op. 8, d. 25, ll. 3–9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Lower Volga and the North Caucasus; Levon Mirzoian in the Urals region and Kazakhstan; Iosif Vareikis in the Central Black Earth region; and Nikolai Gikalo in Belorussia.

Significantly, as network members moved into new formal positions outside the region, they continued to employ their informal ties. Personal network ties provided members with an informal social structure for exchanging information, obtaining valuable resources, and coordinating activities. The archival materials show that personal network ties were used in this way to facilitate the development of the new state's capacities for territorial administration in the decade following the civil war. Moreover, this occurred at a time when the state's formal administrative mechanisms were still not reliable beyond the central industrial region.

A basic aspect of territorial administration, for example, is information exchange. Yet as late as 1930, the state center was by its own admission incapable of assuring that local organizations were informed of its decisions.[69] More than one-third of the North Caucasus region was still without telephone and telegraph connections.[70] In the Transcaucasus network ties were a principal means by which the center both disseminated information about policy priorities to the region and gathered information about regional affairs. Personal correspondence in Orjonikidze's archive showed that after his promotion to the center he continued to monitor events in the region regularly through his informal ties to Orakhelashvili and Nazaretian.[71] These letters typically included personal information, a steady stream of gossip from the region, and, more significantly, mutual consultations on policy matters. By such informal means, Orjonikidze directed the reorganization of economic administration in Georgia in anticipation of the five-year plan.[72] Through other network ties, Orjonikidze monitored political developments in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia for the center during the late 1920s and the early 1930s. His informal supervision of the regional leadership continued into the early 1930s, even though by that time he was employed in the central industrial bureaucracy with no formal responsibility for regional political affairs.[73]

[69] See the remarks of politburo member Lazar Kaganovich delivered to the Sixteenth Party Congress in the summer of 1930. *XVI s'ezd vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b): stenograficheskii otchet* (Sixteenth congress of the all-union Communist Party (b): Stenographic report) (Moscow: Gospolizdat, 1935), 156.

[70] *Spravochnik partiinogo rabotnika* (Handbook for party workers) (Moscow: Partizdat, 1934), 8:272, 273.

[71] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 127, ll. 2–12; d. 140, ll. 1, 2; d. 300, ll. 1–26.

[72] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 304, l. 1.

[73] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 308, ll. 5–52; f. 85, op. 1, d. 317, ll. 1–17; f. 85, op. 27, d. 321, ll. 1–9.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kirov, likewise, relied on informal ties to old network members, Mirzoian and Khanbudagov in Azerbaijan, to gather information about regional affairs and to emphasize the center's policy priorities.[74] In 1928, more than two years after he had left the region, Kirov still employed his tie to Kartvelishvili in Georgia in order to insist that local officials immediately undertake the establishment of production trusts in the economy.[75] And in 1931 Kirov instructed Central Black Earth regional party leader Iosif Vareikis, with whom he shared a strong network tie, on implementing a program to resettle peasants uprooted by the collectivization campaign.[76]

Another aspect of territorial administration is personnel policy and the resolution of local disputes. From the mid-1920s to the early 1930s, Transcaucasian regional politics was riven by intraorganizational feuds and power struggles. Again, despite their formal departures, Orjonikidze and Kirov continued to direct personnel policy and to broker power conflicts in the region. Kirov involved himself in personnel politics on numerous occasions. In 1926, for example, six months after his transfer to Leningrad, he intervened to resolve an internal dispute between the party organization and the control bureaucracy in Azerbaijan; in 1928 he overturned the decision of the Transcaucasian regional bureau to reassign Khanjian outside Georgia; in 1929 he personally appointed a new party leader, Gurzof Osipov, to the local organization in Astrakhan.[77] Similarly, Orjonikidze was barraged with personal correspondence from various actors seeking to secure his favor in the seemingly endless leadership struggles and interethnic conflicts that marked Transcaucasian politics at this time.[78]

Intervention by core network members in regional administrative affairs was especially common in the first years of the state's radical campaign for economic restructuring. The plan for rapid industrialization called for a comprehensive reorganization of the rural economy—the consolidation of small peasant holdings into large collective farms. In this way, the state sought to develop a system in which revenue, in the form of agricultural products, would be extracted directly from the

[74] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 25, d. 11, ll. 1–14; op. 26, d. 40, ll. 1–5.

[75] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 12, d. 29, l. 1.

[76] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 15, d. 45, l. 1.

[77] See, respectively, RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 10, d. 42, l. 1; op. 12, d. 22, ll. 1, 2; op. 13, d. 16, l. 1.

[78] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 307, ll. 3–15; op. 27, d. 308, ll. 16–29, 33–50; op. 27, d. 312, ll. 10–18; op. 27, d. 315, ll. 1, 2; op. 27, d. 321, ll. 1–9. See also Amy Knight's excellent biography of Lavrenti Beria, Stalin's secret police chief, who worked in Transcaucasia at this time and was a protégé of Orjonikidze's; Knight, *Beria: Stalin's First Lieutenant* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), chaps. 2, 3.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

agrarian sector and reallocated to the industrial sectors of the economy. The state's initial plunge into collectivization, however, generated widespread social unrest and economic crises, a situation that was exacerbated by the underdeveloped organizational capabilities of regional administrators. While bogus information routinely passed from villages to regional leaders to central planners, central economic plans often failed to reach their intended destinations along the territorial administrative command chain.

Collectivization proved especially difficult in the predominantly rural Transcaucasus, where small private holdings had long characterized the structure of agriculture. Moreover, as the region was not a major grain-producing area, some Transcaucasian leaders favored a moderate implementation schedule. Orjonikidze and Kirov were forced to intervene frequently into local affairs during the first two years of the campaign to ensure regional compliance with the center's more radical implementation schedules.[79] One notable example involving Kirov came to be known as "the Azerbaijan affair." By the autumn of 1930 Azerbaijan had fallen so far behind in its implementation of collectivization that the state center ordered an investigation of the regional leadership. Although Kirov had not formally worked in the republic for almost four years, he was charged with the task of sorting out the political blame, recommending solutions to the center, and reasserting the center's implementation priorities in the republic.[80]

It is significant that even after individuals from the Transcaucasian network were transferred to posts outside the region, Kirov continued to use his informal ties to them to define policy priorities and to guide the implementation process.[81] Levon Mirzoian, for example, was named party head of Kazakhstan in late 1932. He was assigned the task of developing a grain-production sector and integrating it with the central economy in this geograpically remote and undeveloped region. While Kirov had never previously been involved in the administrative affairs of Kazakhstan, he quickly developed regular informal communications with Mirzoian, instructing the latter on the internal organization of collective farms, grain production quotas, and bread allocations.[82] Kirov further lobbied the head of the central railroad administration on Mirzoian's behalf for the construction of a new railroad line connecting Kazakhstan to the central industrial region of Soviet

[79] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 308, ll. 36–48; d. 317, 11. 8, 9; f. 80, op. 15, d. 13, ll. 1–8.
[80] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 14, d. 10, ll. 9–64.
[81] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 15, d. 45, l. 1; op. 17, d. 58, l. 1.
[82] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 17, d. 55, l. 1; op. 18, d. 103, ll. 1, 2; op. 18. d. 105, l. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russia.[83] In this way, the cross-regional reach of the Transcaucasian network ties enhanced the center's capacity to administer the periphery.

As the state campaign for economic restructuring unfolded, central planners showed themselves incapable of efficiently reallocating resources across regions. The campaign was at once threatened by chronic and widespread shortages of material resources.[84] Again, archival sources show that personal network ties were employed to compensate for the shortcomings of the state's new formal administrative-command structures. Kirov was especially adept at using network ties to bypass the central planners in obtaining badly needed supplies and human resources. During the food shortages of the early 1930s, Kirov was able to secure extra provisions by appealing directly to Boris Sheboldaev in the North Caucasus for bread, to Iosif Vareikis in the Central Black Earth region for vegetables, and to Ivan Rumiantsev in the Western region for potatoes.[85] Although these individuals were now party leaders in various Russian agricultural regions, they still had ties to Kirov through the Transcaucasian regional network.[86] During the 1932 grain crisis Kirov used his personal ties to Orjonikidze and Mikoian in the center to obtain "vodka and spirits" for Leningrad's factory workers for the New Year holiday.[87] In 1933 Kirov used his network tie to Nikolai Gikalo, who had recently been appointed party head of Belorussia, to request that available workers from Belorussia be transferred to Leningrad's growing industrial labor force.[88]

In sum, the Transcaucasian personal network, by providing a means for information exchange, resource allocation, and coordinated action, served as an informal power resource for the development of territorial administration in the new Soviet Russian state.

The next section briefly discusses the problems of constraint and coercion, which arose in the 1930s as a direct consequence of the intersection of informal personal networks and formal political structures in the postrevolutionary state.

[83] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 18, d. 107, ll. 1, 2.

[84] R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 283–309.

[85] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 15, d. 51, l. 1; f. 80, op. 15, d. 49, l. 1; f. 80, op. 17, d. 57, l. 1; f. 80, op. 14, d. 49, l. 1.

[86] For Sheboldaev, see RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 124, op. 1, d. 2138, l. 1; for Rumiantsev, see RTsKhIDNI, f. 124, op. 1, d. 1662, l. 5; for Vareikis, see D. Lappo, *Iuozas Vareikis* (Voronezh: Tsentral'no-chernozemnoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1989), 85–99.

[87] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 16, d. 45, l. 1.

[88] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 80, op. 17, d. 58, l. 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Constraint and Coercion in the Postrevolutionary State

This study has attempted to show how personal network ties contributed to the development of a state capacity for territorial administration. But it was also found that this informal power resource sometimes acted as a constraint on the state center, leading some central state actors to have misgivings about utilizing network ties for territorial administration. As the 1930s unfolded, the Transcaucasian network, in particular, became the object of criticism.

The state center's radical campaign of economic reform placed extraordinary and mostly unrealistic economic demands on regional leaders. While in principle regional leaders supported this campaign, in practice they sometimes advocated less radical implementation schedules. The archival findings show that regional leaders employed their personal ties to core network members in the center to lobby for modified economic targets.[89] Notably, the small group of central leaders identified as a "moderate bloc" in this period (Orjonikidze, Kirov, and Kuibyshev) were the most strongly connected by personal network ties to the regional leadership (see Figure 1). Indeed, on occasion, these particular individuals emerged as advocates of less radical economic goals.[90] Moreover, Orjonikidze and Kirov acted to protect fellow network members who incurred the wrath of other central leaders.[91] Referring to Orjonikidze's efforts to shield Transcaucasian network members from official sanction, Stalin remarked in frustration that he "behaved like a feudal lord, even like a prince."[92]

In such ways, the intersection of informal network ties and formal political structures acted as a constraint on the state center. In response, central actors attempted to employ their formal organizational powers to enforce compliance and to remove recalcitrant regional officials. But these efforts produced limited results. In late 1929 Orjonikidze's appointee Mamia Orakhelashvili was replaced as Transcaucasian party leader by Aleksandr Krinitskii, an outsider to the region. But Krinitskii

[89] RTsKhIDNI (fn. 54), f. 85, op. 27, d. 317, ll. 6–10; f. 79, op. 1, d. 744, l. 2.

[90] Eugene Zaleski, *Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933–1952* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 115–29; Franco Benevenuti, *Kirov in Soviet Politics, 1933–1934* (Birmingham, England: CREES Papers on Soviet Industrialization), no. 8 (1977); A. Vaksberg, "Kak zhivoi s zhivnyi" (As alive as the living), *Literaturnaia gazeta*, June 19, 1988, p.13.

[91] For examples of Orjonikidze's and Kirov's intervention to protect fellow network members, see *Pravda*, March 17, 1964; *Pravda*, January 29, 1991.

[92] Oleg Khlevniuk, *In Stalin's Shadow: The Career of Sergo Ordzhonikidze* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 35.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lasted less than six months, only to be replaced by Beso Lominadze, who had a strong network tie to Orjonikidze. When Lominadze ran afoul of central leaders in late 1930, however, another wave of personnel changes followed and Orakhelashvili returned to the regional leadership.[93]

When taking into account informal network ties, the regional leadership exhibited greater continuity than what is generally assumed in the Western literature. In 1932, however, the center began a concerted effort to uproot personal network ties from the Transcaucasus. In contrast to the personnel changes of 1929–31, the later changes signified a deliberate attempt by the state center to decouple informal social structures from formal political structures in the new state. Later in the decade, this strategy was applied coercively across the periphery.

It can be argued that the "great purges" were an extreme response to the intersection of informal and formal structures. The campaign for radical economic reform provoked disputes and a power struggle between central and regional leaders: whereas the formal lines of command concentrated power in the state center, the informal network ties used by regional leaders acted to constrain the center's formal powers. In 1934 a small group of regional leaders even conspired to remove Stalin as party leader. The majority of the participants in this cabal were members of the Transcaucasian network; they met in Orjonikidze's apartment and nominated Kirov to replace Stalin. The scheme fell apart, however, when Kirov refused to participate.[94]

In 1937, on the eve of the state center's campaign of terror against the regional leadership, Stalin spoke out against the informal social structures that cut across formal organizational structures. "Most often," he remarked,

> acquaintances and personal friends are selected, regardless of their suitability from a political or practical perspective. . . . It is not difficult to understand that such family circles allow no place for criticisms of shortcomings in performance. . . . In selecting cadres for their personal devotion, these comrades evidently want to create conditions which make them independent from the center.[95]

The center's indiscriminate application of coercion against the regional elite in the late 1930s was an extreme response to the intersection of informal and formal structures in the new state.

[93] Suny (fn. 55, 1988), 243–54.

[94] Confirmation of this aborted conspiracy comes from the memoirs of Anastas Mikoian, who was also a member of the Transcaucasian network. See "V pervyi raz bez lenina" (The first time without Lenin), *Ogonek*, no. 50 (December 1989), 27–29. The chief conspirators included Boris Sheboldaev, Iosif Vareikis, and Mamia Orakhelashvili.

[95] *Pravda*, April 1, 1937.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although regional network members eventually fell victim to the great purges, the informal networks were nonetheless instrumental in the state-building process. Recalling Mann's distinction between "despotic" and "infrastructural" powers, the conflict between central and regional leaders in the 1930s was over the formal division of decision-making, or "despotic," powers in the new state. In this conflict, personal network ties afforded regional leaders an informal source of power that constrained the formal organizational powers of the center for a while but ultimately was crushed by the center's systematic campaign of coercion. By contrast, the development of a capacity for territorial administration reflected the implementation capabilities, or "infrastructural" powers, of the new state. In this regard, the evidence suggests that personal network ties contributed positively to this end at crucial moments.

III. State Building and Personal Networks: Conclusions

Does uncovering personal network ties among the Bolsheviks contribute something new to our understanding of state building in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia? Moreover, does it help to explain the subsequent collapse of the state? Are there implications for comparative state-building theory?

Two findings emerged from the case study of the Transcaucasian regional network. First, the study uncovered informal personal ties, existing within and across the formal organizational boundaries of the new Soviet state. These informal ties were cross-regional in reach, and core members were relocated to central positions. Second, the study examined a sample of the personal correspondence of core network members and found anecdotal evidence that informal ties were utilized to help extend the administrative reach of the new state. The case study was limited, however, by the fact that the ties had to be pieced together from an incomplete source base and that these network members could not be interviewed.

Beyond these findings, the study is more suggestive than definitive. The evidence, for example, does not conclusively demonstrate that informal ties had a greater impact than formal channels in conveying the center's priorities to regional actors. The archival data were too incomplete to support a more general assertion that personal networks were the essential element in the Soviet state-building process. At best, the findings showed that informal ties played a supplemental role, helping to bridge formal organizational lapses in the new state. But even if that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is the most one may conclude, it is significant in that it suggests answers to the larger questions raised above.

First, if the formal organizational structure of the state remained underdeveloped and weak for more than a decade after the civil war, how was the state able to carry out such extensive economic reform in the early 1930s? And although coercion and social forces were both part of this process, neither is sufficient to explain how the new state implemented these policies across Soviet Russia's vast periphery. In this regard, the intersection of informal network ties and formal organizational structures offers an alternative explanation to the ongoing "forces from above" and "forces from below" debate. Personal networks provided an informal social structure along which information was exchanged, resources were obtained, and activities were coordinated—all of which contributed to the extension of the state's capacity for territorial administration.

Second, if the Soviet state was a "strong" state, as noted comparativists once argued, what explains its collapse in the early 1990s? Earlier comparative theories assumed that the success of Soviet state building rested on formal organizational structure. If one argued instead that the building process was driven by the intersection of informal and formal structures, then both the building phase and the subsequent collapse could be explained.

Studies of career patterns among the Soviet regional political elite have noted a marked decrease in vertical and horizontal movement since the 1970s.[96] This development is a consequence, partly, of Brezhnev's "trust in cadres" policy and, partly, of a trend toward greater administrative specialization. As a result, the structure of informal network ties exhibited a more limited cross-regional reach and core network members remained in their host regions. This structure contrasted with the state-building phase, in which informal network ties exhibited extensive cross-regional reach and core network members were relocated to central posts.

By the early 1980s the territorial administrative elite had become more insular and particularist as a result of the gradual diffusion of power away from the state center along informal lines. Informal network ties were employed by regional elites to capture political and economic resources from the center, a situation that led to pervasive

[96] William Clark, *Soviet Regional Elite Mobility after Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1989); Michael Urban, *An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in Belorussia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and John Willerton, *Patronage and Politics in the USSR* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic corruption among the regional political elite.[97] When Gorbachev attempted to introduce a radical reform program in the second half of the 1980s, he found that the structure of informal network ties diminished the center's capacity to implement policies outside Moscow. In the end this informal diffusion of power contributed to the state's inability to stave off its own territorial demise. From this perspective, it can be argued that the Soviet state eventually fell apart along the very lines upon which it had been built six decades earlier.

Finally, the findings suggest implications for comparative state-building theory. Israel and Communist China, for example, represent two of the more successful state-building cases in the twentieth century. In both, cadres who actually participated in the state-building process, as in Soviet Russia, were veterans of illegal underground experiences. Furthermore, China's Communist Party and Israel's Histadrut Labor Federation and Mapai Workers Party were compelled to utilize informal network ties to carry out basic political tasks in the early years, before the formal organizational structures of the new states were operative. In a study of the Israeli Mapai Party, Peter Medding argued that in the postindependence period the party was sustained by a "chain of personal contact" that served as a "mechanism for the centralisation of political power."[98] And Victor Nee, in a study of the efforts by the Communist Chinese state to develop an administrative capacity in the rural countryside, noted "the existence of an 'old boy' network of subcounty cadres." "Not only did this network enhance the power of the party-state," he contended, "but it also laid the basis for a new relationship between center and locality."[99]

More recently, the collapse of communism has generated new state-building experiences in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Some scholars have already noted the formative role of personal network ties, especially among the former communist nomenklatura, in shaping postcommunist economic institutions.[100] Postcommunist Rus-

[97] Peter Rutland, *The Politics of Economic Stagnation: The Role of Local Party Organs in Economic Management* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

[98] Medding, *Mapai in Israel: Political Organisation and Government in a New Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 136, 137.

[99] Nee, "Between Center and Locality: State, Militia and Village," in Victor Nee and David Mozingo, eds., *State and Society in Contemporary China* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), 232, 242.

[100] David Stark and Victor Nee, "Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism," in Nee and Stark, eds., *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989), 15. See also Dorothy Solinger, "Urban Reform and Relational Contracting in Post-Mao China: An Interpretation of the Transition from Plan to Market," in Richard Baum, ed., *Reform and Reaction in Post-Mao China* (New York: Routledge, 1991).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sia, moreover, is presently undergoing center-regional power struggles reminiscent of the postrevolutionary Soviet period. In a study of contemporary regional politics, Peter Kirkow described "a revitalization of power exerted by former *nomenklatura* members and an activization of previous social networks."[101] These observations suggest that the hypothesis that the structure of personal network ties affects a state's capacity for territorial administration is applicable beyond the Soviet case.

This article argued that the ways in which informal and formal structures intersect provide an insight into state-building processes that has largely been neglected by scholars. The article developed a rudimentary framework that attempted to show how personal networks in postrevolutionary Soviet Russia provided an informal structural mechanism that facilitated the development of a capacity for territorial administration. While the results may suggest answers to some larger state-building questions, the article represents only a first step. To make the argument more definitive requires further empirical research and a more systematic comparison of informal network structures and state-building outcomes. The analytical framework should also include an investigation of the ways in which personal network ties shape the social identities and preferences of individual members. Despite the limitations of the present study, this analytical focus has potential to build on the recent work of comparativists seeking a better understanding of the ways in which informal, microlevel social structures influence formal, macrolevel institutional forms.[102]

[101] Kirkow, "Regional Warlordism in Russia: The Case of Primorskii Krai," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 6 (1995), 923.

[102] Among comparative state theorists, the "state in society" approach exemplifies this redirection of analytical focus; see Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fn. 15). More generally, a recognition of the informal dimensions of institutions has been associated with the work of William Riker; see, for example, Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 74 (June 1980). Several notable recent studies include Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Putnam (fn. 8).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REVOLUTION FROM WITHIN
Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary

By PATRICK H. O'NEIL*

THE dramatic collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe poses a number of questions still waiting to be answered. One of the most interesting concerns how communism collapsed and how the process varied across the region. The transitions in Eastern Europe are characterized by diversity in timing, manner, and central characteristics. Thus, there were the early, negotiated developments in Poland and Hungary, the sudden downfall of regimes in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the ambiguous "revolution" of Romania, and the palace coup in Bulgaria. Moreover, each one shaped the prospects for consolidated democracy differently.

Hungary is especially striking in that *within the party itself* over the course of 1988 and 1989 there developed a rural-based political movement, the so-called reform circles, which played an important part in undermining the ability of the leadership to dictate the course of the transition. Such differences are suggestive of the diversity of state socialism within the region, contradicting the appearance of uniformity among these political structures.

This study, an analysis of the dissolution of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, or MSZMP), makes the case that understanding how authoritarian rule was first institutionalized in a given case is a key to a better understanding of variations in authoritarian transitions. Institutional orders determine the context that shapes not only the transition event itself but also the subsequent political order, that is, how authoritarianism dies and what replaces it. In this study the strong connection between institutional forms and the

* The research for this study was supported in 1992 and 1993 by a Fulbright-Hays Grant from the Center for International Education of the U.S. Department of Education, as well as by a grant from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), with funds provided by the U.S. Department of State. None of these organizations is responsible for the views herein expressed. My thanks to Andrew K. Milton for his comments on previous versions of this article.

World Politics 48 (July 1996), 579–603

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trajectory of authoritarian collapse in Hungary will serve to illustrate this argument.

Current Perspectives on Authoritarian Transitions

Authoritarian transitions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere are typically explained by reference to either "structural" or "process" arguments. Structural arguments tend to stress the macrolevel conditions (for example, economic development, urbanization, levels of social progress) that are necessary for the creation of democracy out of a nondemocratic form of political control. Process arguments take a different approach, focusing to a greater extent on the means and patterns by which actual authoritarian dissolution takes place and concentrating on the interaction of elite political figures and the success or failure of such negotiations to produce stable democracy.[1]

Both sets of arguments stand in opposition to one another. Structuralism can be criticized in that socioeconomic development and political democratization are often taken as largely axiomatic, and the question of how a nation-state moves from an authoritarian system to a democratic one is not given due consideration. Process-oriented perspectives, by contrast, can be criticized for moving to the other extreme. The oft-cited *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, for example, provides no framework for contextualizing events and opts instead to document the actions of political elites and to stress their resourcefulness as a key variable in the transition, to the exclusion of both state and society as analytical components.[2]

Current approaches to the study of political transitions thus remain unintegrated. Macrolevel structuralist approaches paint the broad brush strokes of state, economy, and society but fail to link these conditions to the dynamic of actual political change; microlevel process approaches catalog the actual transition phenomena but do not connect them to the environment from which they emerge. Each framework, while essential to understanding political transitions, excludes the other, to the detriment of both.

One way of bridging the gap between process- and structure-based

[1] Well-known examples of structural arguments include Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959); notable among process-oriented works is Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Lawrence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

[2] O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (fn. 1).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analyses is to study the way in which organized activities become fixed, self-replicating social forms. The "new institutionalism," which has enjoyed a strong resurgence within social science, stresses the impact of institutions on the ordering and formation of social and political relations.[3] As to what makes this area of study theoretically valuable and how these findings apply to analyses of state socialism and authoritarian decline in general, there are no simple answers, since institutional approaches are characterized by a diversity of views that are not necessarily reconcilable.

However, several central assumptions thread through much of this research. To begin with, they start from a rejection of the individual-based market analogies of the rational choice, pluralist, or behavioralist approaches. These approaches typically view institutions as little more than instrumental structures created to serve specific utilitarian functions, "arenas within which political behavior, driven by more fundamental factors, occurs."[4] By contrast, institutional perspectives rest on the assumption that these organized forms are not simply transparent constructs but rather are a more complex and influential aspect of human behavior. Institutional arguments stress that these forms do not necessarily follow from purposive human design but instead often arise through unintended actions and replication or by default. Institutional conformity to rational expectations can be dramatically affected by the pull of internal and external activity as the organization strives to maintain and define its own integrity.[5]

Second, institutions, as self-replicating structures, develop their own particular characteristics—resources, values, norms, routines, and patterns—which are passed on to individuals both inside and outside the structure. This tends to bestow on institutions independent power, the ability to create and shape the objectives of individual and collective action. In contrast to more atomistic approaches to social choice, institutions can "establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences."[6] Theda Skocpol nicely summarizes this point: "Organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collec-

[3] See in particular James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review* 78 (September 1984); Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[4] March and Olsen (fn. 3), 734.

[5] John W. Meyer and W. Richard Scott, *Organizational Environments: Ritual and Rationality* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983).

[6] Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3), 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)."[7]

Third, an important corollary, organizational "lock in," is central to understanding institutionalization itself. Institutionalization typically involves the formation of policies and patterns of behavior to respond to the surrounding environment. Over time these practices tend to harden, becoming an inseparable part of the organization's objectives and therefore blurring the relationship between means and ends. As a result, dramatic reorganization becomes more difficult. Indeed, when highly institutionalized organizations are confronted with environmental or internal challenges, they are more likely to suppress or ignore these contradictions than to respond with corrective measures.[8]

This has two implications. First, suboptimal systems may persevere over a long period of time. Second, if the growing obsolescence of an institution fosters internal or external pressure, the institution is likely to respond by attempting to preserve the status quo regardless, until such time as the tension succeeds in eliminating the institution entirely.[9] Institutional development thus appears as a punctuated rather than a gradual form of change.[10] This corresponds well to our understanding of transitions and revolutions, such as those in Eastern Europe —situations that arise without warning and bring down the authoritarian system within a relatively short period of time.

Application and Misinterpretation in Institutional Analysis

The institutional perspective has gained a great deal of currency over the past ten years, as many scholars now utilize it to augment or supplant earlier theories of political activity that had stressed individual action without reference to persistent social constructs. Research on the state, including state socialism, is one clear example of this.[11] In some

[7] Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Reuschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21.

[8] DiMaggio and Powell (fn. 6), 14–15.

[9] G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to American Foreign Economic Policy," in G. John Ikenberry, David A. Lake, and Michael Mastanduno, eds., *The State and American Foreign Economic Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), 224–25.

[10] Stephen D. Krasner, "Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984), 240–44.

[11] Notable examples include Ellen Comisso, "Introduction: State Structures, Political Processes, and Collective Choice in CMEA States," *International Organization* 40 (Spring 1986); Ken Jowitt, "Weber, Trotsky and Holmes on the Study of Leninist Regimes," *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (Summer 1991); Victor Nee and David Stark, "Toward an Institutional Analysis of State Socialism," in David

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ways, earlier studies of socialism anticipated this current wave of research, as Weberian-influenced organizational theory, beginning in the 1950s, strongly shaped work on the USSR and Eastern Europe.[12]

Nevertheless, although institutional analysis is winning converts, at least within political science the perspective tends to suffer from weaknesses in both definition and theoretical power. For one thing, institutions are often characterized as little more than self-reproducing constructs, linked to sunk costs and vested interests, rather than as actors in their own right, creating their own organizational culture and resources. As Ronald Jepperson notes, "Institutions are not just constraint structures; all institutions simultaneously empower and control.[13]

A second problem lies in overstating institutional effects. While the institutional perspective has rightly been accorded a role in understanding political order and change, some have utilized the approach in a way that exaggerates the uniqueness of political institutions as variables, which leads to the conclusion that political institutions are so context-dependent as to be largely noncomparative. This then limits the degree to which institutional effects can be generalized.

One finds this particularly in institutional analyses of state socialism.[14] Certainly, the introduction of institutional perspectives into studies of state socialism is a welcome change from earlier attempts to place these systems under the rubric of Western political orders. But when the institutional perspective is overemphasized, the arguments lose their theoretical character and shift away from a concept stressing *process* toward an ideographic symbol emphasizing *character*; differentiation, that is, overshadows causality. Following this logic, the institutions of state socialism thus become "novel" because, to use Ken Jowitt's well-worn term, they are "Leninist," but we then fail to identify the underlying dynamics that institutionalized Leninism in the first place. A generalizable process of institutionalization is consequently lost. Jowitt even rejects the use of the term "state socialism," in that its use has "increased the analytic familiarity of Leninist regimes by denying their institutional peculiarity."[15] As others have noted, such advice does not

Stark and Victor Nee, eds., *Remaking the Economic Institutions of Socialism: China and Eastern Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989); and Valerie Bunce and Mária Csanádi, "Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (Spring 1993).

[12] See, for example, Barrington Moore Jr., *Terror and Progress, U.S.S.R.: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[13] Jepperson, "Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3), 146.

[14] See in particular Jowitt (fn. 11); and Nee and Stark (fn. 11).

[15] Jowitt (fn. 11), 40.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lend itself to either theory building or generalization. Nor does it enrich the analytical process by searching for illuminating concepts elsewhere within the social sciences.[16]

Enriching the "New" Institutionalism with Lessons from the "Old"

Many of the shortcomings in the so-called new institutionalism in political science are aggravated by the fact that our understanding of the intellectual origins of this field is rather limited. Notable for its absence is any reference to the pioneer of institutional analysis, the sociologist Philip Selznick, whose work on organizational development in the 1940s and 1950s paved the way for later studies in the field. This is particularly ironic, given that Selznick's approach is more consistent with arguments currently employed in political science than with those found in sociology itself.[17]

Among Selznick's many contributions in the area of organizational study, one of the most important was his emphasis on the link between co-optation (defined as both the informal linkage of a unit to external actors as a means of pacification as well as the formal incorporation of individuals into the unit itself) and the institutionalization process. Selznick made the case most strongly in his 1949 *TVA and the Grass Roots*, arguing that one of the key factors influencing institutionalization was the degree to which organizations, seeking to validate their activities and/or fill administrative demands, create linkages and/or formally incorporate actors external to themselves. By doing so, the organization connects itself to the broader environment and, it is hoped, increases its technical power and legitimacy as a result.

How an organization responds to the external environment is neither predetermined nor uniform, however; existing social patterns may create certain obstacles or opportunities, and organizational leaders may attempt to realize different forms and degrees of linkage as a result. The given social landscape and the way in which an organization can and does respond makes a difference in the institutionalization process.

Institutionalization can thus be seen as a basic tactic for organizational survival, though one that over time often generates its own set of

[16] See the criticism of Jowitt's approach in Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Karl, "The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America," in Peter M. E. Volten, *Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East-Central Europe* (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1992), 43–45.

[17] W. Richard Scott, "Unpacking Institutional Arguments," in Powell and DiMaggio (fn. 3), 179–80.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dangers. While the process of co-optation creates a set of environmental relations that legitimizes the organization, there is also the risk that these relations will gain a greater priority than had been envisioned in the original policy objectives and consequently that distinctions between means and ends will be blurred. Organizations thus become "infuse[d] with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand."[18] The organization, no longer simply an instrument of a larger policy goal, becomes valued for its own sake, and self-replication becomes the primary objective.

As a result, an institution may grow increasingly inflexible even as the social environment remains dynamic. This raises the possibility that the institution will be less willing or able to respond to succeeding waves of external challenges. One way of dealing with the problem is to continue with the policy of co-optation, building new linkages and incorporating new members. However, the more deeply institutionalized the organization and the greater the blurring of the means-ends relationship, the more resistant it will be to assimilating new actors whose loyalty to the institution (as opposed to its ostensible goals) is in doubt. This is the essence of the struggle within state socialism, described as the battle between the institutional "red" and the independent "expert"—terms that have become part of the lexicon of organizational behavior.[19]

Reinterpreting State Socialism as an Institutional Form

State socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is a clear case of extreme institutionalization. Stalinism represented above all a process of co-optation and penetration into all aspects of society and economy, a process that paralleled the formation of a large nomenklatura whose power derived from loyalty to the organization itself. With the institutionalization of the party came the subversion of its instrumental nature: the party came to be venerated as the revolution incarnate and the infallible manifestation of the people's will; it signaled the complete merging of means and ends. And as it became the embodiment and judge of knowledge and truth, it was the sole evaluator of all information. This was carried to extreme lengths and applied even to

[18] Philip Selznick, *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1957), 17.

[19] As Alvin Gouldner argues, this is in fact a basic part of political development in all societies; in the long run the intellectual "expert" segment must be "either coopted into the ruling class or it must be subjected to the repressive control of a burgeoning bureaucracy." See Gouldner, *The Future of the Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 24.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic and scientific relations, since objective criteria were feared as a source of autonomous, noninstitutional power. Subsequently, this highly institutionalized Soviet form was replicated in Eastern Europe—irrespective of the nature of the local environment.

With the death of Stalin and attempts at reform in the Soviet Union, communist leaders in Eastern Europe realized that their domestic institutional linkages were extremely weak, leaving them vulnerable to the impact of changes in Soviet domestic and international policy. Domestic institutional ties now attracted greater attention. By the 1960s many communist leaders initiated policies of limited political and economic reform in hopes of co-opting the "experts" among the intelligentsia and in that way building local legitimacy and increasing technical power. It seemed the intellectuals were on the road to class power.[20]

These actions reignited the struggle between red and expert. As intellectuals across the region raised calls for the reorganization of socialism and its reformulation on new, objective grounds, party leaders, whose claim to power was based solely on their loyalty to these very institutions, struck back. The end of Prague Spring in 1968 was only the most evident example; intellectuals all over the region were purged from or left the party, leaving the institutionally loyal in clear control.[21] Where domestic institutionalization was still pursued, it was no longer predicated on increased intellectual autonomy but instead appealed either to narrow and limited technocratic claims (rationalizing but not liberalizing the centralized economy) or to traditional legitimizing forms, defining and justifying the party-state with the same myths used by their ruling predecessors.

After 1968 the Czechoslovak party returned to a highly centralized form, legitimized by its conformity to Soviet strictures rather than by the domestic environment. East Germany also soon launched its own offensive against the intelligentsia, merging technocratic reform with extreme ideological ridigity in what has been termed "computer Stalinism."[22] In Poland, the party tried variously repression and technical rationalization, with results so disastrous they eroded domestic institutional linkages and paved the way for the rise of Solidarity and the party's desperate recourse to martial law. Even in Romania and Bul-

[20] George Konrád and Iván Szelényi, *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979).

[21] Iván Szelényi, "The Prospects and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-Critical Reflection on *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*," *Politics and Society* 15, no. 2 (1986–87).

[22] Leslie Holmes, "The GDR: 'Real Socialism' or 'Computer Stalinism'?" in Leslie Holmes, ed., *The Withering Away of the State? Party and State under Communism* (London: Sage, 1981).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

garia, where liberalization had been modest to begin with, those steps forward were quickly reversed. Instead, domestic institutionalization was sought through traditional, "Balkan" institutional forms, such as the development of sultanistic and dynastic party apparatuses, as well as the resurrection of nationalism and precommunist history, which viewed the party as the expression of that national destiny.

Only in Hungary did the process of institutionalization continue to depend upon a liberalized policy as a means of co-opting society and the intelligentsia in particular. While this had the intended effect of blocking the formation of social opposition, it also moved an important segment of intellectual dissent into the ranks of the party itself. As a result of this form of institutionalization—legitimacy attempted through social reconciliation and the formal incorporation of the intelligentsia—the party both perpetuated its rule and created the means of its eventual downfall.

The Institutionalization of Socialism in Hungary: From Stalinism to "Goulash Communism"

To explain why Hungary followed the institutional path that it did, one must first understand the effect of the 1956 Hungarian revolution, significant for having totally destroyed organized party power. Following the rebellion, a violent reaction to the repressive policies of General Secretary Mátyás Rákosi, the party resorted to coercive rule during the years 1956–62. However, the new general secretary, János Kádár, eventually chose to create a new institutional base for Hungarian socialism by pursuing a policy of reconciliation rather than continued force. Shattered by the revolution, shorn of members, its heroic myths, and much of its leadership, the chaos within the party gave Kádár the opportunity to incorporate within the structure a new set of administrative ideologies upon which to construct a policy of broad co-optation.

From the 1960s onward this policy of "goulash communism" was typified by a number of reformist policies unknown elsewhere in the region. Kádárism in essence represented a form of institutional dualism, where a whole array of ad hoc organizational forms were created to compensate for, but not replace, the intractable Soviet model. Economic reforms allowed for a more decentralized and mixed socialist economy, with a greater role for entrepreneurial activity. Simultaneously the party initiated a rapid liberalization within society in general. While the core institutions of the party-state remained intact, new routines and practices formed around the edges of the political system, an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

informal co-optation process known to Hungarian social scientists as the "dual" or "second" society.[23]

A more formal process of party co-optation also took place, as the MSZMP expanded its recruitment to the growing nonmanual sector. This focus was not only on the clerical and managerial sectors but also on the younger intelligentsia. For many of these young intellectuals, party membership took on a highly charged political edge; exposed to neo-Marxist and antiestablishment views, they arrived with a mission to create a modern socialist order.

Thus, while elsewhere in Eastern Europe a conservative counteroffensive had emerged by the late 1960s, driving intellectuals out of the party and sowing the seeds of later opposition movements, in Hungary reforms and co-optative policies were largely kept in place. Kádár as well as the Soviets knew that since 1956 stability in Hungary had been predicated on a tempered form of one-party rule, whose rollback could spell disaster. In other words, the process of institutionalization—of building linkages to an external, legitimizing environment—involved a system of routines and norms that maintained the sanctity of organizational form, while allowing for alternative activity on the margins of the party-state. Reform and co-optation were not intended to rectify the shortcomings of state socialism, but rather were intended to compensate for it.

This created a contradictory situation for many intellectuals in the MSZMP. On the one hand, it became evident that the current system of socialism had clear limits to reform. On the other hand, the Hungarian party remained at least superficially committed to liberal policies. As opposed to elsewhere in the region, many intellectuals retained their party ties in the hope that change could somehow be effected from within. As a result, this group slowly began to develop as an internal "party opposition [that] did not identify with the Rákosi or the Kádárist model, or the Stalinist or post-Stalinist systems that they had created. 'This is not our system, not our socialism. *We joined the party so that we could transform this model*'" (emphasis added).[24]

The party leadership, in the meantime, while simultaneously co-opting intellectuals, took steps to prevent the ascendancy of an intelligentsia "new class." Recent studies have shown that while in Hungary the party actively courted the intelligentsia, they were directed primarily into state positions, while their ascension into important offices

[23] Elemér Hankiss, *East European Alternatives* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), chap. 3.
[24] László Lengyel, *Micsoda év!* (What a year!) (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1991), 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

within the party itself was effectively prevented; these remained in the hands of a poorly educated, aging leadership.[25] This segregation of red and expert between party and state was a useful way of both pacifying and controlling party intellectuals. At the metropole level of Budapest the party intelligentsia found that membership provided opportunities and privileges, even a limited part in political developments if they stepped carefully. These actors, as a necessary part of socialist legitimacy, were thus incorporated into the ruling structure and brought under control in the process.

Obstacles to Party Power for the Rural Intelligentsia

Yet this segment represented only part of the MSZMP intelligentsia. *Outside of Budapest it was an entirely different story: intellectuals were* far from the center of power and thus of much less concern to the party leadership. Resources were fewer, forcing intellectuals to remain within the party for what little access and connections were to be had. Moreover, whereas the co-optative policies of the metropole served to pacify the intellectual class, rural political power acted as a conservative bastion, overwhelmingly staffed by older hard-liners of proletarian background. Conservative county secretaries insulated the party center against local/sectoral interests and threats by means of a peripheral career track for politically loyal but not necessarily talented party cadres. This position usually represented the limit to which the county party secretaries could rise; they occasionally rotated from county to county but almost never upward.[26] While this method was not uncommon in Eastern Europe, what is notable is that in comparison with other Eastern European states, the demographics of Hungary's regional cadre in the 1980s most closely resembled that of post-1968 Czechoslovakia, where younger party leaders had been purged in the wake of Prague Spring—a reality inconsistent with Hungary's image as being in the vanguard of reform.[27]

These long periods of tenure for party officials in effect encouraged the creation of party fiefdoms, dynastic clans where personal and famil-

[25] Ferenc Gazsó, "Cadre Bureaucracy and the Intelligentsia," *Journal of Communist Studies* 8 (September 1992); see also the formerly classified *Statisztikai adatok a káderállományról* (Statistical data on cadre positions) (Budapest: MSZMP KB Párt- és Tömegszervezetek Osztálya, 1983), esp. 10, 67.

[26] For details on the class origin, age, and tenures of county party secretaries in Hungary, see *Statisztikai adatok* (fn. 25), esp. 48; and András Nyírő, *Segédkönyv a politikai bizottság tanulmányozásához* (Resource guide to the study of the Politburo) (Budapest: Interart, n.d.).

[27] Data derived from Central Intelligence Agency publications on Communist Party cadre demographics in Eastern Europe. See, for example, *Directory of Hungarian Officials* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1987).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ial ties, overlapping membership, and patron-client relationships dominated.[28] This was made even more egregious by the fact that whereas elsewhere in Eastern Europe central authorities commonly used political power to enrich themselves, the Hungarian central party elite was relatively poorly rewarded with benefits, a reflection of Kádár's own personal asceticism.[29] Intellectuals, naturally seen by local party cliques as suspicious, typically found themselves shut out of these patronage systems. Talented yet not a part of the elite of the metropole, these regional "second tier" intellectuals frequently complained about their marginal status "*Isten háta mögött*"—"behind the back of God."[30] Reform policies directed by the metropole in Hungary were thus able to neutralize much of the power of the intelligentsia in the capital but had the unanticipated effect of reinforcing center-periphery friction and encouraging mobilization below. In response to this situation, members of this intellectual second tier used the party to cultivate their own informal networks, largely ignored by central party elites. These "solidary groups," bound by common values and interaction, were critical in that they commonly served as a key building block of partisan organization.[31]

The Emergence of the Reform Circle Movement[32]

By the mid-1980s Hungarian society was in a state of deep crisis indicative of the general stagnation of socialist economies as a whole. The economic "miracle" of the past decades began to disintegrate under the pressure of massive foreign debt and new pressures for change from

[28] András A. Gergely, *Az állampárt varázstalanítása* (The disenchantment of the party-state) (Budapest: TTI, 1992); and László Bogár, "A megye pártszervek szerepe a megyei tanácsi területfejlesztési döntési mechanizmusban" (The role of county party organs in the county council's regional development decision-making mechanism) (Manuscript, TTI collection, Budapest, 1989).

[29] One journalist has provided a clever example in his observation that the further one traveled from the capital and out from under the gaze of "*az Öreg*" (the old man), meaning Kádár, the more audacious were party elites and thus the more sumptuous their food: "Nowhere else could one find a more exceptional kitchen than at the county party committee." László Hovanyecz, "Háborús gyerek" (Children of wartime), *Népszabadság*, May 15, 1993, p. 21.

[30] Zsolt Szoboszlai, "Vázlat a vidéki értelmiségről" (Outline of the rural intelligentsia), *Juss* 2/3 (December 1989–January 1990), 103–12; Pál Bánlaky, "A kisvárosok értelmisége a 'helyi társadalom' közéletében" (The small-town intelligentsia the public life of "local society"), in Tibor Huszár, ed., *A magyar értelmiség a '80-as években* (The Hungarian intelligentsia in the 1980s) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1986).

[31] William Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968), esp. 32–37.

[32] The following discussion of the reform circles is based on an analysis of approximately two hundred unpublished reform circle documents collected by the author, MSZMP archival research, and interviews with reform circle participants and former Politburo members (Imre Pozsgay, Reszö Nyers, and Károly Grósz) in Hungary. Specific interviews or documents will be cited as appropriate. For an expanded analysis of this topic, see Patrick O'Neil, "Revolution from Within: The Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 'Reform Circles' and the Transition from Socialism" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1994).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow. While during this period Kádár had tolerated further political changes within the state, such as in the parliamentary election process, those who called too openly for dramatic organizational change still faced serious repercussions. Even with the final ouster of Kádár and his replacement by Károly Grósz in May 1988, dramatic change seemed unlikely, and opposition forces themselves remained too weak to challenge party authority. "Reform communists" spoke largely of a truncated democratization, a limited sharing of power while maintaining the constitutional "inviolatability of socialism."[33] Even under these circumstances, multiparty elections were not anticipated until 1995. The MSZMP, which had institutionalized a set of limited reforms to balance domestic and Soviet pressure, was incapable of reacting to a changed international environment.

The resulting social tension extended to many party intellectuals, particularly those at the rural level. And it is from this position within the party but on the margins of power that the catalyst for self-organization emerged: the party reform circle. The origins of the reform circles lie in Csongrád county and its capital, Szeged, long dominated by conservative party leaders (as is testified by its nickname of "Pol Pot county"). After decades of hard-line, often corrupt leadership, by 1988 a series of scandals finally undermined the county leadership, leaving them grasping for the means by which their authority could be reasserted. One such idea, a consultative body of local intellectuals to "advise" the leadership, was proposed. Though the body never materialized, several of those involved in the attempt continued to discuss the idea privately.

Local intellectuals began to outline the concept of a political movement within the party, a kind of "reform cell" that could link local party reformers scattered throughout different basic party organizations into one horizontally based group. Not only could such an organization concentrate on the local level, but it could also broaden its objectives and foster similar groupings elsewhere in the country. A grassroots movement or party platform that could link up with reformers at the center of power was envisioned as a final outcome.[34]

By November this loose group sought to enter the public sphere,

[33] Author interview with Károly Grósz, Gödöllö, June 2, 1993; also transcripts of Central Committee meeting, December 15, 1988, Hungarian Ministry of Education MSZMP archival collection 288f 4/248 ő.e.

[34] Author interview with Csongrád county reform circle members, Szeged, February 9, 1993, and Budapest, October 20, 1992, and March 23, 1993; József Lovászi, "Párttagok reformköre Csongrád megyében" (The party members' reform circle in Csongrád county) (Unpublished document, dated March 28, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hoping to raise the ranks of its members within the party. On November 29, 1988, the first declaration of the Csongrád county reform circle appeared in the local press. Titled "Reform Circles in the Party as Well!"—a reference to the rise in political "circles" spreading outside of the party—the declaration opened with a radical call to action:

> In Eastern Europe, the countries of so-called existing socialism are in deep crisis. This crisis can only be fought against with radical and complex reforms; the historic task is to liquidate the structure of the Stalinist model. The economy, politics, various spheres of society—and our own socialist concept as well—we must irreversibly liberate from the captivity of the bureaucratic mechanism! This will simultaneously require the following: 1. A clear strategy for reintegration into the world economy (above all a functioning market and the revival of rejected bourgeois values); 2. Political and ideological reform which will rediscover and support every legitimate value of the socialist movement; 3. The reform of political institutions, such that they will give space to individual and communal autonomy and regard a multiparty system as a natural state.

The quarter-page statement continued with a number of points: It discussed the need for a critical analysis of the past and the role of the party within it. It called for the development of a dialogue with those outside of the party and for reformers within the party to unite against hard-liners seeking to sabotage reforms. And finally it exhorted other party members to join the reform circle and create others so as to build a horizontally based national political movement.[35] A subsequent open meeting of the reform circle on December 2, 1988, attracted some 120 people, and over 65 signed the founding statement.[36]

The timing of the declaration could not have been less propitious. That same day General Secretary Grósz spoke to party activists in Budapest, warning of the rise of "strident, bourgeois restoration-seeking, counter-revolutionary forces" who sought to bring about "anarchy, chaos . . . and a white terror" to Hungary. Struck first by the reactionary tenor of the speech, the members of the Csongrád reform circle were then further alarmed by the general secretary's appearance in Szeged two weeks later at a local party conference, where he targeted the reform circle, branding it as factionalist and divisive.[37]

In response the Csongrád reform circle kept a low profile for some weeks, fearing a conservative counteroffensive. However, their reserva-

[35] "Reformkörök a pártban is!" (There are reform circles in the party as well!"), *Délmagyarország*, November 29, 1988, p. 2.

[36] "Megalakult a párttagok reformköre" (The party members' reform circle has been established), *Csongrád Megye Hírlap*, December 3, 1988, p. 3.

[37] "Grósz Károly beszéde a megyei pártertekezleten" (Károly Grósz's speech at the county party conference), *Csongrád Megye Hírlap*, December 12, 1988, pp. 3–4.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tions were soon overcome by increasing rifts at the top. When in late January 1989 Politburo member and noted reformer Imre Pozsgay attempted to break the political stalemate by declaring that the "counterrevolution" of 1956 had in fact been a "popular uprising" against an oligarchic regime, the Csongrád reform circle publicly backed him against those calling for his ouster. The reform circle statement received national press coverage and called attention to the existence of an alternative counterorganization in the party.[38] This was not lost on other party members elsewhere in Hungary.

The subsequent decision not to expel Pozsgay from the party probably had little to do with the protestations of the Csongrád reform circle. However, their public presence, combined with the implications of Pozsgay's radical act, did begin to mobilize other members of the party intelligentsia. By the middle of March reform circles had appeared in Somogy, Hajdú-Bihar, Bács-Kiskun, Zala, and Békés counties, and by the end of the month they were to be found in Fejér, Tolna, Szolnok, and Győr-Sopron—that is, in over half of the counties in Hungary. Reform circles were particularly strong in Csongrád, Zala, Somogy, and Bács-Kiskun—all southern counties well known for lower levels of heavy industry, underdeveloped infrastructures, and conservative, often corrupt local leaders. While in Budapest party intellectuals remained hesitant and kept within the given parameters for reform, at the periphery the intelligentsia was in open revolt.

Despite the lack of direct connections, the spreading reform circles mirrored one another to an amazing extent, suggesting the same party cohort in each case. None incorporated a formal leadership, as all explicitly eschewed any semblance of hierarchy or vertical organization. Nor was there any registered or delimited membership. Participants themselves were usually thirty-five to forty years old, university graduates who held minor positions in party cells or committees at the workplace.[39]

Reflecting their common socialization, early reform circle declarations focused on similar themes, based on their experiences within the party-state system. Despite 1956, Hungary remained an organizationally Stalinist state. Socialism could only be predicated on true democracy and not vice versa. To that end, the institutional framework for a true multi-

[38] Radio Budapest, January 28, 1989, cited in Alfred Reisch, "HSWP Study Re-Evaluates the 1956 Revolution, Imre Nagy, and Forty Years of Hungarian History," *Radio Free Europe Research* (February 24, 1989), 5.

[39] György Kerényi, "Reform kor-kör-kór-kép" (A portrait of the reform time/circle/malady), *Jelző* 1, no. 6 (1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party democracy must be created, both for Hungary and for the MSZMP. This would include the formation of a horizontally based party reform platform and the convocation of an extraordinary party congress to effect a radical reorganization of the party (the current timetable did not allow for such a congress until after the 1990 parliamentary elections).

As the number of reform circles grew throughout Hungary during the spring of 1989, they began to form connections with one another on a horizontal basis, directly challenging the vertical structure of the party. In April delegates from a number of reform circles met at a party reform conference (where many hoped in vain that Pozsgay would announce the formation of a party platform or a new party itself) and set in motion plans for a meeting of their own. Reform circles frequently issued manifestos on political reform and scathing critiques of the party; these appeared first in local papers and then made their way into the national press. These continuous attacks increased discord within the party, demoralizing leaders as well as the rank and file. Reform circles in many counties and cities also demanded local party conferences, where they sought to oust entrenched bosses.

But in spite of these rapid successes, the transformation of the reform circle movement into an organized party platform was not so easy. There were attempts at linking up with Pozsgay and his supporters, but given the latent hostility of some rural intellectuals toward metropole elites, little was achieved. Rather than surrender their emerging influence to a central political faction, reform circles chose instead to act autonomously. Even as reform circles developed ties to each other, they rejected a unified leadership. As some participants later noted, they viewed themselves as a "reform virus," living off the structure and resources of the party to kill it from within—a clear result of their specific institutional origins. This gave the movement much of its anti-institutional strength, but it also hindered coordination and the formation of a single policy.

This dilemma could be clearly seen in late May at the first reform circle conference, where some 440 delegates were in attendance, representing 110 reform circles and by now over 10,000 participants.[40] Delegates drafted an extensive critique of state socialism and reiterated their demands for multiparty elections, economic reform, and the democratic transformation of the party. Press coverage was extensive, and guest

[40] For details on the conference, see István Tanacs and Éva Terényi, "Békés átmenettel a demokratikus szocializmusba" (With a peaceful transition to democratic socialism), *Népszabadság*, May 22, 1989, pp. 1, 4–5; Judith Pataki, "First National Conference of HSWP Reform Circles," *Radio Free Europe Research* (May 30, 1989).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participants included several members of the Politburo and Central Committee. Despite such visible power, however, the movement was still unable to unify its actions, as the delegates struggled unsuccessfully to draft a common platform statement. Jealous of their own autonomy and overly democratic in nature, no agreement could be reached on a single statement despite hours of debate.

On the Offensive and the Party Center in Retreat

While still chaotic, this public show of strength by the reform circles had a clear effect on the increasingly anxious party leadership. Many members of the Politburo and Central Committee now saw political change as inevitable and began to retreat in the face of reform circle demands, leaving the general secretary with fewer and fewer allies. Simultaneously, opposition forces took advantage of this growing disarray within the party to organize their ranks against the MSZMP. By early summer numerous civil groups formed nascent political parties, pressuring the party into roundtable negotiations and eventually achieving their demand for open parliamentary elections in 1990.

Importantly, this internal disintegration of communist power dramatically changed the incentive for collective action, removing the necessity for the opposition to unify in a broad-based "front" movement, as seen elsewhere in the region. Stable, competitive, and articulated political organizations thus developed much earlier in the Hungarian transition process than elsewhere in the region, where counterhegemonic movements developed to challenge still-formidable regimes.

The influence of the reform circles on the path of transition was most obvious at the Central Committee session on May 29, 1989, where members confronted a number of reform circle demands, in particular the call for an extraordinary party congress prior to parliamentary elections (as opposed to the planned conference, whose authority was much lower). The assembly also heard a confidential report on the reform circle national meeting, which outlined the movement's growing strength.[41] Over Grósz's protestations, the Central Committee retreated, approving the party congress for October, with delegates to be elected as soon as possible. Grósz complained in a subsequent in-

[41] "Tajékoztató az MSZMP Központi Bizottságának az MSZMP reformkörök 1989 május 20-án Szegeden rendezett munkatanácskozásáról" (Information for the MSZMP Central Committee on the MSZMP reform circles' May 20, 1989, work conference in Szeged), MSZMP Central Committee meeting, May 29, 1989, Hungarian Ministry of Education MSZMP archival collection 288f. 4/263 ő.é., 125–29.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terview that the party was unprepared for such a meeting, but had to yield to demands from the party ranks, such as those heard from the reform circles.[42]

By the summer of 1989 the reform circles were no longer engaged in trying to defend reform but were preparing to carry it out. With elections for the party congress under way, reform circles hoped to win the backing of as many delegates as possible, isolating conservatives at the congress and forcing the transformation of the party.[43] In anticipation of this showdown, a second reform circle conference was held in Budapest in early September, but as before attempts to form a united platform failed. Importantly, delegates struggled less over the actual content of a platform statement than over the authority implied by such organization. Created as an anti-institutional response to the old order, delegates could not accept the formalization of the movement and the notion of hierarchy that it contained. In the end, the conference approved an ambiguous "statement of platform reconciliation," covering various policy issues on reform and democratization. Also formed was a coordinating council, charged with the daunting task of building a central strategy to dominate the party congress, now one month away.[44]

As the process of congress delegate nomination and election unfolded, the reform circles fought hard to field candidates and win rank-and-file party support. However, despite victories in many electoral contests, they remained constrained by their minority status within the party. When the process finally came to an end in late September, prospects for the congress remained unclear. On the surface, delegate demographics gave the reform circles some reason for hope. Over 80 percent were under fifty, had some form of higher education, and were classified as either white collar or intelligentsia. Nearly 90 percent had never taken part in a party congress before.[45] In this aspect, at least, they clearly resembled the reform circle cohort. Less clear was how many would commit themselves to the reform circle platform. By one estimate over 40 percent of the same delegates came from the ranks of

[42] See the text of a television interview with Károly Grósz, "'Tagadom, hogy a négy évtized zsákutca volt" (I deny that the last four decades were a dead end), *Magyar Hírlap*, May 31, 1989, 4–5.

[43] "Reformkongresszust! Felhívás az MSZMP tagsághoz" (Reform congress! Call to the MSZMP membership) (Unpublished joint document of six reform circles, June 14, 1989); "A Budapesti Reformkörének állásfoglalása a pártkongresszusról" (The Budapest reform circle statement regarding the party congress), *Népszabadság*, June 12, 1989, p. 7.

[44] György Kerekes and Zsusza Varsádi, eds., *Reformkörök és reform-alapszervezetek budapesti tanácskozása* (The Budapest conference on reform circles and reform cells) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1989]).

[45] See *Kongresszus '89*, no. 23 (October 6, 1989), 1. This was a special party publication disseminated to all delegates from September 1989 until the last day of the congress.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the nomenklatura and party apparatus, particularly those delegated from Budapest.[46] Reform circle estimates concluded that the number of those sympathetic to the reform circle platform made up less than a quarter of the over twelve hundred delegates, and within that group only about one hundred were actually reform circle participants.[47]

The Final Party Congress and the End of the MSZMP

Under these uncertain circumstances the party congress opened on Friday, October 6.[48] Delegates had the option of allying themselves with formal party platforms, including that of the reform circles, now known as the Reform Alliance. This was the first moment of reckoning for the reform circles, and a surprising one at that. Of the eight platforms registered, none compared in size with that of the Reform Alliance, which boasted some 464 delegates. (The next largest group, the neo-Marxist Peoples' Democratic Platform, had sixty-eight.) Not only had the Reform Alliance been able to gather the proreform leadership within its ranks (including Pozsgay, Prime Minister Miklos Németh, and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn), but hundreds more had also flocked to their ranks. The alliance, in other words, dwarfed all the others.[49]

Yet it was still open to question as to how many alliance supporters actually backed the reform circle demands, as opposed to joining in order to be on the presumed winning side. Initially events went the alliance's way, blocking Central Committee voting rights, steering congress proceedings, and having a proposal accepted that would lead to the election of a new party leadership on the basis of competing, winner-take-all platform lists. This last victory was particularly important for the alliance, as a means of winning a decisive victory over party conservatives.

However, the sheer political weight of the alliance began to work against it. Fearing that the alliance was going too far in transforming the party and in forcing political change, many delegates turned to the

[46] László Bihari, "A multát végleg eltörölni" (To finally break with the past), *Kapu* (October 1989), 4–5.

[47] Supplement to invitations for the first meeting of the Reform Alliance congress platform, September 25, 1989.

[48] For details on congress events, see Emil Kimmel, ed., *Kongresszus '89: rövidett, szerkesztett jegyzőkönyv az 1989 október 6–9 között tartott kongresszus anyagából* (Congress '89: Shortened, edited transcripts of the material from October 6–9, 1989, congress) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1990); Judit Benkő, György Kerekes, and János Patkós, *A születés szépséges kínjai, avagy a rendhagyó híradás az MSZMP kongresszusról 1989 Október 6–9* (The beautiful agony of birth, or irregular information concerning the October 6–9, 1989, MSZMP congress) (Budapest: Kossuth, n.d. [1990]).

[49] Benkő, Kerekes, and Patkós (fn. 48), 20.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peoples' Democratic Platform, whose left-wing, "third-road" ideology seemed an acceptable counterweight to the radical demands of the alliance.[50] During the course of October 7 the Peoples' Democratic Platform nearly doubled in size, with over 40 percent of the new affiliates from Budapest.[51]

As the balance of power shifted, reform circle delegates grew anxious that the majority of delegates (including many in the alliance) would oppose their radical demands. Platform negotiations, primarily between the alliance and the Peoples' Democratic Platform, argued over the future of the party. Despite fears on both sides that too much would be given up in a compromise, the only other option seemed an open party split—a dangerous prospect given the uncertain state of political transition. After a full day of negotiations, a basic agreement on the nature of the new party was agreed to and put to a vote. By a large majority, with only 159 opposed and 39 abstaining, the congress manifesto was approved on October 8, and a new party, Magyar Szocialista Párt—the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)—was finally established.

Had the victory sought by the reform circles been achieved? Initially, it had been imagined that the alliance would be able to instigate a clear showdown in the party, winning over the delegates, dissolving the MSZMP, and hiving off party conservatives. Now most congress delegates claimed to support reform, though not in the manner the reform circles had envisioned. Compromise, a pseudoreform to reengineer power, seemed in the offing.

Lacking a set of clear strategies and a formal leadership and having a large number of questionable supporters, the alliance quickly lost the initiative. Having emerged as an anti-institutional reaction, they lacked the organizational tools necessary to compete in an open political forum. The issue of the party leadership now became uncertain as well, as the mechanism of election by closed lists raised the fear that in fact an alliance ticket would lose. Platform representatives began to discuss a single, compromise list to preserve party unity but were soon at loggerheads. The party wavered on the brink of a split. But to what end? If alliance members were to withdraw from the congress and found their own party, whose support could they count on? How many of the del-

[50] Rudolph Tőkés, "Beyond the Party Congress: Hungary's Hazy Future," *New Leader*, October 30, 1989, p. 6.

[51] Calculated by the author. Nearly half of the delegates for the Peoples' Democratic Platform were from Budapest, as opposed to less than a quarter for the Reform Alliance; László Vass, "A Magyar Szocialista Párt," in László Bihari, ed., *A többpártrendszer kialakulása magyarországon* (The formation of multiparty democracy in Hungary) (Budapest: Kossuth, 1992), 149.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

egates, even within the platform, would follow? And would this not leave the party in the hands of conservatives and moderates whose commitment to democratization was questionable?

These doubts forced the alliance into a final compromise, a single electoral list for the new party leadership, whose composition conservatives and reformers alike could accept. This back-door manner of leadership selection was denounced by a number of delegates, but to little effect. Having earlier accepted a closed-list format for elections, with now only one list being forwarded, the delegates had in effect surrendered most of their power, reduced to rubber-stamping the list assembled by a handful of platform representatives.[52] On October 9 the new socialist party elected its leadership, with the older centrist politician Rezső Nyers made party president.

The MSZMP had been transformed; a new, avowedly democratic party stood in its place. Yet few were happy with either the results or the method by which they came about. Among reform circle delegates in particular, many felt that too much effort had been spent on dismantling the old party, and too little attention paid to what would be constructed in its place.[53] Yet the change had been made: the old order had been overthrown. With their objective more or less achieved, the reform circles lost their motivating force, and their ranks soon dissolved.

With this incomplete transformation the stage was set for open elections in 1990, and for many the renouncement of one-party rule seemed to bode well for the MSZP. Nyers expressed confidence that the MSZP expected to lose only half of the MSZMP membership, leaving them with a base of nearly four hundred thousand or more, well beyond the membership of all the other parties combined.[54] Upcoming direct presidential elections, scheduled for November, also seemed certain to bring a victory for Pozsgay, who remained one of the most popular and well-known politicians in the nation. His victory would help the party in its bid for political power.

Soon enough, however, the shortcomings of the party's transformation became apparent. As it became clear to former MSZMP members that membership no longer guaranteed economic security, few found that they had any real socialist (or even political) inclinations. By No-

[52] László Kéri and Mária Zita Petschnig, "Ez a név lesz a végső" (This name shall be your last), pt. 2, *Elsö kézből* (October 16, 1989), 9–10.

[53] Erzsébet Sulyok, "Antipolitikus sorok, reformkörben" (Antipolitical ranks in the reform circles), *Szegedi Egyetem*, October 16, 1989, p. 1.

[54] Rezső Nyers, "Az MSZP várja tagjait az MSZMP-ből és azon kívülről is" (The MSZP expects members from both inside and outside the MSZMP), *Népszabadság*, October 14, 1989, p. 14.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vember only fifteen thousand of the more than seven hundred thousand former MSZMP members had joined the MSZP, many from the old apparatus.[55] Moreover, with the old party monolith now clearly gone, opposition forces were free to mobilize fully against the socialist system and quickly developed strong organizations that could check the feeble attempts of the MSZP to hold on to power.

The campaign battle now turned on anticommunism, a litmus test that the MSZP clearly could not pass. Hopes for a presidential victory were similarly dashed when an opposition referendum managed to block the direct election of the presidency, something made much easier by the enervation of the socialists. Having given up the one major appeal of the MSZMP—to hold the status quo—the MSZP became much like any other party, making promises about an unknown future.

The first open multiparty elections for parliament were held in March and April 1990, based on a combination of single-member districts and county and national lists.[56] Far from its original predictions, the MSZP took fourth place in the elections, netting some half million votes (about 11 percent of the total) and 33 out of 386 total seats. A coalition of conservative parties formed the first postcommunist cabinet, while the MSZP and liberal parties went into opposition. The era of socialist rule was officially over.

A Political Resurrection

The disastrous results of the 1990 election proved to be a blessing in disguise. First, many MSZMP cadres who had clung to the new MSZP deserted the party once elections made it clear that the old spoils system had truly come to an end. Second, election results gave weight to the arguments of MSZP reformers that the party had in fact failed to change radically enough; within the year the party leadership underwent a purge of more conservative elements. Nyers stepped down, replaced by former Foreign Minister Horn.

In parliament, while antagonism between coalition and opposition parties intensified, the MSZP took advantage of its outcast position, taking moderate positions and ironically calling attention to its political

[55] Zoltan D. Barany, "The Hungarian Socialist Party: A Case of Political Miscalculation," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (December 22, 1989), pp. 1–2.

[56] For detailed information on the outcome of the elections, see György Szoboszlai, ed., *Parlamenti választások 1990* (Parliamentary elections 1990) (Budapest: MTA Társadalomtudományi Intézet, 1990); an analysis of the Hungarian electoral system can be found in John R. Hibbing and Samuel Patterson, "A Democratic Legislature in the Making: The Historic Hungarian Elections of 1990," *Comparative Political Studies* 24 (January 1992).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

experience and expertise in contrast to the other political parties.[57] These tactics paid off far better than anyone expected. As the popularity of the coalition government deteriorated in 1992 and 1993, hurt by its inconsistent economic policies and authoritarian leanings, public support began to shift toward the MSZP. A population increasingly weary of the costs of economic transition found the party's social market ideology—its image of political and technocratic expertise—more attractive than the liberal opposition's promise of more radical reform.

As a consequence the May 1994 parliamentary elections led to an overwhelming victory for the MSZP, a victory that no one would have predicted just one year before. The MSZP won 149 seats in single-member districts (as opposed to 1 in 1990) and another 60 on national and territorial lists, for a total of over 54 percent of the seats in parliament. A subsequent coalition, formed with the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats, gave the government a two-thirds majority in parliament.[58] In this success, a great debt is owed to the reform circles. As one reform circle founder concluded in 1990, the reform circles were in fact victorious in their defeat. Although unable to realize their objectives as swiftly or conclusively as they had hoped, in the end they were instrumental in bringing about the destruction of the old order so that a democratic system and a modern socialist party could be built in its place.[59]

Conclusions and Comparisons

Selznick and other scholars have argued that institutionalization, the process by which organizations link themselves to the external environment as a means of stability, has the effect of binding the organization to certain routines that inform collective action and influence the path of organizational success or failure. There are two different issues at work here: first, the process of institutionalization itself (a question of degree) and second, the comparative forms of institutionalization depending on the specific case (a question of kind). Overall, extreme institutionalization tends to cause political ossification, as we can see across Eastern Europe, but the particular routines, norms, and structures involved in the institutionalization process are critical in under-

[57] Barnabas Racz, "The Socialist-Left Opposition in Post-Communist Hungary," *Europe-Asia Studies* 45, no. 4 (1993), 660–63.

[58] For details, see Judith Pataki, "Hungary's New Parliament Inaugurated," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (July 22, 1994), 7–11.

[59] József Géczi, "Jöttünk, láttunk, buktunk . . . bukva győztünk?" (We came, we saw, we failed . . . in failure were we victorious?), *Népszabadság*, June 23, 1990, p. 17.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

standing the construct of institutional power and the trajectory of its failure. Indeed, it can be asserted that transition modalities, such as those outlined by Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl—imposition (coercive, elite dominant), pact (negotiated, elite dominant), reform (negotiated, mass ascendant), and revolution (coercive, mass ascendant)—can be much better understood if we trace their forms back to the particular institutional order from which they emerged.[60]

In the Hungarian case the process of linking the party to an external legitimizing environment took the form of social pacification, predicated on a reformist ideology and the co-optation of intellectuals. When this policy was stifled by economic decay, the party lacked the means to respond, having staked its legitimacy on these routines and unable to formulate new alternatives. Yet co-optation inadvertently provided the means by which anti-institutional elements could attack the party from within, weakening the MSZMP and creating greater space for political opposition to form.

As mentioned earlier, the incremental process of transition in Hungary meant that no mass movement along the lines of Solidarity in Poland, Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, the Union of Democratic Forces in Bulgaria, or the Romanian National Salvation Front ever arose to challenge state socialism. Rather, the prolonged erosion of the party encouraged the rise of smaller, more articulated political organizations. This dispersal of political power also meant that no side was able to dominate the transition process or elections as clearly as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Power continued to shift during negotiations between and within regime and opposition as the MSZMP disintegrated and the new political organizations jockeyed for power. Political outcomes that thus emerged came about less through institutional "crafting," which supposes political authority, than by default, influenced by changes in the negotiating context.

This points to a second area of research, investigating the connection between institutions, transitions, and political reconstruction. Beyond the transition moment, the patterns of reinstitutionalization that follow will be influenced by the legacies of the previous order and its failure.[61] Taking again the example of party formation, in Hungary the slow decay of power that produced more cohesive political parties subsequently limited the degree of party fragmentation in parliament, in

[60] Schmitter and Karl (fn. 16), 59–61.

[61] This last point is made most clearly by László Bruszt and David Stark, "Remaking the Political Field in Hungary: From the Politics of Confrontation to the Politics of Competition," *Journal of International Affairs* 45 (Summer 1991), esp. 19 fn. 11.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contrast to the eventual disintegration of mass-based parties that swept into power elsewhere. Hungary thus exhibited a much higher level of parliamentary stability after 1989: the first democratic coalition government held power for its entire term, an occurrence unprecedented for the region. The second set of national elections in 1994 also returned the same six parties to parliament, indicating that the political spectrum has institutionalized rather early in the transition process.

In a second example the inability of any one side to dominate the Hungarian transition meant that attempts to create a powerful, directly elected presidency were blocked, as opposed to other cases in the region (Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria in particular), where strong presidencies emerged as the expression of political actors seeking to institutionalize their own power within the state. Instead, Hungary has a president with more limited, but ambiguous, political powers, enough to vex the government at times. This ambiguity stands as a legacy of the MSZMP's strategy in early 1989 to build a strong presidency for itself, an attempt that was undermined by the revolt of the reform circles.[62] Organizational patterns that now influence the process of political reconstruction are thus informed by the institutional matrix that gave rise to them.

Yet institutions alone will not dictate the form of political transition. Chance, individuals, and unforeseen domestic or international developments can have a tremendous impact, one that overrides institutional forces and turns history in a radically different direction. Keeping these points in mind, an institutional approach can complement our current understanding of the impact of micro- and macrolevel forces. By forming a more theoretical base without sacrificing the unique aspects of the circumstances under consideration, we can allow for the broader forces of theory to merge with the more inexplicable aspects of time and place.

[62] Patrick O'Neil, "Presidential Power in Post-Communist Europe: The Hungarian Case in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Communist Studies* 9 (September 1993).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDEX TO VOLUME 48

apartheid, *see* Marx

Baldwin, David A., Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, I:117
Baylis, Thomas A., Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, III:297
black mobilization, and the end of apartheid and Jim Crow, *see* Marx
Brazil, racial discrimination in, *see* Marx
Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective, The, by Steven L. Solnick, II:209
Britain, the welfare state in, *see* Pierson
Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe, by Paulette Kurzer, reviewed by Cohen, II:268

China, economic success in, *see* Montinola, Qian, and Weingast; collapse of political, industrial, and state fiscal hierarchies in, *see* Solnick; economic reforms and sustaining rapid growth in, *see* Yang
China-U.S. relations, rational behavior and the evolution of, *see* Langlois and Langlois; liberal and conservative attitudes in, *see* Nathan and Shi
Chipping Away at the State: Workers' Resistance and the Demise of East Germany, by Jeffrey Kopstein, III:391
Chu, Yun-han, Tse-min Lin, and Melvin J. Hinich, Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis, IV:453
Cohen, Benjamin J., Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, II:268
communism, East German workers under, *see* Kopstein
comparative politics, the role of theory in, *see* Kohli et al.
comparative state-building theory, *see* Easter
Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis, by Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, IV:453
Crawford, Beverly, Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia, IV:482

decentralization in China, institutionalized, *see* Montinola, Qian, and Weingast
democratic transition, in Taiwan, *see* Lin, Chu, and Hinich
Deng Xiaoping, *see* Nathan and Shi
distribution of power, the relation between stability and, *see* Powell
Domestic Choices, International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets, by Andrew C. Sobel, reviewed by Cohen, II:268

East Central Europe, executive authority in, *see* Baylis
East Germany, workers' resistance in, *see* Kopstein
Easter, Gerald M., Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined, IV:551
economic reforms, in China, see Yang
elite interaction, in Eastern Europe, *see* O'Neil
End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications, The, ed. Michael J. Hogan, reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
European Union, tax rates on capital and mobile labor in, *see* Hallerberg
Evans, Peter, Atul Kohli, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1
expansion, of the welfare state, *see* Pierson
Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia, by Beverly Crawford, IV:482

Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, by Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, I:50
financial globalization, the causes and the consequences of, *see* Cohen
free market reforms in Latin America, *see* Roberts
Fujimori, Alberto, *see* Roberts

Gaddis, John Lewis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
General Survey of Social Change, *see* Lin, Chu, and Hinich
German unification, *see* Hallerberg
Germany, the welfare state in, *see* Pierson; recognition of Croatia by, *see* Crawford
Godson, Roy, Richard Shultz, and Ted Greenwood, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Goodman, John B., *Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Bamking in Western Europe,* reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Governing China's Transition to the Market: Institutional Incentives, Politicians' Choices, and Unintended Outcomes, by Dali L. Yang, III:424
Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State, by Ethan B. Kapstein, reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Graham, Allison, and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
Greenwood, Ted, Richard Shultz, and Roy Godson, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993, by Barry Naughton, reviewed by Yang, III:424

Hallerberg, Mark, Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union, III:324
Helleiner, Eric, *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s,* reviewed by Cohen, II:268
hierarchy, an agency model of, *see* Solnick
Hinich, Melvin J., Tse-min Lin, and Yun-han Chu, Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis, IV:453
Hogan, Michael J., ed., *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP), *see* O'Neil
Hungary, reform socialism in, *see* O'Neil

international relations, security studies as a subfield of, *see* Baldwin; rationality in, *see* Langlois and Langlois

Jim Crow, *see* Marx

Kapstein, Ethan B., *Governing the Global Economy: International Finance and the State,* reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Katzenstein, Peter J., Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1
Kohli, Atul, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1
Kopstein, Jeffrey, Chipping Away at the State: Workers' Resistance and the Demise of East Germany, III:391
Kurzer, Paulette, *Business and Banking: Political Change and Economic Integration in Western Europe,* reviewed by Cohen, II:268

Langlois, Catherine C., and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case, III:358
Latin America, populism in, *see* Roberts
Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China, by Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjian Shi, IV:522
Lin Tse-min, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis, IV:453

Marx, Anthony W., Race-Making and the Nation-State, II:180
Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe, by John B. Goodman, reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, I:50
moral economy model, of social action, *see* Kopstein
MSZMP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), *see* O'Neil
multilateralism, in foreign policy, *see* Crawford

Nathan, Andrew J., and Tianjian Shi, Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China, IV:522
national security, the concept of, *see* Baldwin
nation-state, building of, *see* Marx
Naughton, Barry, *Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978–1993,* reviewed by Yang, III:424
Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case, by Kenneth M. Roberts, I:82
New Politics of the Welfare State, The, by Paul Pierson, II:143

O'Neil, Patrick H., Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary, IV:579

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

parliamentarism, in East Central Europe, *see* Baylis
Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined, by Gerald M. Easter, IV:551
Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance, by Benjamin J. Cohen, II:268
Pierson, Paul, The New Politics of the Welfare State, II:143
Political Logic of Economic Reform in China, The, by Susan Shirk, reviewed by Yang, III:424
populism, in Latin America, *see* Roberts
Powell, Robert, Stability and the Distribution of Power, II:239
presidentialism, in East Central Europe, *see* Baylis
Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe, by Thomas A. Baylis, III:297
Przeworski, Adam, Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1

Qian, Yingyi, Gabriella Montinola, and Barry Weingast, Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, I:50

Race-Making and the Nation-State, by Anthony W. Marx, II:180
rational behavior, and the evolution of China-U.S. relations, *see* Langlois and Langlois
rational choice model, of social action, *see* Kopstein
Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case, by Catherine C. Langlois and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois, III:358
reform circles, in Hungary, *see* O'Neil
Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, ed. Allison Graham and Gregory F. Treverton, reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
retrenchment, of the welfare state, *see* Pierson
Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary, by Patrick H. O'Neil, IV:579
Roberts, Kenneth M., Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case, I:82
Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, The, by Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, I:1
Rudolph, Susanne Hoeber, Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, James C. Scott, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1

Scott, James C., Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, and Theda Skocpol, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1
Security Studies and the End of the Cold War, by David A. Baldwin, I:117
Security Studies for the 1990s, ed. Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
Shi, Tianjian, and Andrew J. Nathan, Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China, IV:522
Shirk, Susan, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China,* reviewed by Yang, III:424
Shultz, Richard, Roy Godson, and Ted Greenwood, eds., *Security Studies for the 1990s,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117
Skocpol, Theda, Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, and James C. Scott, The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium, I:1
Sobel, Andrew C., *Domestic Choices, International Markets: Dismantling National Barriers and Liberalizing Securities Markets,* reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Solnick, Steven L., The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective, II:209
South Africa, racial discrimination in, *see* Marx
Soviet Russia, state building in, *see* Easter
Soviet Union, collapse of political, industrial, and state fiscal hierarchies in, *see* Solnick
Stability and the Distribution of Power, by Robert Powell, II:239
state building, in Soviet Russia, *see* Easter
States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s, by Eric Helleiner, reviewed by Cohen, II:268
Sweden, the welfare state in, *see* Pierson

Taiwan, conflict displacement and democratic transition in, *see* Lin, Chu, and Hinich
Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union, by Mark Hallerberg, III: 324

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tax rates, on capital and mobile labor, in the European Union, *see* Hallerberg
Treverton, Gregory F., and Allison Graham, eds., *Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order,* reviewed by Baldwin, I:117

United States, the welfare state in, *see* Pierson; racial discrimination in, *see* Marx
United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations, The, by John Lewis Gaddis, reviewed by Baldwin, I:117

Weingast, Barry, Gabriella Montinola, and Yingyi Qian, Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China, I:50
welfare state, expansion and retrenchment of the, *see* Pierson
Wilhelmine Germany, tax competition in, *see* Hallerberg
working-class behavior, in East Germany, *see* Kopstein

Yang, Dali L., Governing China's Transition to the Market: Institutional Incentives, Politicians' Choices, and Unintended Outcomes, III:424

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

Volume 48

October 1995–July 1996

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UNDER THE EDITORIAL SPONSORSHIP OF
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
PUBLISHED BY THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS

EDITORIAL BOARD
John Waterbury, *Chair*
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Benjamin J. Cohen, Matthew Evangelista, Judith Goldstein, Stephan Haggard, Peter A. Hall, James R. Hines Jr., Miles Kahler, Jack Levy, James D. Morrow, Elizabeth Perry, Jonas Pontusson, Henry Shue, Vivienne Shue, Jack Snyder, Robert C. Tucker

Editors: Nancy Bermeo, Richard D. Challener, George W. Downs, Michael W. Doyle, Richard Falk, Aaron L. Friedberg (*Review Articles*), Robert G. Gilpin, Joanne Gowa, Jeffrey Herbst, Atul Kohli, John Waterbury

Associate Editors: Jeremy Adelman, Kent E. Calder, Harold A. Feiveson, Marc A. Levy, John B. Londregan, Kathleen R. McNamara, Pei Minxin, Gilbert Rozman, Anna Seleny, Paul E. Sigmund, Robert L. Tignor, Lynn T. White III, William C. Wohlforth
Executive Editor: Ilene P. Cohen; *Assistant Editor:* Susan Bindig
Secretary: Patricia D. Zimmer

The editors invite submission of articles (up to 10,000 words, including footnotes) bearing upon problems in international relations and comparative politics. Manuscripts and footnotes should be double-spaced throughout and submitted in triplicate, together with an abstract. Footnotes should be placed at the end of the manuscript. Address: WORLD POLITICS, Bendheim Hall, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544.

Authors may expect to be notified of the editors' decision within four months. Procedures for reviewing manuscripts are based on the anonymity of the author and the confidentiality of readers' and editors' reports. Editorial policy does not provide for transmitting readers' evaluations to authors of rejected manuscripts. Exceptions may be made if, in the opinion of the editors, such comments contain substantive suggestions. WORLD POLITICS does not accept manuscripts that have already been published, are scheduled for publication elsewhere, or have been simultaneously submitted to another journal. Statements of fact and opinion appearing in the journal are made on the responsibility of the authors alone and do not imply the endorsement of the editors or publisher. The journal does not publish communications to the editor or rejoinders to specific articles. Scholars who believe they have been challenged are encouraged to submit an article that will advance the scholarly debate.

Reprint permission: Permissions Department, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Subscriptions: WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Phone: (410) 516-6987; FAX: (410) 516-6968; toll-free (800) 548-1784. Individuals: $25 per year; institutions: $56 per year. Single copies: individuals, $8.00; institutions, $15.00. For postage and handling in Canada and Mexico, add $3.80 per year; outside of North America, $9.00.

Back Issues: WORLD POLITICS is available in microfilm or xerographic copies from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Two years after publication, complete volumes are available in microfiche form from KTO Microform, Route 100, Millwood, NY 10546. Individual issues in the current and two preceding volumes may be ordered from The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

Advertising: Journals Advertising Coordinator, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319.

WORLD POLITICS is indexed by *ABC POL SCI, Book Review Index, Combined Retrospective Index Sets (CRIS), Combined Retrospective Index to Book Reviews in Scholarly Journals, 1886–1974 (RSJ), PAIS Bulletin Social Science Index,* and *Periodica Islamica;* it is abstracted and indexed in *United States Political Science Documents, International Bibliography of Periodical Literature (IBZ), International Bibliography of Book Reviews (IBR),* and *Current Military and Political Literature.* Abstracts of articles also appear in *Book Review Digest, Historical Abstracts, International Development Abstracts, International Political Science Abstracts, Political Science Abstracts,* and *Social Sciences Abstracts.*

Copyright © 1995, 1996 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

WORLD POLITICS (ISSN 0043-8871). Published quarterly by The Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 48, October 1995–July 1996. Second class postage paid at Balitmore, MD, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to WORLD POLITICS, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Journals Publishing Division, 2715 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218-4319. Printed in the United States of America by Princeton Academic Press.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTENTS

No. 1—October 1995

The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium	*Atul Kohli, Peter Evans, Peter J. Katzenstein, Adam Przeworski, Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, James C. Scott,* and *Theda Skocpol*	1
Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China	*Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian,* and *Barry R. Weingast*	50
Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: The Peruvian Case	*Kenneth M. Roberts*	82
Review Article		
Security Studies and the End of the Cold War	*David A. Baldwin*	117

No. 2—January 1996

The New Politics of the Welfare State	*Paul Pierson*	143
Race-Making and the Nation-State	*Anthony W. Marx*	180
The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China: A Neoinstitutional Perspective	*Steven L. Solnick*	209
Stability and the Distribution of Power	*Robert Powell*	239
Review Article		
Phoenix Risen: The Resurrection of Global Finance	*Benjamin J. Cohen*	268

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NO. 3—APRIL 1996

Presidents versus Prime Ministers: Shaping Executive Authority in Eastern Europe — *Thomas A. Baylis* — 297

Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union — *Mark Hallerberg* — 324

Rationality in International Relations: A Game-Theoretic and Empirical Study of the U.S.-China Case — *Catherine C. Langlois* and *Jean-Pierre P. Langlois* — 358

Chipping Away at the State: Workers' Resistance and the Demise of East Germany — *Jeffrey Kopstein* — 391

REVIEW ARTICLE

Governing China's Transition to the Market: Institutional Incentives, Politicians' Choices, and Unintended Outcomes — *Dali L. Yang* — 424

NO. 4—JULY 1996

Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis — *Tse-min Lin*, *Yun-han Chu*, and *Melvin J. Hinich* — 453

Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia — *Beverly Crawford* — 482

Left and Right with Chinese Characteristics: Issues and Alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China — *Andrew J. Nathan* and *Tianjian Shi* — 522

Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined — *Gerald M. Easter* — 551

Revolution from Within: Institutional Analysis, Transitions from Authoritarianism, and the Case of Hungary — *Patrick H. O'Neil* — 579

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



WORLD POLITICS

Inaugurates Its Own Home Page

The *World Politics* home page contains tables of contents and abstracts of articles published in recent issues. In addition, it contains a form-based method that will allow visitors to comment on articles. Subsequent visitors will be able to read these comments and respond accordingly. In this way, the editors hope to promote discussion and debate about critical issues in international relations and comparative politics.

Visit the *World Politics* home page at
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/World_Politics

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comparative Politics

Editor-in-Chief: **Dankwart A. Rustow**
(City University of New York)

Comparative Politics is an international journal containing articles devoted to comparative analysis of political institutions and behavior. Articles range from political patterns of emerging nations to contrasts in the structure of established societies. **Comparative Politics** communicates new ideas and research findings to social scientists, scholars, and students. The journal is indispensable to experts in research organizations, foundations, consulates, and embassies throughout the world.

1996 Issues to Include:

Henry Bienen and Jeffrey Herbst, "The Relationship between Political and Economic Reform in Africa" . . . *John T. S. Keeler*, "Agricultural Power in the European Community: Explaining the Fate of CAP and GATT Negotiations" . . . *Dennis McNamara*, "Corporatism and Cooperation among Japanese Labor" . . . *Ian Brodie*, "The Market for Political Status" . . . *Patricia L. Hipsher*, "Democratization and the Decline of Urban Social Movements in Chile and Spain" . . . *Donald C. Williams*, "Reconsidering State and Society in Africa: The Institutional Dimension in Land Reform Policies" . . . *Torben Iversen*, "Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective"

Published quarterly.
Subscripton rates: Individuals $30/1 yr., $55/2 yrs., $77/3 yrs.; Institutions $55/1 yr., $101/2 yrs., $140/3 yrs.; Students $12/1 yr.; Outside the U.S.A. add $8.50/1 yr., $17/2 yrs., $25.50/3 yrs., Airmail add $23/yr.; Single copies $9/individuals, $15 institutions.
ISSN 0010-4159.

Comparative Politics
Subscription Fulfillment Office
49 Sheridan Avenue
P.O. Box 1413
Albany, NY 12201-1413

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United Nations Publications



The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996

The response of the United Nations and its Member States to the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq highlighted the extraordinary strengths of the Organization and its capacity to act decisively, when consensus exists, as a force for international peace and security. *The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict, 1990-1996* is a comprehensive account of the Organization's multifaceted efforts to reverse Iraq's aggression, to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, to promote – through innovative mechanisms and a sustained involvement – long-term peace and stability in the region and to deal with a complex humanitarian emergency.

The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume IX

E.96.I.3 92-1-100596-5 846 pp. $49.95

Chemical Weapons Convention with Selective Index

This complete text of the Chemical Weapons Convention presents the reader with the facts and details on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and also on their destruction. The selective index provides the main elements, key words and phrases of the Convention.

E.95.IX.2 92-1-142213-2 207 pp. $35.00

Arms and Technology Transfers: Security and Economic Considerations Among Importing and Exporting States

Technology and armament transfers create a major problem for peace and international security. This publication analyzes the current trends and issues in the proliferation of weapons and the technology of war. The contribution of the experts also include the examination of the political and military factors associated with this proliferation and the economic and security implications.

E.GV.95.0.10 92-1-9045-103-3 287 pp. $38.00

United Nations Publications
Sales and Marketing Section, Room DC2-0853, Dept. A022, New York, N.Y. 10017
Tel. (800) 253-9646, (212) 963-8302; Fax. (212) 963-3489
E-Mail: publications@un.org Internet: http://www.un.org
Visa, MC and AMEX accepted. Please add 5% of gross ($5.00 minimum) for shipping and handling.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation

SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE

Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan

"This is an important volume by two major scholars on a central topic—one of broad interest to people in comparative politics, to those interested in democracy, and to regional specialists on Southern Latin America and on Central and Eastern Europe. The book will unquestionably be a major contribution to the literature on constructing democratic governance."—Abraham F. Lowenthal, University of Southern California

$18.95 paperback

Class and Conservative Parties

ARGENTINA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Edward Gibson

"This is a first-rate book. It makes a number of contributions to the study of Argentine politics and to comparative work on Latin America. It offers fresh historical perspective on the failure of democracy to take root in Argentina, and provides important new material on the challenges faced by conservative politicians in aggregating diverse sectors of their 'core constituency' while reorienting their political activity toward electoral politics."—Robert Kaufman, Rutgers University

$48.50 hardcover

Democratizing Mexico

PUBLIC OPINION AND ELECTORAL CHOICES

Jorge I. Domínguez and James A. McCann

"*Democratizing Mexico* makes a very important contribution to the study of public opinion and elections in Mexico. No other analysis of parties and elections makes such effective use of national opinion polls. It is a fine addition to the growing literature on electoral participation in Latin America."—Kevin Middlebrook, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego

$45.00 hardcover



Beyond Sovereignty

COLLECTIVELY DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS

edited by Tom Farer

How can external actors—governments, regional organizations, the United Nations, financial institutions, non-governmental organizations—affect the process of democratic transition and consolidation? Leading scholars and policy experts examine the experiences of a variety of Latin American nations.

An Inter-American Dialogue Book

$19.95 paperback

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Hampden Station, Baltimore, Maryland 21211 • To order, call 1-800-537-5487.

Visit our web site at http://jhupress.jhu.edu/home.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

at

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

The Georgetown University National Security Studies Program is a multidisciplinary course of study designed to meet the educational needs of persons who are professionally involved in national defense, or who would like to pursue a career in that field. The Program, which is part of the University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, provides a rigorous and balanced curriculum of advanced courses taught by recognized experts, including:

- Persian Gulf Security (Anthony Cordesman)
- Weapons Proliferation (Janne Nolan)
- International Economic Security (Bradley Billings)
- Defense Decision Making Process (Arnold Punaro)
- Emerging Security Challenges (Kenneth Adelman)
- U.S. Defense Policy (Stephen Gibert)
- Intelligence and National Security (James Bruce)
- Media and the Military (Loren Thompson)
- Congress and National Security (Jeffrey Bergner)
- Economics of National Defense (Robert Howard)
- Low Intersity Conflict (Chris Lamb)

If an M.A. degree in national security studies matches your professional needs and career goals, please call

(202) 687-5679

to receive an application package.

›plication deadline for the fall, 1996 semester is August 1.

Application deadline for the spring, 1997 semester is December 1.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Art of Bargaining

RICHARD NED LEBOW



Richard Ned Lebow draws on his years of experience with the United States government, NATO, and numerous European and American businesses to explain the principles of negotiation—from buying a car to planning business mergers to signing an international treaty. Unlike studies that examine only what is said and done at the negotiation table, *The Art of Bargaining* looks at the context in which negotiation takes place—and shows why some of the most critical decisions about bargaining are made even before the parties sit down to talk.

"This is a sophisticated, powerful book with useful ideas. The examples are entertaining in their own right and bring the book to life. Lebow's close contact with the international examples should intrigue and interest many readers looking for the inside line on well-known international events."
—Peter Carnevale, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

$24.95 hardcover

Coping with Conflict after the Cold War

EDITED BY EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ AND ROGER E. KANET

This volume provides answers to the question of how the international community might cope with armed conflict after the Cold War. It identifies key actors—states and international organizations—that have the resources and (potentially) the will to address the problems of continuing violence and enduring conflicts. The book also evaluates the strategies that might be adopted by these actors, unilaterally or cooperatively, to ease or end such armed struggles. Contributors are Arthur J. Alexander, Mohammed Ayoob, Nicole Ball, Paul F. Diehl, Roger E. Kanet, Samuel S. Kim, Edward A. Kolodziej, Edward J. Laurence, David F. Linowes, Patrick M. Morgan, Jack Snyder, Janice Gross Stein, and I. William Zartman.

Perspectives on Security: Richard Ned Lebow, Consulting Editor

$49.95 hardcover

The Johns Hopkins University Press

Hampden Station, Baltimore, MD 21211 • To order, call 1-800-537-5487.
Visit our web site at http://jhupress.jhu.edu/home.html

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Ben-Gurion's Spy
The Story of the Political Scandal That Shaped Modern Israel
Shabtai Teveth

"Teveth had access to all the secret files which were unavailable in earlier years and he has interviewed at length all of the leading actors. . . . No one has ever had remotely as much access and, on the other hand, sufficient time has now passed as to make a judicious treatment possible. In other words, there could be no better book on the subject."
—Walter Laqueur, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.

296 pages / $29.95, cloth

Friends or Rivals?
The Insider's Account of U.S.-Japan Relations
Michael H. Armacost

"Michael Armacost, who served as U.S. ambassador to Japan during 1989-1993, has written a valuable book, recounting in great detail the events that claimed his attention in Tokyo.... An excellent introduction to the study of an emerging Asia."
—*The Washington Post*

272 pages / 16 photos / $24.95, cloth

Now in paper, with a new Preface

Terrorism and the Media
From the Iran Hostage Crisis to the Oklahoma City Bombing
Brigitte L. Nacos

"This book is a welcome and valuable addition to the literature on terrorism. It fills a gap by providing a uniquely detailed and comprehensive examination of the relationship between terrorism, the media, public opinion, and government decisionmaking in the American context."
—Martha Crenshaw, Wesleyan University

214 pages / $16.50, paper

Now in paper

The Cold War on the Periphery
The United States, India, and Pakistan
Robert J. McMahon

"The author, an American historian who has combed the archives, argues that the U.S. alliance with Pakistan in 1945 was a monumental strategic blunder that increased Indo-Pakistani hostility, undermined regional stability, and led India to seek closer ties with the Soviet Union.... This study is a model of its kind and, whether one accepts the conclusions or not, it sheds a good deal of light on center-periphery relations during the Cold War."
—*Foreign Affairs*

431 pages / $17.50, paper

Pacific Passage
The Study of American-East Asian Relations on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century
Edited by Warren I. Cohen

"An essential volume for general public and scholars alike, ***Pacific Passage*** marks the third decade in which the field of U.S.-East Asian relations has critically examined itself. It makes a major historiographic contribution, opening new areas of study and examining old ones in the light of new research."
—Marilyn B. Young, New York University

352 pages / $18.00, paper / $40.00, cloth

Rescue as Resistance
How Jewish Organizations Fought the Holocaust in France
Lucien Lazare

"An important, well-researched document that must be read and studied by anyone interested in what happened in occupied France."
—Elie Wiesel

352 pages / $32.50, cloth

AT BOOKSTORES.

http://www.columbia.edu/cu/cup
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
FOUNDED 1893

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BLACKWELL JOURNALS

International Social Science Journal

Edited by David Makinson

The International Social Science Journal is international in readership and contributions. It is the only multidisciplinary thematic journal in its field diffusing information and debate to the widest possible audience.

ORDER FORM INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL

Subscription Rates, Volume 48, 1996 ISSN 0020-8701

Institutional Rates, £56.00 (UK-Europe), $116.00 (N. America*), £72.00 (Rest of World)

Personal Rates, £31.00 (UK-Europe), $63.00 (N. America*), £39.00 (Rest of World)

Published in: March, June, September and December *Canadian customers please add 7% GST

❑ Please enter my subscription/send me a sample copy

❑ I enclose a cheque/money order payable to Blackwell Publishers

❑ Please charge my American Express/Diners Club/Mastercard/Visa account

Card Number . . . . . Expiry Date . . . . .

Signature . . . . . Date . . . . .

Name . . . . .

Address . . . . .

. . . . .

. . . . . Postcode . . . . .

Payment must accompany orders

Please return this form to: Journals Marketing, Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

Or to: Journals Marketing, ISSJ, Blackwell Publishers, 238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA.

SEARCH
NEWS & EVENTS
BOOKS
JOURNALS
RESOURCES
SERVICES

Internet

Full details of Blackwell Publishers books and journals are available on the Internet.

To access use a WWW browser such as Netscape or Mosaic, and the following URL:

http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk

BLACKWELL Publishers

APPLY FOR YOUR FREE SAMPLE COPY BY E-MAIL!

jnlsamples@blackwellpublishers.co.uk

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Transforming Agrarian Economies

Opportunities Seized, Opportunities Missed

THOMAS P. TOMICH, PETER KILBY, AND BRUCE F. JOHNSTON

The authors systematically explore the multiple aspects of economic development in the world's 58 poorest countries. "An impressive piece of scholarship and interpretation which is unlikely to be rivalled soon."—DAVID K. LEONARD, University of California, Berkeley. $25.00 paper

Government and Society in Malaysia

HAROLD CROUCH

"Crouch has drawn effectively on his intimate knowledge of the country . . . to develop the controversial thesis that while civil society has expanded with economic development, as predicted by conventional political development theory, authoritarianism has been enhanced by executive ascendance in contemporary Malaysia."—K. S. JOMO, University of Malaya

ASIA EAST BY SOUTH

$42.50 cloth, $16.95 paper

Restrained Trade

Cartels in Japan's Basic Materials Industries

MARK TILTON

"This fine book contributes to debates over the links between politics and economics in Japan. *Restrained Trade* offers much new information and insight into Japan's basic materials industries, and into the interactions among government, market, and industrial groups. The analyses of the specific industries, especially cement and petrochemicals, are well beyond any others I know."—T. J. PEMPEL, University of Washington, Seattle. $29.95

CORNELL STUDIES IN SECURITY AFFAIRS

Cooperation under Fire

Anglo-German Restraint during World War II

JEFFREY W. LEGRO

Legro here offers a new understanding of the dynamics of World War II and the sources of international cooperation. "A careful, systematic investigation that comes up with some fascinating and sometimes quite surprising conclusions. The book is a fine read, well-considered, and a real contribution."—JOHN MUELLER, author of *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War*. $35.00

Reputation and International Politics

JONATHAN MERCER

Mercer examines reputation formation in a series of crises before World War I. He tests competing arguments, one from deterrence theory, the other from social psychology, to see which better predicts and explains how reputations form. He extends his findings to address contemporary crises such as the Gulf War, and considers how culture, gender, and nuclear weapons effect reputation. $35.00

Revolution and War

STEPHEN M. WALT

"The sweep and sustained argumentation of *Revolution and War* are deployed to transform our understanding of realism and the causes of war. Breaking with the usual divide between domestic and international politics, the book's nuanced historical cases marshal evidence for a daring argument about how within-state developments affect the system of states."—IRA KATZNELSON, Columbia University. $35.00

At bookstores, or call (607) 277–2211

Cornell

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Sage House • 512 East State Street • Ithaca NY 14850

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SURVIVAL:
The IISS Quarterly

Published for the IISS
by Oxford University Press

The need for forward-looking analysis is essential during times of rapid political change. *Survival* is a leading voice in the field of strategic studies, featuring original research and innovative assessments of current international problems.

> **"Survival *is the indispensable journal of record and analysis concerning security policy issues.*"** Samuel P. Huntington, *Harvard University*

With NATO troops deploying to Bosnia, the EU preparing its 1996 Inter-governmental Conference and France rejoining NATO bodies, the **Spring 1996** issue of ***Survival*** looks at the challenges and issues facing a partnership in transition. In this special issue, leading academics and practitioners assess European security and transatlantic relations at this crucial turning-point.

Highlights include:

- **Nicole Gnesotto** on Common European Defence and Transatlantic Relations
- **Philip Zelikow** on The Masque of Institutions
- **Robert Grant** on France's New Relationship with NATO
- **Philip H. Gordon** on Recasting the Atlantic Alliance
- **Charles Barry** on Combined Joint Task Forces
- **Review essays** by **Charles Kupchan** and **Gideon Rose**

The Summer 1996 issue of ***Survival*** will include several articles on Far Eastern and Japanese security issues, plus the regular features:

Book Reviews: The latest and important titles reviewed each quarter.
Letters to the Editor: Stimulating debate on articles from previous issues.

1996 ORDER FORM

Please enter my subscription to: **SURVIVAL** ☐ Volume 38 (4 issues) £39/US$62
(Please note: £sterling rates apply in UK/Europe, US$ rates elsewhere, and that customers in the EU and Canada are subject to their local sales tax)

☐ I enclose the correct remittance ☐ Please send me a free sample copy

(Please make checks payable to Oxford University Press)

Name: ..... Address: .....

..... City: .....

County ..... Zipcode: .....

☐ Please charge my Diners / Mastercard / American Express / JCB / Visa Card Number:

☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ ☐☐☐☐ Expiry Date: ☐☐☐☐

For further subscriptions information please contact:
Oxford University Press, Journals Department, 2001 Evans Road, Cary,
NC 27513, USA. Toll-free in the US and Canada: 1-800-852-7323 or 919-677-0977.
Fax: 919-677-1714 • e-mail: jnlorders@oup-usa.org

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pew Working Papers in
Central and Eastern European Reform and Regionalism

Editors: Anna Seleny and Ezra Suleiman

Center of International Studies
Princeton University

Princeton University's Center of International Studies is pleased to announce the publication of the Pew Working Papers in Central and East European Reform and Regionalism. The research and writing of these papers was funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The papers are available for a modest fee to help defray reproduction and mailing costs.

____ 1. Willam M. Branson and Jorge Braga de Macedo, *Macroeconomic Policy in Central Europe*

____ 2. Wolfgang Danspeckgrüber, *Regionalization, Sub-Regionalization and Security in Central and Eastern Europe*

____ 3. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik, *Collective Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993*

____ 4. Harold Hau, *Privatization under Political Interference: Evidence from Eastern Germany*

____ 5. János Kornai, *Eliminating the Shortage Economy: A General Analysis and Examination of the Developments in Hungary*

____ 6. Charles Kupchan, *Regionalizing Europe's Security: The Case for a New Mitteleuropa*

____ 7. Minxin Pei, *Microfoundations of State Socialism, Patterns of Economic Transformation, and Political Realignment in Postcommunist States*

____ 8. Jan Rutkowski, *Becoming Less Equal: Wage Effects of Economic Transition in Poland*

____ 9. Anna Seleny, *Institutional Legacies of Socialist Transformation and Post-Socialist Politics in Hungary and Poland*

____ 10. Ezra Suleiman, *Bureaucracy and Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe*

Please indicate title(s) desired and send $4.00 per title (check only), plus $1.00 each for foreign postage, to:

Center of International Studies
Bendheim Hall
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ 08544-1012
Attn: Ms. Carol Bowers

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PLUS 48 BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHINA JOURNAL

Formerly The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs

ISSUE 35 January 1996

Yunxiang Yan, The Culture of *Guanxi* in a North China Village

Alastair Iain Johnston, Learning Versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s

Scott Rozelle, Stagnation Without Equity: Patterns of Growth and Inequality in China's Rural Economy

. . . . . .

David Bachman, Li Zhisui, Mao Zedong, and Chinese Elite Politics

Anne F. Thurston, The Politics of Survival: Li Zhisui and the Inner Court

Lucian W. Pye, Rethinking the Man in the Leader

Geremie R. Barmé, Private Practice, Public Performance: The Cultural Revelations of Dr Li

. . . . . .

Leo Ou-fan Lee, Visualizing the Tiananmen Student Movement

SPECIAL OFFER TO NEW SUBSCRIBERS
1½ years for the price of a 1-year subscription

'ONE OF THE FEW JOURNALS THAT I READ COVER TO COVER'.

JAMES L. WATSON
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Subscription Rates (two 230-page issues per year—**plus** a free copy of this issue for new subscribers): *Within Australia:* $25 per year, students $20, institutions $30. *Outside Australia:* US$25 per year, students US$20, institutions US$30; or the equivalent in other currencies. New 3-year subscriptions: $60/US$60, institutions $75—plus 2 complimentary copies (this and another issue).

I would like a: ☐ 1-year ☐ 3-year subscription
☐ Enclosed is my cheque (payable to **The China Journal**)
☐ Please charge to my ☐ Bankcard ☐ Mastercard ☐ Visa

Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____

Name _____ Signature _____

Address _____

Payments to: Contemporary China Centre, RSPAS, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Vital Books

MUSLIM POLITICS

Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori

In an attempt to demystify "Muslim politics" for a wide audience, Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori explore how the politics of Islam play out in the daily lives of Muslims throughout the world. The authors probe the diversity of the contemporary Islamic experience, suggesting general trends and challenging popular Western notions of Islam as a monolithic movement. In so doing, they clarify concepts such as tradition, authority, ethnicity, protest, and symbolic space, notions that are crucial to an in-depth understanding of ongoing political events.

Muslim Politics poses questions about ideological politics in a variety of transnational and regional settings throughout the Muslim world.

"This is an impressive, richly documented study. . . . The authors take a refreshingly different approach to their subject by establishing the facts and building their interpretations from the ground up."—L. Carl Brown

Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics: Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori, Editors

Cloth: $39.50 ISBN 0-691-03184-3

New in paperback

MODERN TYRANTS

The Power and Prevalence of Evil in Our Age

Daniel Chirot

Along with its much vaunted progress in scientific and economic realms, the twentieth century has witnessed the rise of the most brutal and oppressive regimes in the history of humankind. Daniel Chirot offers an important and timely study of modern tyrants, both revealing the forces that allow them to come to power and helping us to predict where they may arise in the future.

"Chirot's insightful book looks squarely at radical evil . . . and warns us of the array of new onslaughts against democratic values and governments that are to be expected from various quarters, most often in the name of some collective identity or self-styled expression of community."

— Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Journal of Democracy*

Now in paper: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-02777-3

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

AVAILABLE AT FINE BOOKSTORES OR DIRECTLY FROM THE PUBLISHER: 800-777-4726
WORLD WIDE WEB SITE: HTTP: //AAUP.PUPRESS.PRINCETON.EDU/PUPRESS

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED